Edited by ALEX MORRISON

A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security

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KRISTINA IKAVALKO
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THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

A CONTINUING COMMITMENT:
CANADA AND NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY

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93-01688/

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Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

The National Library of Canada has catalogued this publication as follows:
Main entry under title:: A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security
Proceedings of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Spring Seminar held in Montreal, on April 9, 1992.

ISBN 0-919769-44-6

1. Canada - Defences - Congresses 2. Canada - Defences - Economic aspects - Congresses 3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Congresses.
I. Morrison, Alex, 1941 - II. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Spring Seminar (1992: Montreal, Quebec.).

UA600.C66 1992 971.064'7 C92-094689-5

The holding of the seminar, A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security, and the publication of this volume were made possible in part by the co-sponsorship of l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration Publique (Universite du Quebec) and by the assistance of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Military and Strategic Studies Programme of Universite de Montreal and the Canadian Marconi Company.

This volume printed and bound in Canada by Canadian Printco Limited

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Alex Morrison
Executive Director, CISS

Introduction

It is clear that the end of the cold war is not about to carry the world directly into a condition of peace, security and stability, at least not for many years to come. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the movement towards democracy in its former colonial republics on its own territory and in eastern and central Europe have prompted a rise in ancient nationalist and religious quarrels in the region. It is apparent that the world of the future will be one which demands sustained and significant efforts to prevent regional conflicts from escalating into world wars.

Central to such efforts must be positive and determined cooperative actions between national governments the United Nations. On 17 June 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented a report entitled *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* in response to a request from the 31 January 1992 Summit meeting of the UN Security Council. The report lays out quite clearly the direction in which the Secretary General wishes the United Nations to travel.

The responses of the UN of the future will be more proactive than reactive, reflecting enhanced abilities to detect and forestall conflict at its earliest stages, and to respond quickly and decisively.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali is determined that the United Nations develop early warning information mechanisms to give a timely indication of the areas in which future troubles might develop. The situation in Moldova, which many think has the potential to erupt into large-scale conflict, provides an illustra-

tion. The Secretary-General has dispatched a fact-finding team to the area to gather information which he will use to compile a report for the Security Council. Any further United Nations efforts in Moldova, such as the dispatch of peacekeeping troops, will be better prepared because of this action. The next step towards developing a more advanced early-warning system ought to be the sending of fact-finding teams to areas in which it is suspected that unrest may occur. However, in order for the full potential of this idea to be realized, the Secretary-General requires a freedom of action which he does not currently possess.

In addition to an increased ability in the UN to identify potential sources of conflict before they erupt, Mr. Boutros-Ghali is quite adamant that the Security Council in the future must act quickly and with determination to stop threats to peace and security or acts of aggression. He has outlined a wide array of options which deserve the careful consideration of all UN member states, not just those currently serving on the Security Council.

In parallel with these thoughts and recommendations of the Secretary-General is a growing sentiment among the international community that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states might not be one which should be upheld and respected in all situations. Many hold the view that certain internal situations may threaten life and wellbeing to such a great extent that they merit, indeed demand, concerted action by the international community to restore the *status quo ante*. Prime Minister Mulroney has been at the forefront in calling for a more interventionist approach in international affairs. In September of 1991, during the course of an address to Stanford University in California, he called on the United Nations to adopt such a position. He continued that campaign when he spoke to an International Conference of Young Leaders in Montreal on 24 May 1992, referring to the call by Canada in September of 1991 for United Nations action in Yugoslavia. He indicated that instead of heeding the Canadian bid, "the world has been, at best, dilatory and dangerously indifferent." He added that "The UN and its member states must be prepared to intervene earlier and stronger in the future to prevent such disasters....The UN's capability to intervene on behalf of the innocents is inadequate." In a clear call for the UN to be much more interventionist than it has been in the past, the Prime Minister said "In this era, and more so with every day that passes, the interests of nation states and the imperatives of geopolitics must be subordinated to

the interests and well-being of people." In other words, the international community is justified in taking action in a country even against the wishes of the government of that country when its peoples are not being accorded the treatment that is their right.

The situation in Sarajevo which required the United Nations to take over the airport in order to permit the delivery of humanitarian aid brings to the fore an issue which has been discussed to a greater or lesser degree for the past few years: that is, the use of force to guarantee the delivery of food and medical supplies. In certain countries where people are dying from starvation and disease, governments are blocking the delivery of aid to citizens who are at odds with official policies. The question now arises, if the United Nations is willing to use force in the former Yugoslavia for humanitarian reasons, why not use force to deliver food and medical supplies in other parts of the world?

It now appears that the world of the future will be one in which the United Nations peacekeeping forces, however they are defined and employed, will be increasingly used to establish, protect and maintain security in individual countries. Even as this essay is being written, the United Nations flag has been raised by Major-General Lew MacKenzie and a reinforced Canadian Infantry Battalion is securing the airport in war-torn Sarajevo.

As is the case with the United Nations, so too has NATO been undertaking a reexamination of its role and relevance in the post cold war security environment. One outcome of this process has been an agreement among NATO members to allow the Alliance's troops to take on a peacekeeping role. In the Final Communique from the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, Norway on 4 June 1992, NATO's foreign ministers stated: "We are profoundly disturbed by the violence and destruction which continue in various areas of the Euro-Atlantic region. This is in sharp contrast to the peace and stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic area to which we are committed. We will do our utmost to prevent unbridled nationalism and attempts to resolve disputes by violence from frustrating our efforts to achieve a peaceful and cooperative order in Europe."

* * *

The CISS Spring Seminar, *A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security*, was held at an opportune moment. It encouraged a review of Canadian policy from the perspectives of Ottawa, NATO headquarters, and a number of Central and East European countries.

In his presentation, Ambassador Pop of Romania raised the question as to whether Europe would be able to cope with all the security challenges with which it will be faced in the future. Almost certainly the answer to this question is "no". The European Community realized on the weekend of 27-28 June that it would have to concede its inability to rectify the situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and it handed almost total responsibility over to the United Nations, indicating agreement to the use of force by the UN. It was also made clear that not all European countries would be able to participate in military action and the Community indicated, very sensibly, its preference for the use of peaceful means.

But should peaceful means become exhausted, the UN is now free to use force on European territory - a step it was hesitant to take without European acquiesence. On 28 June President Mitterrand of France visited Sarajevo in an act of solidarity and reassurance with the beleaguered residents there. It was a positive step, and was probably a major factor in persuading the opposing sides to allow the UN to take over the Sarajevo airport. Perhaps the dominant factor however, was the international consensus that was growing in the direction of mounting a concerted, cooperative military operation.

It appears as if the Europe of the future will be much like the Europe of the past - a continent rife with inter- and even intra-national ethnic tension and conflict.

It is also certain that it is the wish of the Canadian government that the Canadian role be maintained at a high level. In order to do so, it will be necessary to halt the regular and rapid decline in the strength of the Canadian Armed Forces. If this does not come about, the day may soon come when Canada will not be able to reply to a request for help from the international community with the words "ready, aye, ready".

George G. Bell Fellowship 1992

The George G. Bell Fellowship in Strategic Studies is awarded annually to a Canadian university student, affording an opportunity to conduct research and analysis in an area of strategic importance to Canada. The work may take the form of an independently researched paper on a specified topic, or it may entail cooperation with CISS staff on a more extensive work.

Upon completion of the project the recipient will be invited to present the results to the members of the selection commmittee at a luncheon meeting in Toronto.

This year the fellowship has been awarded to Gregory Keeling, a Queen's University student enrolled in the Masters of Arts programme in Political Studies.

His proposed area of research is: "*The Examination of the Implications for Canadian Security of the Development of a European Defence Identity.*"

The CISS extends its congratulations to Gregory Keeling, the first recipient of the George G. Bell Fellowship.

Alex Morrison

Opening Remarks

Welcome to the annual spring seminar of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. This year, our topic is *A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security*.

For this seminar, we are extremely fortunate. We have succeeded in attracting speakers of high calibre who will have many interesting and controversial matters to discuss with us. Additionally, our audience is composed of a wide range of interested and knowledgeable individuals who will contribute much to our activities today and in the future.

Our two annual seminars are enjoying an ever-increasing reputation as a focus for objective consideration of strategic issues affecting Canada and Canadians. Published proceedings of our seminars, which include the complete text of the presentations, the public forums and a number of valuable reference documents are being used more and more by those who wish to learn more about the formulation, development and practise of Canadian strategy and strategic thinking in a myriad of areas.

We are particularly happy that we are holding this seminar in Montreal. It has been a number of years since we met outside of Toronto. I would like to think that, in the future, we might be able to hold one seminar per year in a location other than Toronto. The CISS has also embarked on a programme of re-instituting regional seminars, and held a very successful session on Canada and the shipbuilding industry in Saint John, New Brunswick last autumn. We are now exploring the possibility of holding a seminar in Western Canada some time this year.

I draw your attention to the CISS Publications List, in particular to the publication *Divided We Fall: The National Security Implications of Canadian Constitutional Issues*. That was the subject of our seminar last autumn and it attracted a good deal of media attention at the time. It has been favourably received and I commend it to those of you who have not yet had an opportunity to read it.

I would also like to draw your attention to the other CISS publications. Our *Strategic Datalinks* are 1500 word monographs on single subjects. *Strategic Profile: Canada* is a wallet-sized card containing useful information about Canada and our armed forces. The books published after our seminars, the *Strategic Datalinks*, and *Strategic Profile: Canada* are free to CISS members. Publications available on a subscription basis include: *The McNaughton Papers (The Canadian Journal Of Strategic Studies)*, and *Peacekeeping And International Relations*.

You will have noticed a large number of students in the audience. Their presence is facilitated by those who sponsor our student internship program. We are very grateful for their support and believe, for a number of reasons, that participation of high school and university students is essential to the educational portion of our mandate. We have had a great deal of success with this programme. Future success will depend on the continued generosity of our members and other sponsors.

We chose the topic of this seminar, *A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security*, before the budget of 25 February 1992. After the budget we were not sure where we should put the question mark in the title. Last September 11, the Minister of National Defence issued a defence policy statement which I called, in the circumstances, realistic and responsible. I said, from a strategic point of view, that the absolutely most important part of the statement was that Canada was going to continue to station troops in Europe because we wanted to continue contributing in a very practical way to peace, security and stability in Europe. This was not only because we thought it was a good thing but the Western Europeans and the Eastern Europeans were imploring us to continue our presence. In mid February 1992, I wrote an article for an American publication, entitled *Defence News*, in which I commented on the defence statement of 11 September 1991 in much the same terms as I have just laid before you today. The paper was

published 24 February 1992 and then we had the budget of 25 February. Once again we saw the Minister of Finance being the person chiefly responsible for the making and issuing of defence policy in the Dominion of Canada. We have returned to the days of the Member of Parliament for Etobicoke, Mr. Wilson, who regularly made defence policy through his budget speeches.

In the 25 February budget, the Government of Canada decided not to station troops in Europe. The government, however, has said it is fully committed to NATO and indeed that Canada will return with military force to the continent of Europe when appropriate and if the government of Canada deems that it is necessary. However, I would submit to you that when there are no longer Canadian troops in Europe under NATO command and control that the distance between Canada and Europe will be greater from a psychological point of view than the actual number of kilometres and the decision to be taken by the government of Canada will be a decision of a vastly increased magnitude. It will not be a decision to commit more troops to Europe but it will be an *ab initio* decision of whether to commit troops to Europe at all. The Minister of National Defence has recently pointed to the Canadian troops in Yugoslavia as evidence of Canada's continuing interest in Europe but I would suggest that that statement is one specifically designed to deflect criticism of the decision to return all our NATO troops to Canada.

Today is the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Vimy Ridge, that great and wonderful undertaking from which most would agree has sprung the Canadian nation. It is a battle in which 35,000 Canadians took part during the course of a war from which 60,000 Canadians did not return. Not quite a generation later, another war in Europe caused 40,000 Canadians to remain behind. We fought another war in Korea, participated in one in the Gulf, and in the meantime invented United Nations peacekeeping as it is now practised. I am not sure I would like to be the Prime Minister of Canada today or the Minister of Defence participating in the Vimy Ridge celebrations. I would not blame the Europeans at all today as they witness the Prime Minister of Canada and the Minister of National Defence at Vimy paying tribute to Canadian efforts at peace, security and stability in the world on one hand and at the same time saying we do not have the financial resources to continue having at least 1,000 troops in Europe. I mention financial resources because of course as we know defence policy in the country these days and

with increasing degree, foreign policy, is being formulated strictly on the basis of fiscal and financial concerns.

Let me, at this point mention those institutions and companies that have materially assisted us in the staging of this seminar. Our co-sponsors are Canadian Marconi Company, L'Ecole Nationale d'Administration Publique (Universite du Quebec), and the Military and Strategic Studies Programme of the Universite de Montreal. The seminar has also been generously supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ITT Canada Ltd., Litton Systems Canada Ltd, and the Donner Canadian Foundation. A significant number of CISS members have also been of great assistance in their sponsorship of students. We thank them as well.

I would now like to turn the proceedings over to Major-General Andrew Christie who will be our Chairman for the first session. General Christie recently retired from the Canadian Army after a very distinguished and long career. His last overseas posting was in a high-level position at North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters in Brussels. Immediately before retirement, he was the Commandant of our National Defence College.

Jeremy Kinsman

The Canadian-European Security Situation

Major-General (Ret'd) Andrew Christie, Session Chair

Our lead-off speaker is Mr. Jeremy Kinsman, Assistant Deputy Minister (Political and Industrial Security Affairs) of the Department of External Affairs.

After graduation from Lower Canada College, Princeton University and L'Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris, Mr. Kinsman was with the Aluminum Company of Canada for one year following which he joined the Department of External Affairs in 1966.

His postings abroad have included our embassy in Brussels, the European Economic Community, Algiers, our Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, and at the Canadian embassy in Washington, D.C.

Before assuming his present appointment in 1990, he was seconded to the Department of Communications for four years as the Associate Deputy Minister (Cultural Affairs and Broadcasting).

In the near future Mr. Kinsman will resume the important and challenging role of Canadian Ambassador to Russia.

Jeremy Kinsman

Ladies and Gentlemen,

To speak on the subject of security in Europe is to impose an artificial form on something that is quite frankly without form. I prefer to give you a collage

of the European continent which is still in constant transformation after 40 years of Cold War and to indicate to you where Canada fits in.

The changes in Europe present defeats, great defeats. The most difficult defeat, mainly for politicians, the military and for strategists, is to accept the idea of change and of the unforeseen. Another problem is the tendency to nullify the amplitude of these changes and to attach oneself to institutions and even to political and other personalities as habitual and stable models. All the governments of the West have problems: they have internal problems; they have political problems; they have recession problems; they have problems in Europe, one of which is an resurgence of the extreme right. The result is that the politicians have created a sort of agoraphobia -- a fear of open spaces and change.

It is not only limited to the politicians. I remember in 1988 in Toronto there was a Soviet film festival which featured works by cinematographers with great imagination and calibre. In 1989, Europe was turned upside down, changed completely. We asked ourselves, "What are these cinematographers going to do with these new realities?" These brilliant cinematographers have nothing to do. In a small way because they don't have money, but more so because the reality has overstepped, in depth and form, their capacity to make fictional and imaginary works. In fact, unreality has become reality.

Speaking of reality in Europe, I will give you the security collage as I see it.

The security relationship is no longer only a defence relationship and the North American European relationship is not only a defence relationship. It is and, in fact, it has always been a community of values, of shared values, and the extension of these values to the east is both what ended the Cold War and what is the basis of the new security challenge. It is the securing of those values in the east which will provide the best security for all of us. If these values take and hold, then we'll be relatively secure. If they don't we won't. And the way you approach that question determines whether or not you are an optimist or a pessimist.

The second context I should give you is that the security and European defence or value relationship cannot be detached from the economic

relationship. It ought to be remembered that if North America and Europe can't solve our economic differences, particularly in the context of our common relationship and differences with Japan, we will not have the confidence and political will necessary for meaningful political and security commitments. None of this is going to be easy. I'm a big reader of Vaclav Havel, and Vaclav Havel has been saying a lot of things this year. One of the things he's said which is most profound is that 1992 or 1993 will be the end of something long and big. It is the end of the assumption that human beings - European human beings or North American human beings - could believe in the perfectibility of controlling systems. The systems are turned off, they are gone. What we have is human individuality with all of its unpredictability, all of its intemperance, all of its spontaneity and all of its costs. What we have, above all, is pluralism. People, ethnicities, tribes, groups are acting in an uncoordinated manner. We also have, as was pointed out poignantly in the New York Review of Books recently, profiteering, crime, jealousy, competition, bitterness, vengeance. The way ahead will not be easy.

Security may well be determined by the extent to which democracy takes hold. And it may be that for the human species democracy is not natural. It doesn't come easily. What we need, and what we are trying to build, is a relatively safe space. That is what governments are trying to do; to create a safe space in which to build and practice new activities for the people whose activities will determine our security. There are reams of things, written, spoken, said by bureaucrats, by academics about the architecture of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the European Community and the United Nations. All of it is terrific, it keeps us all employed. But it is not really the issue. What we are after is a way to deal with real security. Real security has two components. The first is whether and how people feel secure. Mr. Reagan won an election in 1980 by addressing how people felt about security. The second is how real, anchored security in fact can be promoted. You can't judge how people feel. Many of us who are paid to be right, were wrong just a few years ago about how people in the East felt. I remember that before the election in the former German Democratic Republic, we all thought the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) was going to clean up in East Germany. This was important because we thought this meant the SPD and

its aggregate would win the whole of Germany. We thought, therefore, that the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe and indeed of NATO's hold in Germany itself could come into question. Well, we were wrong. The East voted Christian Democrat.

Similarly, we were wrong when Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary became free. We thought that Dubcek, "socialism with a human face", would have a certain amount of appeal. And these countries would not want NATO hanging around too much. We thought we had a presentational problem of public relations with these countries because NATO would be a vestige of the past. We were dead wrong. NATO is what they want. Why? Because NATO is real, NATO is real security. NATO is also as far as possible from their previous lives. If they could get seats at the New York Stock Exchange, they would want that. I remember last December when the ministers of the Eastern countries, including all of the now free, independent ex-Soviet republics, came to NATO for the first meeting of foreign ministers of what is called the North American Cooperation Council (NACC). They walked into the conference room and saw General Gavin, the Supreme Allied Commander in the flesh. During that meeting, I recall, the representative of what was still the Soviet Union, raised a point of order. He said,"I have to tell you that I am not a minister - the others are ministers. My minister couldn't come. I have to point out that in the communique it must be changed from minister to representative." People said fine and then he got up and kept getting up and finally at the end the meeting he came back and said, "I'm sorry, I'll have to ask you to change the communique again. I have been on the phone. The Commonwealth of Independent States are meeting in Moscow, and they have asked that all references to the Soviet Union be deleted." During the course of that meeting the Soviet Union had disappeared.

NATO provides security. It provides security by projecting force. NATO was created to defend Western Europe against Eastern Europe. Now NATO provides security for people in Eastern and Central Europe and indeed even Asia to help them defend themselves. The CSCE, which is its cousin, can't provide security but maybe, we hope, it can create security. Until recently, it wasn't really able to take hard decisions on security - to take decisions to intervene when security is breached. Increasingly, it can. It was our Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mrs. McDougall, who had the idea to create a peace process involving the two countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan and the

people of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the CSCE has no armies so it has to call on other peoples' armies. Increasingly it will do so through its common membership with the countries of NATO and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

What we have to do is to deal with the real threats, and very quickly. I'm going to tell you what I think they are. I have counted eleven.

The first are the forces of nationalism and pluralism released by the removal of controls all over Central and Eastern Europe. Country versus country, majority versus minority, and minority in one country being a majority, often vengeful, in another. There is a new element called clientism. Clientism foments provocation. Albanians have their clients in Kosovo; Romanians have theirs in Moldova; Armenians have theirs in Karabakh and all of them have immigrants in Canada.

The second is obvious. It is the failure of economic transition. Former USA President Nixon is right when he says that if we can't help Russia and the others, the costs are going to be ours. I don't have to say any more than that.

The third threat is related to the second, and that is the failure of democracy to take hold in these countries, leading to a decline in tolerance and an outbreak of violence.

The fourth, ensuing from those, will be takeover. Rightist forces will prey, promising ethnic vengeance for something done to the ethnicity somewhere else by somebody else and proposing easy solutions to an enormously complex problem.

The fifth, I think, is the separation of Russia from Europe. Michael Ignatieff wrote recently in *Harper's Magazine* that Russia has two literary faces. There is Dostoevsky, the Slavic face or personality, and there is Tolstoy, the European face. And what we have to do is appeal to the Tolstoy in Russians and have that appeal to us.

The sixth threat is the separation of the southern republics - all of the 'stans' - and the current grouping of their populations into a highly Islamic, embittered, militant underclass.

The seventh would be the inability of Russia to complete its separation agreements with Ukraine in a peaceful manner.

The eighth threat, may be the most important. It is the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons. What if there is a successful coup from the right in Russia? What if there is a coup or a hardening from the right in Ukraine? Already we are worried. This would place weapons in the wrong hands. I'm not so sure what the intelligent and responsible president of Kazakhstan has in mind. We are not at all sure what the president of Ukraine is really trying to do in using nuclear weapons as leverage in his negotiations with Russia.

Related to this is the ninth threat, the leakage of nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, nuclear brains, nuclear software and scientists. Undoubtedly the world's biggest security problem now is nuclear proliferation.

The tenth is one about which you don't hear a lot in North America but you hear about in Europe and that is the safety of very poorly built and secured nuclear reactors.

The final threat , which I think in many respects is the most important one of all, is Canadian and American indifference and American neo-isolationism.

What are the solutions? First we have to know what is going on. There is a tremendous disrespect for intelligence.

I think there are three basic ways we can group solutions: one is institutional, one is geopolitical and one is economic.

Institutionally, we have to hold countries to their commitments on human rights. That is fundamental. They have agreed to the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They have agreed to the tolerance of minorities; they have agreed to democracy and now we are going to hold them to their agreements.

Second, we have to abandon the notion of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. There is a new doctrine in the world called Humanitarian Intervention - and we believe in it. And the CSCE, which used to be a consensus organization, is in effect abandoning the consensus rule to permit in-

tervention when people's lives, *en masse*, are genuinely threatened or crushed.

Third, we have to build an organization which can intervene in conflict in the way the CSCE could not in Yugoslavia because it was stymied at that time by the Soviet Union. The USSR could not get around the problem of eventual intervention in Georgia or somewhere else of concern to it - a doctrine abandoned last September in Moscow.

Fourth, the CSCE has to be able to prevent conflict - it has to work on conflict prevention mechanisms. As well as conflict resolution - it has to work on mediation; it has to work on peace processes. And when this fails, I should say, we have to have the nerve and decisiveness to impose sanctions.

Next is the building up of democratic assistance. It doesn't come easily. People have to be helped around the enormous technological complications of things that have taken us 150, 180 or 210 years to build up things like an independent judiciary, new rules of law, ways to relate to elected representatives. You don't, like the President of Peru for example, find that when you have a congress that disagrees with you, dissolve it.

Last, you have to facilitate a meaningful transition to genuine defensive defence doctrines and regimes.

At the geopolitical level, we have to deal with the identified threats. By all means, secure Russia in the West but remember that Russia is also Asian and if we secure Russia only in the West we are going to alienate the Tatars, and others across that vast expanse of land.

To do that, it is necessary to ensure that Japan participates in world affairs to a greater degree. There is also the all important issue of the Japanese dispute with Russia concerning the Northern territories.

Next the southern republics must be secured. They have a model of a secular, Islamic state - Turkey. We have to support Turkey and its relationship with these countries.

Last, we have to promote a settlement of the issues between Ukraine and Russia. We have to be very firm if there is any backsliding on the nuclear issues on the part of the Ukrainians themselves.

The third set of solutions is economic, and this category is our focus of attention, as members of the G7 which will be discussing nuclear issues at the Munich Summit in July. To begin with, we need to get real aid - aid which works - to Russia and to the other republics. We must not forget the Central and East Europeans.

In addition, we have to grasp the nuclear issues and all their complexities. The vertical build-down between the United States and Russia is very related to the issues of the disposal of nuclear waste. The cost of securing and increasing the safety of the poorly built Soviet reactors must form a part of our aid program.

We have to reach an agreement with Russia and the other republics on nuclear export controls. We have to make sure, with respect to European security and world security, that there will be no provision of any nuclear technology without agreement on the part of the acceding country to adopt full scope safeguards and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To do this at the G-7 summit in July, we have to agree to strengthen what is probably the most important international agency in the world right now in terms of real security and the most under-used - that is the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have to double its budget; we have to strengthen its ability to conduct inspections; we have to strengthen its ability to provide for reactor safety and indeed to ensure apt safeguards and dissemination of safe nuclear energy.

Now to my conclusions. You have seen the menu. What is the table? There are three basic forums right now apart from the United Nations. The most important negotiation is that taking place currently in Helsinki; it is the follow up meeting of the CSCE and it will conclude with a CSCE summit on July 10-11. Just before that, there is the G-7 summit in Munich which will bring the most important, most influential countries of the world together to focus on the economic problems and some of the nuclear problems that I have described. And then there are, of course, NATO's meetings such as the NATO ministerial meeting in Oslo at the beginning of June.

I listened to Alex Morrison, in his introductory remarks, speak about Vimy and about Canada's commitment. I don't feel the slightest bit of shame. We have left 100,000 people behind in European wars. I don't see why there is a huge issue right now about our reluctance to continue to station military

troops in Europe. We can have aircraft, troops or whatever you want in Germany in 24 hours. It may have made sense at one time to have Canadian troops in Europe but it doesn't make sense today. The decision to withdraw was not solely a financial decision. We have a thousand troops in Yugoslavia. We have another 600 in Cyprus. We are sending 200 to Cambodia. We are sending 50 to El Salvador and so it goes. We had 900 or a thousand on standby for Morocco. All of these things are good things to do. All of them cost money. All of these things are responding to today's real security threats. Of course, we know about the arguments that if Canada pulls its troops out today, then Congress is going to feel badly about the American troops and maybe it is going to hurt the British argument about their particular version of the Space Defense Initiative as opposed to that of the French. Well, I guess some of that is true, but then we are dealing in the 1990s and not the 1970s. There is no question about Canada's commitment to European security, but the commitment we are talking about is to the real security issues that I have outlined.

The last thing I would like to say is that there is one threat - a much bigger threat to the efficacy of this country's policy - and that is that we get so lost in ourselves and in the eternal problems and inwardness of this country that we forget about the extent to which our interests out there are very fundamentally engaged. Thank you.

Laure Paquette

Towards a Conceptual Analysis of Canadian Security: North Atlantic Aspects

Andrew Christie

Our second speaker this this morning is Ms. Laure Paquette, a Ph.D candidate in Political Studies at Queen's University and a Senior Research Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Ms. Paquette is an alumnus of l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration Publique of Montreal, a Barton Scholar, and she represents Canada as a founding member of a new society for the study of strategy organized under the auspices of the Fondation des Etudes de Defence Nationale in Paris.

Her particular field of study encompasses the conceptual underpinnings of security issues and strategic theory.

Laure Paquette

When Alex Morrison asked me to deliver a paper on the conceptual underpinnings of Canada and Canadian security, I was initially at a loss as to how to proceed. I have decided to be quite orderly and proceed step-by-step.

The first part of my presentation will deal with premises, definitions, characteristics, things of which strategic theorists are very fond. In the second part, I will look at the importance of Atlanticism in Canadian strategy.

Every theory has to start with some premises and I am going to give you two basic premises. First, we have to assume that every state has a strategy,

otherwise there would be very little for us to analyse. And the second premise is that national values shape a state's strategy.

Hindsight is 20/20. In retrospect, it is easy for all of us to agree that Canada's decision to withdraw troops from Europe was perfectly predictable and a long time coming. On the other hand, foresight, that much vaunted ability of political scientists, has been singularly in abeyance for the last few years. The effects of glasnost and perestroika were emphatically unforeseen. The Revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe defied prediction. The *deroulement* of the Gulf War took a number of military analysts by surprise. Edward Luttwak, for instance said that "The widely circulated estimates of 30,000 U.S. casualties, including 10,000 killed ... are becoming credible." In this context, this paper takes the bold step of making a prediction: a relative shift away from Atlanticism, though by no means an abandonment of it, has begun and will continue for some time.

I base this argument on a conceptual analysis I developed in my academic work. This paper's first part outlines the framework for analysis. At the very centre of it is the relationship between national values and national strategy, and the fact that one influences the other. One side of the coin is more familiar: that strategy's goal is to protect national values is a commonly accepted statement. This paper concentrates on the other end of the equation, that national values influence national strategy.

Putting these building blocks in place is the paper's main task, but a second part of the paper does show the framework in action. The argument that Atlanticism in Canada's commitments abroad is going to become less important is just one of several by-products of this framework.

PART I: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The building blocks of this particular approach to strategic analysis are two premises, two concepts with two characteristics each, and two ways to identify those concepts.

1. Two Premises

Premises are the starting point for any theory. This framework relies on two main premises: first, every state has a strategy; second, national values shape a state's strategy.

A. Every state has a strategy

I emphasize that the above statement reads "Every state has a strategy", not "Every state has a plan". There is a big difference between a strategy and a plan. A plan is what organizes several distinct actions over a given period of time. A strategy is an idea that inspires the organization and execution of those actions.

Obviously this premise is necessary as a starting point: otherwise there would literally be nothing with which to work. But the premise also begs the question is strategy used much at all by states? I suggest that there are several factors that might prevent us from perceiving a strategy. First, in order to observe national strategy, one has to take the long view of things. The time and resources required for this kind of observations may not be at the disposal of the analyst. Second, we must be careful not to confuse poorly conceived strategies, poorly executed strategies or simply very secret strategies, for no strategy at all. It is very tempting for the analyst who holds strategy in high regard to dismiss ineffective strategies as not being strategies at all, while attributing successes to his use. Third, it makes more sense for a strategist to conceal his strategy that it does to make it clear or obvious to all comers.

B. National values shape a state's strategy

As mentioned earlier, strategic theory has long established that a relationship between a state's strategy and its national values exists, though the literature has concentrated on only one side of the coin. Thus the role of Canadian strategy is to protect what makes Canada and Canadians unique and distinct (provided we know what that is!) from the rest of the world in historical and cultural terms.(1) This national distinctiveness is based on culture, of course, which can have as much influence on strategy and strategists as it does on any other social phenomenon, namely a great deal. Moreover, it has long been established by sociologists that social values have an influence on individuals from which it is well-nigh impossible to escape. Therefore, it is possible to suggest that national values affect a state's strategy in two ways. First, they act like a filter on a state's perceptions of threats to its security. Second, they shape the criteria used to judge whether one course of action is acceptable or not.

i.Filters on a state's perceptions of threats.

A state will cherish certain aspects of its existence according to the most general principles that the population esteems: that is the basic, if abstract-sounding, function of a national value. In turn, these values at the national level determine what area of a state's *milieu* needs to be watched carefully for signs of a possible threat or challenge to its integrity or security. At the same time, national values will guide a state's judgement about which changes in a state's *milieu* (including other states) may constitute a threat.

For instance, let us say that concern over the natural environment is one of Canada's national values. If that is the case, Canada is more likely to devote time and money to keeping a close watch on changes in its environment. When some changes occur, Canada is going to evaluate their significance in terms of preserving that environment. They include whether those changes require some sort of action, i.e. whether, in this context, they constitute a potential or actual threat. These challenges can have repercussions in the international sphere: for instance, Canada's relationship with the United States has been affected by acid rain falling over the Great Lakes as well as emissions from a Detroit incinerator polluting Windsor's air.

On the other hand, the preservation of a particular religion is not a value in Canadian society. Canada does not see attacks on members of its dominant religion, Christianity, as a threat (although it would be concerned on humanitarian grounds). Consider how different Canada's attitude about religion is when it is compared to a state like Israel, where religion has historically been closely related to national identity, or Saudi Arabia, whose laws prohibit the introduction of any religion other than Islam. For those states, a threat to the religion would be considered a direct threat to security. What all of this points to, incidentally, is that for the state, survival is not simply a matter of its continuing physical survival, but also the survival of what makes the state a distinct entity.

ii.Shaping the criteria used to judge various options

In political science generally and international relations specifically, judgement of behaviour as being right or wrong, good or bad, is usual-

ly made on the basis of some standards that are considered near-absolute or near-universal. This harkens back to the whole tradition of *just bellum* and *casus belli*. What is different in this discussion is that values are not considered either absolute or universal: they can and do vary considerably from culture to culture, and state to state. While this may seem like an obvious point, it is worth making given how easily strategists in the past have fallen prey to ethnocentrism.

National values shape the criteria used to judge the desirability of a course of actions open to a state, but these values are state-specific. Depending on what those values are, some aspects of a state's existence will be sacrificed ahead of others if the state's survival is at stake. For instance, Canada might be considered a more communitarian or collectivist state than an individualist one: it sees its own destiny as bound up with the fate of other states. If that is the case, not only would Canada be more likely to consider an attack on another state to be a threat to itself, but Canada would be unable to sacrifice another state's survival to preserve its own in the most extreme circumstances. Canada has proven this repeatedly by its involvements in wars and peacekeeping abroad.

2.Two concepts

The definitions of both strategy and national values are important given the central role of these two concepts and the theoretical nature of the analysis. The definitions I will give are generic: they enter as little as possible into the various complications of defining such *'accordion words'* as former USA Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger called them.

A.Strategy

Strategy is a key idea that serves two functions for a state. First, it expresses in a nutshell how a state plans to achieve some or all of its objectives. Second, it guides all of a state's subsequent actions when it comes to implementing that strategy. The actual application of strategy can be quite broad or quite narrow. There can be a strategy for seeing to a state's energy needs, or there can be a strategy to achieve a state's irredentist goals. But the significance of national values shows up most clearly in terms of a national strategy.

B.National values

National values are principles intrinsically esteemed by the whole population of a nation or state. There is always more than one national value, usually a group of them. Although they are abstract, and cannot be measured or counted very easily, they are extremely important to societies. I have already listed a number of examples of national values: concern for the integrity of the environment (Canada), concern for the respect of a particular religion or for the rights of co-religionists (Israel, Saudi Arabia); and concern for the protection of the community of states rather than the individual state (Canada again). The list of possible national values is almost endless, including individualism, peace, order, justice, wealth, etc.

3.Characteristics

In addition to the premises and definitions, the framework relies on two characteristics of strategy and two characteristics of national values. Those characteristics have a role to play in terms of the relationship between their respective concepts.

A.Strategy

There are two characteristics that are important for strategy. First, a strategy can vary in size. Second, a strategy helps a state make decisions.

i.A strategy can vary in size.

It is just as possible to talk about a strategy of defence or economic development as it is to talk about a national strategy. National (also called grand) strategies need not be the only strategies a state can use: its strategies can be as small or as sector-specific as the state wants.

ii.A strategy helps a state make decisions.

Once a state has put a strategy in place, it has an idea that expresses its intentions concisely. Every action the state takes can be related to this central idea. Resources, both human and physical, can be mobilized around it. Every decision can be taken in terms of the larger context. All this can happen even with a high degree of uncertainty. The everyday problems and unpredictable obstacles that every leader faces is what Clausewitz called friction. Friction can be dealt with quite effec-

tively by having a strategy. When some unexpected event takes place, as it inevitably does in situations as complex as those faced by states, it can be dealt with in a systematic way if the decision-makers always refer back to the strategy. That is what makes strategy worth having: in the end, it saves the state a lot of time and energy, because the state does not have to rethink its whole objectives every time it has to make a decision quickly. Instead, it makes a choice of strategy once, and it usually does not have to change that strategy for some time.

B.National values

There are two important characteristics to national values. First, they are at least in part a function of the ethnic composition of the population. Second, they change slowly.

i.Partial dependence on ethnic composition of population.

It comes as no surprise that the content of the culture of states varies from society to society, from state to state. Students of international relations have been in the habit of thinking in terms of nation-states or at least of states with an ethnically and culturally homogeneous population. Of course, very few modern states fit that traditional perspective. The corollary of a culturally homogeneous state is a state with uniform and widely-shared national values which rarely experience any change in them. If the former statement is not entirely accurate, then neither is the latter; the actual composition of the population becomes a significant variable in the formulation of a national strategy. The cultural make-up of the population will always give some important indication regarding the values that the population holds.

ii.National values change slowly.

National values are the most basic and fundamental components of culture, and as such they have received their share of attention from scholars. By and large, the sociological theory that deals with values and society posits that national values evolve slowly. Moreover, these values exercise a certain hegemony over the population: in other words, almost every individual shares those values and only the very rare individual, usually an intellectual at the fringes, and then only in times of great social upheaval, can ever escape their influence.

4.Two ways to identify those concepts

For the framework I have outlined to be useful at all, one has to be able to identify the concepts.

A.Strategy

There are many ways one can seek to identify strategy, but the more obvious and practical the method, the better. In this case, I consider the reactive merits of official statements versus historical inference, based on observation of a state's behaviour: one method for the able strategist and one for the not-so-able strategist.

i.Official statements

Political scientists naturally pay a good deal of attention to a government's documents. Official statements such as speeches, press releases, legislative debates or minutes from executive meetings (when they are available) receive their fair share of distribution and attention. They often contain broad statements of goals, but they are less likely to give details of a state's strategy unless the strategists themselves neglect one of the basic precepts of good strategy-making, which is secrecy and surprise. One striking example of this kind of sound strategic thinking was obvious in the conduct of American operations during the Gulf War. It was perfectly obvious that there was a strategy in place, but only after it was all over did General Schwarzkopf fully brief the press on what it was.

In short, while this type of source should not be neglected for its clues, the best strategies are unlikely to be found there.

ii.Inferences from historical observation

This second method, better suited for the more able strategist, analyzes the series of decisions made by a particular state over time. Within the area of state behaviour that is of interest, the analysts will try to identify what sociologists call the 'pattern of action'. It eventually becomes possible to infer from this pattern what strategy the state is using. The sounder the strategy, then, the more effective this method of identification is.

B.National values

There are no such things as good or bad national strategies, so the methods proposed here are equally valid: the analysis of political culture or historical inference.

i.Political culture

Political culture is an established field of study in political science. It is important because it bridges conceptually the culture of a state and its behaviour and as such, it has deservedly received a good deal of attention. Established states have been studied already, the exceptions being the newest states: in the 1960s that meant post-colonial states, in the 1990s that could mean East European or former Soviet states. The analyst can exploit this literature or its methods with an eye to the states that matter the most. Political culture is made up of a number of components, namely more basic values which change slowly, and various expression of these values, such as leader images, media icons and so on, which change more quickly.

ii.Through historical inference

This second suggestion is the same as the one proposed for strategy. In essence, it is a matter of analyzing the series of decisions made by a particular state over time. Within the area of state behaviour that is of interest, the analysts will try to identify what sociologists call the 'pattern of action'. It eventually becomes possible to infer from this pattern what strategy the state is using. The more sound the strategy, then the more effective this method of identification is.

PART II: ANALYZING CANADIAN STRATEGY

There is one very important conclusion for Canada to be drawn from all this. If a state is made up either of comparatively recent immigrants or their descendants, or if the state has a long-standing ethnic diversity, or if its population grows insignificantly, then the countries of origin of those immigrants are of particular importance to the strategist. This is of even greater importance for two types of state: first, a state whose population grows through immigration, especially if there is a diversity of countries of origin; second, a state with a long-standing ethnic diversity that has not integrated.

1. Foundation of Canada's National Values

This second part builds on the conclusions that can be drawn from the framework outlined above. National values change slowly, and they are linked to the ethnic composition of the population. Taking those two statements together, it is logical to conclude that the evolution of national values can be correlated with the pattern of the origins of those immigrants. Canada is just such a country. Two points need to be emphasized. First, the peak of European immigration began in 1954 and ended by 1970 or thereabouts. Second, after 1971, the proportion of new Canadians born in Asia grew suddenly and quickly, outstripping its European counterparts in both proportion and absolute numbers.

It is difficult to say much about the post-1986 period, especially as comparable data is not available. Although there is not enough data from which firm conclusions can be drawn, there is anecdotal evidence in support of little if any changes in immigration trends, even though there have been very significant changes in the world since 1986. For instance, the Southeast Asians who come to Canada as refugees do so for political reasons. Although there has been a global trend towards democratization in the eighties (Argentina, Eastern Europe), Southeast Asia has not been as touched by this trend, except for the Philippines. If anything, the proportion of refugees must have increased, given the addition of Chinese after the events of Tiananmen Square in May 2, 1989. Among non-refugee immigrants, there is a trend of Hong Kong residents settling in Canada, although it is still too early to judge its importance. Finally, certain characteristics of the Canadian system, such as family reunification, will only accentuate any trends we may observe in terms of regional distributions.

2.Implications for Canada's Strategy

What does all of this mean to Canadian commitments abroad, if anything? Even without the theoretical explanation given above, we could make a case for a shift in the domestic base of support for commitments abroad, in favour of the Asian continent, as immigrants became politically enfranchised in this country. In this scenario, the relative importance of commitments and relations to Europe would slowly and gradually decline, as there is a shift in national values towards a different configuration. The shift has been and will continue to be gradual and gentle, which might explain why it could escape

notice. In any event, the shift in relative importance of foreign commitments among the regions of the world has been accentuated by the exercise of fiscal restraint in Canada beginning in the late 1970s: the less room for maneuvering a state has, the clearer its priorities are likely to become. Moreover, during the Trudeau government, the period during which these trends became clear, foreign policy was a relatively low priority, which only accentuated the lack of resources, both financial and human, devoted to its formulation and implementation.

3.Significance of Atlanticism in Canadian Strategy

The first question we have to answer when it comes to Canadian strategy, is whether or not there is one. The popular opinion of Canadian strategy is rather poor. Generally speaking, even among political scientists, there is a consensus that there is little autonomous strategic thinking in Canada. Does that necessarily mean that there is no Canadian strategy? Perhaps not. If one accepts the foregoing argument that a national strategy is not something that is changed yearly, one can look back into recent Canadian history to discern some sort of pattern of action. To paraphrase Professor Sa Benwang of the Beijing Institute of Strategic Studies, this year's CISS Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, how could Canada have committed itself to NATO, the Korean War, peacekeeping and the Gulf War, all significant military commitments, without some sort of strategy?

4.Canada's Grand Strategy

Analyzing the relationship between values and strategy works best at the national level. Once that relationship is established, then decisions like the one about Canadian troops in Europe, i.e. changes in tactics, become much easier to explain.

Canada's national strategy sets the tone for the part it wants to play on the international stage, whatever the circumstances. It has been the argument of analysts of Canadian foreign policy that a pattern of action does indeed emerge, and that the pattern, this strategy, is multilateralism since the first Trudeau government at least, and arguably even before then. The image that Canada's place in the world conjures up is well-known: it is that of the mouse in bed with the elephant. In other words, Canada's place in the world is overshadowed by the giant to the south. In order to compensate for that,

the mouse decides to invest in relationships with other states, in participation in international forums, in support of multilateral organizations, not the least of which is the United Nations, and in multilateral solutions, if only symbolic, to international problems, as much as possible.

There are many examples of this strategy: Canada has been an enthusiastic supporter of the UN throughout, being one of the few member states to make its financial contributions regularly and on time. It has served on the Security Council many times, most recently in 1989 and 1990. And it was one of the mainstays of the United Nations throughout the difficult eighties, when the US's relations with the UN reached an all time low. Canada makes important commitments of personnel and funds to peacekeeping. It has recently joined the Organization of American States. It has long advocated multilateral arms control talks. It has never put its participation in NATO in question. And it lobbied hard to be invited to become a member of the G-7. There are many other examples.

In this context, Atlanticism itself has been, and will without a doubt remain, a linchpin of multilateralism. It is possible to say that because, even in the midst of withdrawal of the troops from Europe, declaratory policy regarding NATO remained steady and indeed was never put into doubt. On the other had, if one credits the shift in national values that has been predicted from the immigration pattern, the decision to withdraw troops can be seen in a different light. The strategy itself, however, has merely been amended.

Conclusion

Two final points have yet to be made. First, as mentioned earlier, the impact of national values shows up more clearly with grand strategy than it does with sectoral strategy. Strategy is a tool for macro-analysis, not micro-analysis, and its usefulness shows up more sharply at the national level. It has the advantage of being of help in analyzing complex situations in the long term, but it also has the disadvantage of not being worth the trouble, since it requires considerable amounts of information and time when it comes to predicting the outcome of a single decision.

By using strategy as the unit of analysis, rather than the inter-state relationship itself, the analyst can achieve a significant improvement in success in predicting future decisions, once the opponent's strategy is known. It is a lit-

tle like playing chess. A player begins by observing the opponent's moves. If that opponent's moves seem to be uncoordinated or going in a variety of different directions, so much the better. It means that the opponent is not really thinking strategically, and will be that much easier to defeat. On the other hand, it may not be in the player's best interest to make assumptions about an opponent's confused state of mind or ineffective planning. The player has information about the opponent. That player can make predictions about the kind of strategy the opponent is more likely to use based on that information. The player can reduce the number of possible strategies that the opponent might use, and the player has to consider in strategizing, by about 75 per cent. At that point, it is much easier to determine which strategy the opponent is actually using. Once the strategy is known, then the rate of success in predicting the specific decisions will rise exponentially, whatever the circumstances. Thank you.

1. Of course, that is only one aspect of national values: the other dimension has to do with standards of behaviour, for judging who and what is right and wrong, good or bad. This other aspect comes in for some discussion below.

Abraham Triestram

The NATO Perspective

Andrew Christie

Mr. Abraham Triestram, Netherlands Liaison Officer and Senior Officer in the Information and Press Office at NATO Headquarters, Brussels is our next speaker.

A graduate of St. Bernardus College in Heerlen and of the Catholic University of Nijmegen, he served for 12 years as Public Relations Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe and has been in his present position at NATO Headquarters for the past 13 years.

Mr. Triestram has initiated and organized international seminars for academics and was the NATO Project Officer for the first NATO and Central and Eastern European Joint Conference in Prague in 1991. His list of public presentations is both impressive and lengthy.

Abraham Triestram

Before beginning my presentation, allow me to confide in you: Canada has always held a privileged place in my memories. I was born in a miniature country - a type of Disneyland - with a population per square kilometre that is the most dense in the world. I was always fascinated by the greatness and the vast spaces of your country.

All Dutch people and, in particular, those of my generation remember the welcome that you had given and reserved in May 1940 for Princess Juliana, our future Queen and her child, Beatrix, our present Queen.

For myself, I was 14 years old when I saw my first Canadian. He was a soldier. He went across our yard. He participated in the liberation of my country. You will understand why I am particularly happy to be invited to this conference. You invitation has allowed me to visit your country for the first time.

I have been a member of the NATO secretariat for almost the past 25 years. My presentation is based on personal observations and does not represent the official opinion of the Atlantic Alliance.

Before looking towards the future to share with you some thoughts on NATO's perspectives as I have been asked to do, permit me to take stock of what we have been confronted with and I will restrict myself to the most important events, each a political earthquake which would score an eight on the Richter Scale:

- End of the Division of Europe and Germany;
- End of the confrontational policy between NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- End of the Warsaw Pact;
- End of the communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe;
- End of the Soviet Union.

The history of the old European continent for the past 2000 years is an endless series of belligerent, mostly dramatic events which we Europeans have viciously inflicted upon ourselves. The most turbulent part is undoubtedly the twentieth century which now draws to a close. During this century, on two occasions, we were no longer capable of re-dressing the situation ourselves, and help from abroad was needed to restore peace. Fortunately for us Europeans, this help was made available, but maybe not always at the most appropriate moment. Hence two world wars! Canada has an outstanding record in coming to the rescue of its European allies. Six hundred thousand service men and women fought in Belgium and France during the First World War and some 400,000 Canadian troops participated in the European theatre during the Second World War. The price Canada had to pay for its generous contribution towards the restoration of freedom, and democracy, was a heavy one. Sixty thousand soldiers killed in action during

the First World War and over Forty thousand deaths during the second World War.

After the First World War attempts were made to avoid a recurrence of what was most likely the most bloodiest war in Western Europe. But the League of Nations and other bi- and multilateral alliances which were concluded were unable to prevent another war. It soon turned into a global war with, for the first time in the history of warfare, more casualties amongst the civilian population than amongst the combatants.

The post-Second World War initiatives to prevent a large scale military conflict have resulted in the creation of a few very successful international organisations. Their successes largely stem from the fact that they were combined and concerted efforts between North America and Europe. These institutions have stood the test of time and instead of being crushed under the avalanche of political change, they have demonstrated their ability to adapt. They have emerged more mature and able to cooperate with the new demands made upon them.

The United Nations and in particular its Security Council has begun to function optimally for the first time in its fifty year existence. The Gulf Crisis and the recent peacekeeping initiatives in Yugoslavia and Cambodia prove the effectiveness of the UN Charter. This is a very promising evolution which must be particularly appreciated by Canada with its long-time UN peacekeeping tradition.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established in the framework of the United Nations Charter, is another post-Second World War initiative. To a certain extent it is a prolongation in peace time and an institutionalization of the transatlantic alliance which successfully ended the Second World War with the defeat of fascism.

Permit me to pay tribute to the important role played by Canada in the political consultation process which preceded the signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949, exactly 43 years ago. In April 1948 the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, was the first one to launch in public the idea of a mutual transatlantic defence system. He was very active in convincing the US foreign minister George Marshal of the uniqueness and usefulness of such a system. Article 4 of the Washington Treaty,

which stipulates the obligation on the part of member countries to consult in the event of a perceived threat, was included in the final treaty following the explicit request of Canada.

It has always been NATO's primary objective to prevent war through creating the proper climate for dialogue while at the same time maintaining a credible defence capability in the framework of NATO's collective and integrated defence structure. The recent developments have proven how effective the Alliance's approach towards the potentially explosive East-West relationship has been throughout the entire period from 1949 to the present situation. NATO's policies have been more than instrumental in defusing the political and ideological stalemate between east and west, NATO and the now abolished Warsaw Pact. This demonstrates the non-validity of the often-used argument that the mere existence of a strong military capability makes its use unavoidable.

The way in which the Alliance has dealt in the past with the Soviet ideological and military threat was always the result of a delicate and continuous political consultation process. It was this permanent process which paved the way for the political compromise between the 16 allies. Since the Alliance's policy cannot be but the consequence of consensus amongst the 16 sovereign governments, each of them has to contribute to this difficult process and has to demonstrate its political willingness actively and creatively to participate in reaching the most credible compromise. It is inherent to membership of the Alliance that governments must solve their domestic problems in their national, political and parliamentarian environment. Attempts to shift domestic problems to an international forum, such as the North Atlantic Council, and to expect allies to solve the problem for you, seriously handicaps the already vulnerable consensus reaching process. In other words domestic problems should not be solved at the cost of the Alliance's solidarity.

If we now look at the way NATO has reacted and adapted to the almost entirely changed political-military environment in the world and in Europe in particular, one must reach the conclusion that the Alliance, in spite of it not being an easy decision-taking institution, has done remarkably well and at an unprecedented speed.

The uniqueness of NATO is that it is the only organisation that can guarantee the security of its members. It alone is capable of action as well as consultation. If we could not continue to do this effectively, the Alliance would have failed in its primary objective. Recognizing the changed political environment, the Rome Summit of NATO leaders in November 1991 adopted a new strategic concept. It is a strategy with no specified enemy and no predominant scenario and with a minimum of forces. Between now and the end of 1994 our forces in Europe will have been reduced by 50%. We will have reduced the level of readiness, and of large scale exercises and will have de-activated a large number of military installations. NATO's remaining forces will be made more flexible and mobile to be able to defend against all types of risks. NATO's new strategic concept stresses the cooperative dimension of security, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Another important aspect of our adapted force structure will be its multinational composition. The initial Canadian plan to reduce considerably its forces stationed in Germany fit perfectly into NATO planning. The forces remaining after 1995 were to symbolize the continued Canadian military commitment to collective defence. The more recent unilateral decision which calls for a total disengagement of ground and air forces from Europe, with the exception of small numbers assigned to ACE Mobile Force and NATO's Airborne Warning and Control system, seems to be the wrong signal to Canada's European allies. It also takes no account of the pressing and continued pleas on the part of some, if not all, of the Central and Eastern European partners. The decision affects the transatlantic dimension of NATO's collective defence and could have an adverse effect on the debate in the United States. As a European it seems to me that the modest budgetary savings in the long run are nowhere comparable with the negative political impact on the Alliance's solidarity in general and transatlantic solidarity in particular.

NATO, however, is not the type of institution that sees its future role solely as an insurance policy for its members. Today NATO is doing much more. At the Rome Summit the Allies further extended the hand of friendship apparent in the London Declaration by creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council - an institutionalized framework of consultation, cooperation and assistance intended to draw the new democracies of Central and Eastern

Europe and the new states of the former Soviet Union into the new Europe and to help them overcome the difficulties of transition. If we achieve this ambitious objective and succeed in integrating them into the Western economy and institutions, we will have eliminated the most likely future risks to security and stability in Europe.

In the meantime the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has met at the level of Defence Ministers and at the level of Chiefs of Staff. A detailed work plan was agreed upon and the Council has the potential to evolve rapidly evolving into the primary security forum of a future Euro-Atlantic, provided it receives the political support of all NATO members. It would almost be inconceivable if this unique effort, in which all our cooperation partners have invested so much hope, would be seriously hampered in its endeavours by the obstinate resistance of one or two of our allies.

Is NATO's enhanced relationship with Central and Eastern Europe working to the detriment of the CSCE? Not at all. NATO has recommended a variety of proposals which have all been implemented and have had but one goal: to improve the CSCE. But it will take time for the CSCE with its more than 50 members, to become effective. Its decision-making process is based on consensus and it has little structure or experience. But NATO is fully committed to the ultimate success of the Helsinki Process.

This applies to European Political Unification as well. The Alliance actively encourages a unified European role in security and defence. The European Community in the Maastricht Summit of December 1991 received a mandate for the European Union to define and implement a common foreign and security policy. The future security policy must be compatible with the one established within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, the strategic unity and indivisibility of one security will be maintained and the transatlantic link will be strengthened. Therefore the emergence of a European security and defence identity will provide better security for all of us.

Why then do we need the combined commitment of the United States and Canada? Their participation and presence, political and military, is essential for the stabilization of power in Western Europe. Without them Europe could return to its traditional power politics and old rivalries. Their presence further contributes to the stabilization process in Eastern Europe. But North America

needs Europe as well and North America should not become isolated. The United States, as the only remaining superpower, can no longer lead alone and carry the burden all by itself.

To conclude, let me once again make a personal reflection. The political climate in Europe is deteriorating. The traditional political parties are encountering great difficulties. The new coalition governments are, for the most part, non-viable. Within these governments, parties are profiting by way of malcontent manipulated by politicians with few scruples who play disproportionately important roles. It is within this political reality that great decisions are imposed. The Maastricht Accord foresees an ambitious, political calendar. Without being pessimistic, after all I was a European Federalist in the 1950's, the governments of the 12 EC countries must prove that they are capable of respecting their engagements. A certain prudence should be adopted. If the European Community does not become a political union with a common foreign and security policy, and if our allies in North America withdraw more or less from Europe, then Europe risks beginning the 21st century in a climate of growing instability. Thank you.

Gordon Hamilton, Masters student, Public Policy Administration, Concordia University

Mr. Triestram, in your opinion what will be the role of the NACC once it has become more fully developed?

Mr. Triestram

Well, first of all, I should like to say that NACC is not an initiative which was readily taken by the 16 members of the Alliance. I think the only reason it was taken was because of the very high pressure on the part, in particular, of the Central European countries. They refused to take no for an answer and thus, NATO decided to initiate the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The mandate of this council is a vague one. In other words, everything concerning security can be discussed. It will be up to the initiative and intuitiveness of our partners, of which we have 20 by now, to give impetus to the NACC. You know that we have accepted a very ambitious working plan. There will be cooperation with our partners on practically all levels of NATO cooperation. There will be a parallel instrument for consultation. The NACC Defence Planning Committee, in which France does not participate by the way, meets at the level of Defence Ministers . Then we have a certain military cooperation between the military chiefs of staff of NATO and the military chiefs of staff of the partners. So there is a very large framework for consultation.

Jeremy Kinsman

First of all, Canada has not disengaged its forces from Europe. We have decided, instead of keeping Canadian families in Europe, to have our soldiers live in Canada with their families and go back to Europe as needed. You have to realize that we are not talking about soldiers, we are talking about families and I think we have to make this point because our distinguished visitor suggested that we were disengaging our forces from Europe - that is not true! Each soldier's family in Germany, arguably the most wealthy country in the world, costs Canada $150,000.

Let me make another point, simply to clarify something. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council may have been difficult to sell to some NATO allies, but it sure wasn't difficult to sell to Canada. Prime Minister Mulroney proposed it in California, at Stanford University in September 1991. Indeed we were fighting for it because we heard the Central Europeans from the very beginning.

Major Morneau, 5th Canadian Brigade in Valcartier

I would like to address my question to Mr. Triestram. NATO was created during the cold war because of two conflicting ideologies, the east and west. With the evolution in the geo-political sector of late we ask ourselves today about this *raison d'etre*? If the threat has disappeared, must NATO maintain itself even though its primary *raison d'etre* has disappeared? We see today economic globalization and the close interrelationship of international politics. Could NATO, or more specifically its military establishment, be used by the UN to project its intentions, not only in Europe but outside of Europe?

Mr. Triestram

Allow me to remind you that there are three *raisons d'etre* which, in fact, have not changed, and which give a certain importance to the survival of the Atlantic Alliance.

First of all, the North Atlantic Council constitutes a permanent forum for consultation. Even countries that have great difficulty with a new mandate for the Alliance profit greatly and recognize that it is a desired arena for consultation.

Second, there is within NATO the guarantee of collective defence. I speak to you as the representative of a very small country, Holland. For countries like mine, there is no alternative to our defence other than participating in collective defence. You don't see the Netherlands defending itself alone. It is impossible and the cost would be exorbitant. Small countries, and remember that there are many within the Atlantic Alliance -- there are more small countries than there are large ones -- maintain that NATO continues and survives if only to ensure collective defence.

The third point is the coupling of the security of Europe with that of North America.

I think that placing everything on the United Nations would be risky. I believe that the CSCE could be the organization which more easily takes on the role to which you alluded. With more assigned areas of competence, an organization (and why not the North Atlantic Alliance), could provide assistance or military intervention in Europe. We have always recognized other regions as the "out of area problem". Since the changes in 1989 this region has the tendency to widen a little. It is no longer very clear what is "out of area".

Brigadier Jim Bevan, British Defence Advisor, Ottawa

Mr. Kinsman, first of all, as I understand it, the 1100 Canadian soldiers which are now not staying in Europe are actually being cut out of the order of battle completely, and in fact another defence cut. But my question is: are any of the troops left here in Canada actually going to be assigned to NATO? From what you said, I understand they are.

Mr. Kinsman

As a professional soldier, you realize that one of the problems with moving soldiers is that you are moving people and people have human needs. We have so many people, soldiers, who live alone without their families, whether it be in Cyprus or now in belligerent Yugoslavia or elsewhere, that our problem as I said was not one of stationing troops in Europe but of stationing families and that is simply what the Canadian public can't understand. Yes, we could leave soldiers behind but it would mean leaving soldiers again behind without their families. Under these circumstances, if you join the military, if you are a soldier, you'd have to spend more than half your career

without your family and we simply wouldn't be able to recruit or retain people in the services if that were the case. What we are going to do here is dedicate a brigade from Canada to Europe, precisely to make the same military contribution that we would have made earlier. Yes indeed, the Canadian defence plan is to cut overall the number of forces and as you know, to reconfigure our forces into a much more mobile, lightly armed type of configuration rather than the heavily armoured configuration we had in Europe. Bear in mind that the troops we had in Europe, with their heavy tanks and heavy armour bore no relationship to any conceivable threat to Canada and made no contribution to our peacekeeping role. They were there to respond to a notion of an attack by Russian tanks rolling over Prussia which is never going happen. And so it wasn't just a question of moving troops, it was a question of changing the structure and configuration of those troops.

Don Macnamara, President of the CISS, Professor, Queen's University

Mr. Kinsman, I would like to follow up on the previous question. I find it very difficult to understand some of the complexities in your argument. Barely a year ago, the Department of External Affairs was putting tremendous pressure on the Department of National Defence to leave troops in Europe - very much an External Affairs pressure - not just an initiative but a continuing pressure. Then all of a sudden there has been a change about this, perhaps exclusively based on the cost of leaving families. I will not comment on how much it costs us to keep diplomats abroad but the fact is that you concluded your argument this morning by saying that Canada should be much less inward-looking and much more outward-looking. Surely that means that we should be much less selfish and much more selfless as befitting our history as indicated by both of our other speakers in terms of our involvement in Europe. So my question is what are the other pressures if they are not simply financial? Are there cultural pressures, value pressures that are bringing this to bear? Are there political pressures that are bringing it to bear? I would think that perhaps it would be easier to try and explain to the Canadian population why the families have to be there and perhaps integrate the Canadian families into the local economy and thereby reduce the costs rather than leaving no troops there at all and withdrawing our total commitment from Europe.

Jeremy Kinsman

First of all, I really have got to clarify the issue of commitment to Europe. There is no change in our commitment to Europe. The challenges in Europe, today and tomorrow, don't have anything to do with these troops and their families in Europe, they have to do with our ability to aid Russia and the other republics to the tune, right now, of upwards of $4 billion. They have to do with the ability of Canada and our partners to fashion intervention mechanisms, drawing from NATO's unique success and resources to intervene in ethnic conflict in these places. They don't have to do with our ability to dismantle nuclear weapons in those places. They don't have to do with patterns of troop stationing based on perceptions and patterns that existed in 1955.

Now what has changed since last September? There was a coup in Moscow - a coup that didn't work. The enemy no longer is there. Second, what else has changed? The deepest recession in Canada since the 1930s. And I appreciate what you are saying. There were arguments about this recession and its impact. It is a very real thing. Our reasons for keeping troops in Europe were political, they were not military. Our reasons were to ensure a visible North American troop presence in Europe. We had no illusions that Canadian soldiers made a big tilt one way or the other strategically, though they always did a terrific job and are very respected. But of course we knew that it was part of a North American commitment, along with 375,000 American soldiers. Those American soldiers are going down now to 145,000 and prophetic people predict it will be down to about 85,000 or 95,000 by the end of 1993.

Things are changing and we have to have the ability to change with them. This is one change which the government, listening to people, thought was a valid one to propose. It was proposed not because the situation is the same as September 1991 but because the situation is very different from last September and we have new demands and new challenges. Canada's commitment to European security, to NATO, and to our allies has not lessened in any way.

Don Macnamara

I hope that the Canadian people can be told in a very clear way why the Canadian forces in Europe, in lieu of their current contribution to peacekeeping efforts in Yugoslavia, might not be better left in Europe to continue to stabilize southeastern Europe. I hope they can be told why other elements of the Canadian Forces could not be left there to contribute to CSCE arms control initiatives, to maintain a presence and to be seen cooperating with our allies on the ground.

Andrew Christie

Ladies and Gentlemen, we must close this session off. On your behalf, at this time I would like to thank once again Ms. Paquette, Mr. Kinsman, and Mr. Triestram for their very illuminating presentations this morning and for contributing to our discussions. Thank you very much.

George G. Bell

Whither Canada?
Long Term Strategic Requirements

John Young, Head, Department of Strategic Studies, College Militaire Royale, Session Chair

I would like to call the second session of the morning to order. I should note, in passing, that my department is the only department of strategic studies in this country and many of our students are here today. I would like to thank Alex Morrison, very sincerely, for having the good idea of holding one of the annual seminars of the CISS in Montreal. I hope we have another soon. This session provides three different overviews from different perspectives on the transatlantic relationship.

We are privileged indeed to have Brigadier-General (ret'd) Dr. George Bell with us today.

General Bell was the driving force behind the formation of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies in 1976 and served as its President for that time until 1990. He is currently the Chairman of the CISS Board of Directors.

Following a successful and distinguished career in the Canadian Army in war and in peace, he was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs of the Province of Ontario. Subsequently, he became, successively, Vice-President, Finance and Development and Vice-President External Relations and University Development of York University. In addition, he carried out extensive teaching and research in three faculties at York.

Dr. Bell is the Colonel Commandant of the Royal Canadian Army Corps, an appointment which, together with his continuing study and research and his work as the chairman of the CISS Board, ensure that he remains one of the most knowledgeable and thoughtful Canadians in the fields of strategic, foreign and defence policy.

George Bell

In addressing the question "Whither Canada?", I want to talk about where we are going and where we have been, and perhaps where our deficiencies lie in the area of long range strategic requirements or strategic planning. I will mention the subject of strategic planning in the broadest sense and then go on to talk about it in terms of Canada's interests in Europe and in particular, the kinds of decisions our government has been making recently.

Why are we here today? Well I think we are here because the subject of Canada and Canadian involvement in Europe, in NATO, and in the growing European-Atlantic community is of significant interest. Some of us will support the government's decisions and some of us will argue against them. But with the three discussions we have had this morning and the ones we have coming later, I am sure that we are going to illuminate a number of ideas. We will not all leave here agreed, but we will leave here more conscious of some of the issues that confront Canada with its recent domestically-focused decisions. Jeremy Kinsman in his presentation helped me very much, because he saved me the task of providing the background for the current situation of Europe. He stressed the constantly changing picture of the evolution of the newly-free East European and Central European nations, the gradual adherence of those nations towards NATO; the impact of Northern European nations becoming more involved with the European Community and the range of institutions we have to put together to deal with the security situation in the North Atlantic and Eurasian areas. It is in this setting, of course, that we come later to consider what our importance is in NATO.

One of the causes that I, and many others at the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, have engaged in for more than fifteen years has been the advocacy of the necessity for strategic analysis and strategic planning in order to build a national security strategy or a matrix of strategies with a view to maximizing Canada's national power, or if you prefer, our overall capabilities. That is, with a view to providing our national security and our

capability of participating in international security regimes. I want you to consider this in the broadest sense and to understand that I am using "national power" to mean: "the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behaviour of other nations." National power is not an absolute, it changes up and down as world situations, challenges and competition occur. It is also important to note that there are limitations and to understand that the power we have may not be fully applicable in the management of our particular policies or because in some situations which develop it is not always appropriate to use all of the power we have.

Having said this, I now want to focus on why we started talking about this subject and perhaps focus a little on the European situation in doing it. If you turn your minds back to around 1960 - 1961, just after the Berlin crisis, we had the first reduction of the armed forces, in the summer of 1962, just before the Cuban Missile Crisis. The government of the day applied the dollar factor, and the defence and civil defence budget were cut. We had a Prime Minister who had the illusion that the European Economic Community, or Common Market, which started in 1955, was not to be the focus for Canada. His emphasis was on keeping Britain out of the Common Market and an attempt to divert Canadian trade from the United States to the United Kingdom. This was also the period when we had the drastic impact on our whole industrial scientific and technological base of decisions such as the cancellation of the Arrow Aircraft project, which resulted in the fleeing from this country of much of the technological research and development personnel and knowledge associated with defence and, indeed, the type of research and development that might have helped domestic industries. Less than ten years later, we had a similarly catastrophic situation with the government of Pierre Trudeau, which reduced our forces in NATO, withdrew Canada from the international scene to a large degree and considered it to be, and thus made it, a much smaller nation. At the same time, that government was trying to apply the "third option" of a series of economic options by attempting to establish a link with the European Economic Community. But that fell on stony ground for quite a while until we got our head around the idea that European politicians did not have three heads, one for politics, one for economics and one for the military. It was clear from their resistance that they only had one head and they thought about political, economic and

military policies together and not as separate compartments. It was not until 1974-75 that Canada was actually able to establish that link. The favourable decision then related to what was in fact the confirmation and the strengthening and the firming up of the commitment of the "interim force" that we had stationed in NATO Europe by making it more substantial and more permanent.

When I come to current actions, I'm going to refer to these past events in some additional detail, because we are really looking at the impact of negative images created by the actions that we are taking in the withdrawal of land and air forces. I am not saying that we should not make change. I am saying that the long term effects on Canada will be costlier than the 900 million dollars we think we are saving. I am sure that we will be losing key staff positions throughout the NATO structure; positions that we fought very hard to reclaim after the debacle of 1969-1970, when we reduced our staff positions from 400 to 125. Some of the positions that were later held by Major-General Christie and others, we obtained only through very hard diplomatic and military negotiations over a period of years. These key positions which are in areas of importance to us in terms of information, of access, and of influence will gradually disappear. One cannot hold onto them if one does not have anything in the game.

What the impact of all this will be on the access of our business community to Europe is difficult to forecast but there will be a much cooler environment than that which Canada enjoyed previously. Our business community really has not done as much in the European scene as it should have in preparing for the European integration in 1992. This very year is supposed to be the culminating year of that coming together of the twelve member states of the European Community. Remedying this situation will now be made more onerous by our actions. We seem to have failed to perceive fully the importance of active participation in all of the dimensions - the political, economic and military dimensions - together. In terms of economic strategy, as a nation, we appear unprepared to perceive the importance of being inside the European Community from the point of investment, the point of joint-ownership and joint ventures. Canada is well behind the curve in terms of investment related to the size of our economy compared to our American allies or compared to other nations such as Japan. We also do not seem to be as aware as we should be of this growing community in Europe to which the

northern neutral states are coming closer, and where the Eastern and Central European states are seeking participation. In the not too distant future, we are going to see a market, not of just 300 million but progressively adding 110 million and up, perhaps, rising to 500 million. One only needs to talk to and listen to the President of the European Community, Jacques Delors, to understand the objectives of the European Community for the future. In time a very, very strong trading bloc will exist and Canada needs to have effective access to it. So as we look at Europe, we are not looking at it just in military terms, we are looking at the whole political, economic and military scene. What I'm trying to say is that, in foreign political, economic and military affairs, we need to do a thorough analysis of all of our interests in Europe, set our objectives, identify the linkages and assign priorities to this and other regions.

As Laure Paquette said this morning, when talking about strategy, nations like Canada must indulge in considerations which in previous times would fall into the category of "grand strategy", because today national security strategy, involves all aspects of the nation. Canada's strategy for Europe and the developing Euro-Atlantic area must be a security strategy derived from a comprehensive and coherent national strategic analysis covering all regions of the world. The framework should include a number of strategies: industrial strategy, manpower strategy, communication strategy, energy strategy, transportation, finance, and military strategies, etc. If you look back at the work of the CISS, I would recommend to you to read the early seminars in 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980 in particular. There you will find that many of the issues of today which are being discussed in David Crane's Toronto Star columns about the economy were discussed then, and many of these earlier conclusions were the same as to what should happen and what we needed to have in the way of strategies linked together to make this nation work. To do this, of course, we have to develop in Canada a real consensus and identification of what our interests are and that is a subject where the leadership must be given by governments and people must be made to know what our national aims and objectives are. It is now twenty-one years since *Foreign Policy for Canadians* was published by the Government of Canada. Then some very general national aims were set out and a number of policy themes identified, but the plans and priorities were not put in place to implement them and the implementation of social welfare and social justice took

place before we created the economic wealth to afford them. So that is part of the problem that we face today, not just the effects of the recession, because the problem has been the lack of strategic planning, and the lack of integrated planning in our national headquarters.

The responsibility for the development of such a matrix of strategies must be at the federal level, but the body responsible for producing it should be national in composition including representation from all levels of government, and the major sectors of society. It should be at arm's length from the Privy Council Office. We do not have such a body now, so the outputs of the ill-fated Economic and Science Councils and many institutes like our own, have no effect or no centre for coordination, analysis and planning except the Privy Council Office which is overloaded with current domestic affairs, and has very little time to deal with long-term planning.

In all this, the major question is what are our priorities to be in terms of the regions of the world and the emphasis which is to be given. The allocation of effort for each region of the world must be established by a critical analysis and should be related to a set of clear aims and objectives and a time-frame for achievement for each region or sub-region. By that I mean out of an analysis must fall such considerations as: Is Europe the most important area in the next 10 years? How is the Pacific Rim evolving? What are the relevant resources? Can we in fact do less in Europe or should we be doing far more in the European-Eurasian scene?

The strategies must be developed with a view to the long term, not just a period of a government. The studies have to be done for much longer periods. We have to look out farther, look at what could happen, look at what is happening in the regions of the world in terms of development, in terms of instabilities, in terms of their military and economic structures. These analyses have to be reviewed and revised periodically in the light of changes in the global and regional situations. It is not a static process, it is one that is constantly ongoing.

Our country has a great deal of potential power. Although we have achieved the position as the world's seventh largest economy, we have not achieved our potential due to the lack of long-term strategic and policy planning, and the somewhat haphazard development, from time to time, of public policies, many of which function at cross purposes and some of which are

not tailored to our needs. Much of our power is being diffused. Many of the current issues that have been looked at before in our seminars and many recommendations made, including the recommendation for some form of body to do the analysis on a national level, are still valid.

When one looks at recent decisions in defence policy, one may ask what the strategic rationale was, besides money, for the withdrawal of our forces from Europe. Why did we reduce and withdraw our forces in Europe at a time when the preservation of stability and the protection of peace requires many of the professional skills embodied in our forces? Why are we doing this at a time when we really need to maintain a positive image in Europe and perhaps even to expand our efforts through our participation in maintaining stability and preserving the peace? At home, for example, we have also reduced the Armed Forces when they could be used a superior means of training and retraining of Canadians in skills, trades and leadership. Why not expand and use the most efficient educational system in the nation to improve our human resource base? The nation would benefit, industry would benefit, institutions would benefit and the armed forces would have a current experience in mobilizing for what really is a national emergency of untrained human resources. Canada lacks balance in its skilled trades. Clearly, there are many things that could be done by the Armed Forces where the net benefit would be greater and the overall net budgetary cost would be no greater.

Strategic planning in Ottawa is not really strategic in the global sense. Except for a few ministries, most strategic planning is short-term and domestically oriented. Most ministries do not deal with the external setting, and those that do often deal with it in isolation from the other ministries. The interest of ministries in the Annual Comprehensive Strategic Review, initiated a good number of years ago by Department of National Defence, was abysmal. It found little favour among the resident mandarins. It would appear that it was not in their interest to spend a lot of time thinking about things outside the boundaries of the country unless their ministry was directly involved. While the Department of External Affairs seems to have a greater strategic sense and has strongly supported a credible military presence in Europe to complement other political and diplomatic actions, DND seems to have lost its strategic perception and would appear to have become a mere shaper of defence policy based on expediency and the selection of a least-worst

scenario based on an overemphasis of the single factor of finance. This is not difficult to understand because finance has been the bane of the armed Forces existence since 1962. There has not been a decade since the1960s, when we have not had a series of budget cuts and therefore one can become gun shy.

The full impacts of withdrawing our forces from Europe, of the drastic cuts in force structure at home, and of the reductions in the capital equipment programs are not being exposed nor fully articulated to the Canadian population. These have become major problems which need much public discussion. So far there has been little public outcry because Canadian citizens are preoccupied with their own economic circumstances and the constitutional debate which has sapped our energies for more than twenty-six years. A few of those who are affected by base closures and those who have had cancellations or truncation of contracts, have sounded the alarm. But they are very few and although they are somewhat vocal there is no general focused attack upon such short-sighted policies. This situation should not be blamed solely on the Mulroney government. Many of the situations we face today result from the policy decisions or lack of decisions in the Trudeau era. One should look back at foreign and defence policy in the 1970s and the three-year flat budget period for defence in that period involving re-allocation of resources from defence to other domestic areas of government, such as social welfare and social justice.

On the question of our European relations today, the projected political and economic integration of Western Europe in 1992 and beyond and the progressive adherence of Northern, Eastern and Central Europeans to the European Economic Community should be a cause of great concern about increased economic competition and problems of market access for countries like Canada, which lacks a strong economic foothold in the countries of the European Community. The related impacts of success or failure of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is of vital importance. What is to be our position if the GATT talks are not successful? Have we considered how we are going to deal with the European Community under those circumstances?

Images are important in international relations, particularly in alliance, political, economic, and military decision-making circles. The impact of our

withdrawal of our stationed ground and air forces from NATO, despite the realignments and reductions of other allies, will be seen in negative terms. This will be particularly so, since Canada was a charter member and a prime advocate for the creation of NATO. We will be seen to have left the field before the consolidation phase is complete and continued peace is ensured.

I believe that Canadian interests in Europe are important. When we consider together the drastic actions by our current government in reducing defence related foreign aid and development budgets and the pull out of our troops in Europe, the impact on Canada's long-term international position is likely to be great. It is clear that our country lacks a long-term strategy or matrix of strategies to deal with the future security of Canada in the broadest terms. Leaders who attempt to separate the political and economic dimensions from the military dimension fail to perceive the real linkages and the negative images which this creates among the allies. In a period in which Western Europe is integrating, and in which the newly free Eastern and Central states are adhering to NATO and the European Community, our short sighted actions are affecting and will continue to affect our future participation in the key crisis management forums in Europe. They also affect negatively our ability to gain European support for our position in the United Nations and the access of our business and industry to that ever-growing economic bloc. The potential for being marginalized by our own imprudent actions is immense and we are increasingly in danger of being seen as an inconsequential satellite of the United States with no real voice in the discussions which affect long-term national security. I recommend to you most strongly a 1989 CISS pamphlet, *Security and Sovereignty*, for a fuller discussion of this latter point.

Our policy and our strategy towards Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community needs to be reviewed and developed, and the inappropriate decisions reversed or modified. Canadian interest in Europe must be continued at a high level. It is a major source of power; it is a major source of markets; it is a major source of finances, where we do some of our borrowing; it is a source of political support for us in major institutions of the international community. We also need to be very cognizant of the impact of the United States of America single superpower strategy and the implications for us if we do not have a sounding board in the NATO Military Committee, the NATO Defence Planning Committee, and the North Atlantic Council of NATO and CSCE and

other forums. We have to be aware of the relative importance of other regions of the world such as the Pacific Rim, the Middle East, and Latin America. We must rank them in terms of importance and establish the evolutionary time-frame for action in each of these areas. I believe that right now, with the on-going evolution in the Eurasian area, Europe should be at the top of our list. In terms of military forces, I think that the way we have planned to implement our decisions is very wrong. We could have done better. First of all, the timings could have been changed and the method could have been changed. The committing of the contingency brigade group to NATO as an "assigned" force or as an "earmarked" force has not been done yet. This should be done. It means we have to make decisions on having pre-positioned equipment so we can fly over to Europe and train on equipment *in situ*. Otherwise, we have to work out how we move the brigade group in our allied shipping. Now that is not impossible, because in the Gulf War our ferries went from Newfoundland and the roll-on-roll off ships of Federal Navigation from Montreal went from the very beginning of the Gulf War to carry American vehicles and equipment across to the Persian Gulf.

There are also many tasks which the Canadian Armed Forces could be performing in support of our arms control and disarmament initiatives and agreements that have been written and signed. We could deal with the verification of reductions. We could work on the control of surplus equipments. We could participate in stability and instability operations in the newly free states. The current Yugoslav operation is an indicator. By having pre-positioned equipment, we would have a forward base in Europe which would be useful for most peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, in Cyprus, and the Eurasian area. I share Mr. Triestram's view that we have damaged ourselves by our recent actions. Thank you.

Michel Fortmann

The Challenging Alliance: Between Success and Irrelevance

John Young

Our next speaker is Dr. Michel Fortmann, Professor of Political Science at the Université de Montréal.

Dr. Fortmann, in addition to his teaching responsibilities, is also the Director of the Military and Strategic Studies programme at U de M. With Dr. Albert Legault, he is the author of *Une Diplomacie de l'Espoir: Le Canada et le Desarmement, 1945-1988* which will soon be available in English.

A member of the CISS Board of Directors, Dr. Fortmann is particularly active in the CISS Strategic Liaison Officer programme and serves on the seminar planning committee.

He has written many articles on Canadian and American defence matters, arms control, European security and most recently, his research has been concentrating on various aspect of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Michel Fortmann

In the wake of the dramatic events which have modified the European strategic landscape it is reassuring to find a feature which hasn't changed. European security is still based on a striking paradox. Up to 1989, this paradox resided in the fact that Europe was at the same time the most heavily armed part of the world and the most peaceful. Today another paradox is

emerging. On the one hand, the old threats are gone, the Warsaw Pact has been disbanded, thousands of Soviet tanks are rusting beyond the Urals, CSCE states have agreed on a *Magna Carta* which sets out the principles on which the future of Europe's security will be based and, finally, a whole set of new institutions have been built or adapted in order to maintain stability on the continent. On the other hand, one could as easily underline that this apparent orderliness is an illusion and that what some see as a pan-European security structure is no more than an alphabet soup of acronyms, a murky broth stirred by dark undercurrents such as political, economic, and social dislocation in the East, tribal warfare in the South, and increasingly disconnected national security policies in the West. In some way, this new paradox is more worrying than the first in that it does not reflect an underlying geostrategic order as in the past, but suggests a growing and fundamental disconnection between policies and the underlying reality to which these policies apply. In other words, there seems to be a growing gap between perceptions and realities. The main risk facing Europe's security policies today resides in their potential irrelevance vis-a-vis the real threats to Europe's stability. While regime building is certainly a worthy cause in the post-Cold War environment, we must consider whether we are building the right structure or simply the Maginot Line of the future.

Using the NATO Strategic Review as a case study, the purpose of my presentation will be to answer this question while showing both sides of the coin. More specifically, NATO's adaptation to the post-CFE environment and the end of the Soviet Empire could be described as an amazing success and I shall attempt to expand on that. At the same time, however, looking at recent events which challenged the new security order in Europe, especially Yugoslavia, one could argue convincingly that if the Alliance continues on the course it has set for itself in the last two years, it is in real danger of being disbanded before the end of the century, or even before the end of the decade, not because some grand architecture will have replaced it but because of sheer irrelevance.

The New and Improved NATO Alliance: A Success Story

First, let us examine the positive side: How did NATO adapt to the end of the Cold War? The answer is obvious: beautifully well.

Six points may be made in that regard. I will name them and then develop some of them.

1. The NATO Strategic Review was successful as a process[1], which is unusual in an organization known for its resistance to change, its complexity, and its slowness.

2. That process, in turn, has produced a clear and coherent analysis of its new environment and a correspondingly convincing statement of the Alliance's new strategic concept.[2]

3. NATO has succeeded in proposing a new force structure which, although modest in scope, seeks to bridge the gap between linear forward defences and multiple-purpose, rapid reaction, mobile forces.[3]

4. At the political level, the Alliance has succeeded remarkably well in harmonizing its own review with the growing assertiveness of a European security identity which threatened the very existence of NATO.[4]

5. Along the same lines, instead of attempting to replace the various institutions which had a potential role to play in the future European security environment, the Alliance has actively promoted a framework of interlocking institutions and mechanisms which would -- each in its own way -- contribute to Europe's stability.[5]

6. Finally, in creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), in December of 1991, NATO has taken the lead in opening a new era of dialogue and partnership with its former enemies.[6]

Now, let us examine some of these points in more detail.

First, regarding the NATO Strategic Review process, one cannot fail to be struck by its speed, its coherence and its effectiveness. Indeed, since the start of the Vienna negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 1989, the Alliance has begun to look at the European security environment "beyond CFE" in order to adapt itself to a situation of parity with the Warsaw Pact. Specifically, Chapter III of the Alliance Comprehensive Concept, adopted in the spring of 1989, and a series of studies carried out under the authority of the Military Committee in early 1990, had already reflected NATO's preoccupation with adapting itself to a changing situation.

Moreover, in the spring of 1990, NATO leaders called, on three separate occasions, for a review of the existing strategy.

The first occurred at the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting on May 22-23, 1990, when Defence Ministers tasked the DPC Permanent Representatives to review the military strategy as set out in MC 14/3. This was followed up by the Turnberry North Atlantic Council (NACC) meeting on June 7 and 8, 1990, during which Foreign Ministers instructed the Council in Permanent Session to oversee the work with a view to ensuring its effective coordination and to report regularly on its progress. Finally, at the London Summit, on July 5 and 6, 1990, NATO Heads of State ad Government endorsed the DPC and NACC decisions.[7]

Accordingly, three task forces have been established:

- The Military Committee has created the Military Strategy Review Group (MSRG) which has been put in charge of developing NATO's new force structure;
- On the civilian side, the Strategy Review Group (SRG), chaired by Deputy Secretary General Michael Legge, was in turn tasked to define the new Alliance strategic concept, i.e. the threat assessment and "job description" of the future Alliance;
- The NAC itself, in brainstorming sessions, has taken up the difficult task of overseeing the whole process.

This three-tiered approach, although not without problems and frictions, has worked so well that six months after the London Summit drafts of the new Alliance Strategy and Force Structure were available, long before the Rome Declaration of 1991. The best illustration of NATO's success came when France - which had at first refused to participate in the Review - realized that it was running the risk of being completely isolated from the Allies, and decided to join the SRG in February 1991.

In a nutshell, then, the experience of the review shows that NATO, far from being a senile bureaucracy, has dynamism and stamina. It is ironic then to remember that it had taken NATO six years after Robert McNamara's speech in Athens, to adopt the "flexible response strategy", in a much more stable environment.[8]

Besides bureaucratic celerity, what the Review showed more importantly is that there was a political consensus that the Alliance had to survive as it is still an essential element of Europe's security.

Let us turn now to what the Review produced. The main elements of the Alliance Strategic Concept and Force Structure are widely known; still there are a few fundamental points which deserve to be mentioned.

First, it is quite remarkable that the Review succeeded in going beyond a bland statement regarding the continuing relevance of the Alliance in a post Cold War world. Indeed, the Review went straight to the heart of the matter in stating that:

> a. NATO was and still is the only viable collective defence organization on the continent, and even in the absence of a massive Soviet threat it still has an essential role to play if only as a kind of insurance policy in a more peaceful but also more uncertain environment;
>
> b. the NATO alliance is also the essential forum for consultation among its sixteen members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on their security and defence. As such, as more than a consultative platform, NATO is an irreplaceable decision-making body providing impetus and leadership to European security policy as a whole;
>
> c. Third, only NATO guarantees that North America's security remains tied to that of Europe, thus extending the Alliance's security zone from Berlin to Vancouver and adding the might of a superpower to Europe's already significant political and military capability.[9]

In fact, what the Review is implying is that, whatever the environment, the security risks Europe would have to face in the future could only increase with the disappearance of the one true common defence organization in the region and the concurrent drift or even re-nationalization of European defence policies. Moreover, the dislocation of NATO would quite clearly cut the Atlantic link, thus eliminating the only international actor which can guarantee that the balance of power in Europe remains stable.

Second, and drawing directly from the preceding remarks, the Review raised the problem of the new NATO functions. In the absence of a clear and present military danger, the Alliance could only remain useful if, from a

defence oriented organization, it could evolve into an effective crisis prevention or crisis resolution mechanism. And this is why, according to the Review, NATO would, in the future, have to put the emphasis on:

- political dialogue, cooperation, and arms control in time of peace;
- peaceful resolution of disputes or crisis management during periods of tension; and
- deterrence and defence against any threat or potential aggression.[10]

To summarize all of this further, one could say that the Review implicitly recognized that the main role of the Alliance was to prevent any dramatic shift in the changing balance of power in Europe and that the best way to achieve this was to keep the sixteen nations united. But this could not be stated explicitly. Hence, NATO had no other choice but to change its vocation from a military to a political one: taking the lead in addressing Europe's variegated security problems at large.

Leaving aside the issue of NATO's new force structure – which, although important in general, is not essentially relevant for the present argument – the Alliance had to face three challenges: an emerging competitor in the guise of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the definition of its working relationship with the CSCE, and the opening of a burgeoning dialogue with the Central and Eastern European countries.

Regarding the ESDI, first, suffice it to say that it probably represents the most prominent danger that the Alliance has had to face during the last two years. In essence, the notion of a Common European Defence rests on two basic assumptions:

1. in the short term, the Americans will leave Europe, *ergo* the Alliance will lose its main *raison d'etre*;
2. the process of European political union has progressed enough to assume that the Community could take over NATO's defence and security role.[11]

In practice, for ESDI supporters, this has meant two things: that the centre of European security policy-making should shift from the North Atlantic Council to the European Community and that the Western European Union

should progressively become the military arm of the Community. If this had materialized, the dangers for the Alliance would have been threefold:

1. NATO's defence structure could have been duplicated;

2. the ESDI would have become a competing forum where an inner group of European states would have arranged in advance their security policy among themselves;

3. North American members of the Alliance would have been reduced to the status of hired guns, kept out of the magic circle where policy is made.[12]

The overall strategy the Alliance adopted to fend off this challenge was both simple and effective: instead of attacking the notion of ESDI, the Allies welcomed it as a positive development; in essence, they sought a pragmatic solution that would ensure that the respective roles and tasks of the transformed NATO and the European Security and Defence Identity were carried out in full transparency and in a complementary fashion. The allies thus adopted the Copenhagen principles in order to:[13]

1. reinforce the transatlantic link;

2. maintain the Alliance as the first European forum of consultation on security policy, and

3. establish links between the emerging ESDI and the Alliance to ensure that the Allies who were not currently participating in the development of this identity were adequately involved in decisions that might affect their security.

These principles were stated again at the Rome Summit, in November 1991, and were largely integrated in the European Political Union treaties agreed upon in Maastricht in December of the same year.[14]

In short, the Alliance would remain at the apex of the European security architecture, at least up to 1996.

The Alliance's attitude towards the CSCE has largely been guided by the same principles of complementarity and cooperation. In other words, the Allies stated very clearly that NATO should not become a second CSCE.

Specifically, the CSCE has a unique role to play as the only forum that brings together all the countries of Europe and North America under a common code of fundamental rights and principles.[15] Accordingly, the Allies felt that it was in their collective interest that the CSCE be reinforced in its capacity as a pan-European organ of consultation and cooperation, and also as one of the effective mechanisms for crisis management and for the peaceful settlement of disputes. This, of course, is necessary for NATO does not have the constitutional mandate, nor the membership required to deal with ethnic disputes, political tensions or border clashes in Central and Eastern European countries.

Finally, in the area of the Alliance's relationship with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, NATO again, instead of reacting to the unfolding events, took the lead in attempting to address the issue of the power vacuum created in the East by the retreat of the Red Army and the dislocation of the Soviet Union itself. Specifically, in its ministerial meeting in Copenhagen, the Alliance has clarified its approach to the security concerns of the Central and Eastern European nations: even if these countries are not integrated in the Alliance tomorrow, NATO will nonetheless considerably develop its ties with these countries. Though lacking specific guarantees, this approach will perhaps be a more effective way of helping them feel more secure - both internally in gaining civilian control over their armed forces and externally in acquiring modern military expertise and developing cooperation with the armed forces of other countries in Europe.[16]

Since then, the Alliance has formalized its cooperative network with the Central and Eastern European countries in creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, at the ministerial level, and a whole range of regular contact points, at the ambassadorial or expert level. Just to stress the vital importance of this institutional network, let us simply underline that the crucial issues of nuclear disarmament in the Central and Eastern European countries and the implementation of the CFE Treaty will be addressed in this framework.

III. The Other Side of the Coin

Overall, then, if one takes a bird's eye view of all the six challenges the Alliance has addressed successfully since 1989, it would be difficult not to feel optimistic regarding the Alliance's future as the main pillar of the European

security system. However, if we now turn to what might be rightly conceived as the first real test of this system, namely the Yugoslavian crisis, this optimism is likely to fade rapidly. Indeed, the first war in Europe since 1945 - the Serbo-Croatian War - demonstrated the limitations of the new European security structure once real military emergencies arise.[17] The CSCE remained totally ineffective, so did NATO, not to mention the WEU. The only viable institution was the European Community.

In view of the tremendous efforts that Europeans, and specifically the Allies, have put into the construction of a new security architecture, and in view of the fact that Yugoslavia prefigures the likely type of situation which would threaten Europe's stability in the coming years, it is of prime importance to look at the weaknesses the Serbo-Croatian War revealed regarding Europe's new security system in general, but also the Alliance's.

I would like to underscore eight points in that regard.[18]

1. The Yugoslavian crisis shows that although the signs of danger were there for all to see, Europeans were unable to plan and prepare for it. Indeed, since 1990, tensions had been growing between Belgrade and Zagreb, but the crisis had to reach its boiling point before the Western countries agreed to "face the music".

2. No "concert" of European security institutions will play harmoniously in the future, unless core Allies agree on the manner in which to orchestrate national policies for the purpose of crisis management and to use international organizations to that end. In the word of Uwe Nerlich:

> *"What did happen during the Serbo-Croatian War was that instead of interlocking European institutions as a way to harmonize national approaches, Western Allies blocked each other except - within narrow confines - in the European Community."*[19]

In fact, this interlocking between allies recalled vividly the 19th century competitive alignments which, at the time, had been a prime catalyst for European conflicts.

3. The events of the Balkans have demonstrated that the allies and their new 'partners' from the East did not have a common definition of what constitutes a threat or a risk to Europe's regional stability. Europeans did not seem to agree either on a definition of what kind of conflict or tension would require collective responses.

4. "The war suggests that at present there are two kinds of European security institutions: some have roles but no means (the CSCE, the EC); some have the means but no appropriate role (NATO)".[20] For example, it is hard to see how NATO could develop a role in real "out of area" contingencies, not to speak of intra-Alliance conflicts. If it is unable to intervene in a vital area like the Balkans, in a case where basic international norms are violated. Moreover, along the same lines, the war shows that conflict and tension management will require the use of all means available, namely diplomatic pressures, conflict resolution procedures, peacekeeping methods and ultimately military intervention. Hence the problem is not how to connect existing organisations, as an end in itself, but to look at how organisations, if properly developed, can complement each other in operational terms in a given crisis.[21]

5. If the UN involvement in European contingencies were to become a habit, this would have far-reaching consequences. In essence, what is troubling in the Serbo-Croatian case is that the UN was called in because most of European institutions had failed to offer any solution. The CSCE, in particular, did not use the new Paris Treaty as a source of legitimacy in support of positive collective action, nor did all of NATO's resources contribute to solve the crisis. To the extent that there was an effective interplay between the EC and the UN, this derives in large part from the fact that Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance had a long-standing relationship built on trust and access.[22]

In other words, the real damage done to Europe by the Serbo-Croatian war is that, at a time when a new security culture is emerging in the region and when Europe is opening to the East and to the world, Western countries displayed a blatant inability to cope with a brutal and primitive conflict in their own midst.[23]

The question, of course, is: Was the failure of the European security structure just an accident or does it signal a regressive trend resulting from the re-nationalization and fragmentation of Europe's security policies?

Thus, the war may have been a timely reminder that Europe is at a crossroad, facing strong countervailing trends.[24] It is on its way toward political union; the Helsinki framework has produced a unique pan-European code of conduct;NATO has proved its capacity to evolve accordingly; yet, if events similar to the Yugoslavian crisis are allowed to proliferate, this will show the new European order for what it is: a castle built on sand.

6. Aside from that, the turmoil in the Balkans should also bring home to Europeans that if they do not put their house in order and if they continue to quarrel over the future status of the US in the new European home, they might often hear from Washington that the crisis is purely a "European affair".

7. The peacekeeping operations undertaken in Yugoslavia under UN Security Council resolution 743 should clearly show to NATO military authorities that the new force structure is by no means tailored for the type of low-intensity operations which might be required in the future from the Alliance. This, in turn, raises the question: Should NATO create a kind of peacekeeping corps or should this function be delegated to a specialized European force under the authority of the CSCE or the WEU? I don't have any ready answer to that question, but it seems that Europe will, in all likelihood, require both types of forces in the future, depending on the kind of contingencies. It would, however, be a shame if Europeans had to ask again 31, mostly Third World countries, to bring order in what has been, for 40 years, one of the most peaceful corners of the planet.

8. It should now be clear that the Yugoslavian crisis was a model experience, not because it had catastrophic dimensions but because it challenged the very principle on which the new European security architecture is built.[25] In other words, what is at stake here is not the damage to life and property – however, dreadful – but a set of basic values, i.e. democracy, the rule of law, human rights, which are essen-

tial to political, social and economic development and hence, to a more peaceful and stable world. In short, if disorders of the Yugoslavian type are allowed to multiply, it will be difficult to convince Eastern or Western Europeans that they have a vital stake in promoting an ambitious but ineffective security system.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to quote Ralph Lysyshyn, Canada's Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO who best summed up the situation in saying:

> *'We are finding all the security institutions in Europe proving somewhat inadequate. Their inadequacy is particularly in evidence because in the period 1989-1990 each of them succumbed to hubris. They all said - 'We won the Cold War' and busied themselves with patting themselves on the back. Then the problems came. In Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The CSCE was exposed because it couldn't act without consensus. NATO found it had the wrong kind of military muscle. It was also prohibited from acting by other agendas, insecurities and even prejudices of certain of its members. The EC gambled and took on a big role, expecting it could use economic pressure only to find that in this situation the Serbian irregulars and Croats weren't terribly interested.... They were all exposed, but that should not be a reason to throw them all out. The security situation is full of uncertainties, there are still military risks and we don't know where they will come from.... So, if we turn to find the institutions are somewhat inadequate, this isn't surprising. The idea is to fix these organizations in one way or another.'*[28]

And I might add, let's start with the Alliance!

NOTES

[1]See M. Fortmann, "NATO Defence Planning in a Post-CFE Environment: Assessing the Alliance Strategy Review (1990-1991)" in D. Haglund, O. Mager, Homeward Bound, Allied Forces in the New Germany, Westview Press, 1992, pp. 43-44.

[2]See "The Rome Summit, NATO Transformed" (special issue), NATO Review, December 1991, no. 6.

[3]See D. Meyer, A. Sens, "Multinational Formations in NATO: From Forward Defense to Rapid Action", in D. Haglund, O. Mager, op.cit., pp.91-112.

[4]See M. Fortmann, "In Search of an Identity, Europe, NATO and the ESDI Debate," CISS, Extra Mural Paper, no. 48, Ottawa, 1991.

[5]Speech of Secretary General M. Woerner at the Wehrkunde Meeting, Munich, February 8, 1992, NATO Press Service, p.3.

[6]G. von Moltke, "NATO Takes Up Its New Agenda", NATO Review, February 1992, no.1, p.3.

[7]M. Fortmann (1992), op.cit, p. 43.

[8]R.S. McNamara, "The No-Cities Doctrine," in R. Art et al., The Use of Force, University Press of America, 1983, p. 148.

[9]M. Fortmann (1991), op.cit., p.23.

[10]M. Fortmann (1992), op.cit., p.51.

[11]M. Fortmann (1991), op.cit., pp. 18 and 28.

[12]Ibid, pp. 23-24.

[13]Ministerial meeting of the NAC in Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991, Final Communique.

[14]See "Les textes adoptées a Maastricht", Le Figaro, Paris, 12 December 1991.

[15]M. Woerner, op.cit., p.5.

[16]J. Shea, "The Evolution of NATO's Nuclear and Conventional Strategy", Jane's NATO Handbook, 1992, Jane's Defence Data, London, 1991, p.84.

[17]See J. Goodby, "Peacekeeping in the New Europe", Washington Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 2, Spring 1992, p. 153.

[18]The following argument draws heavily from U. Nerlich, "Indifference or Engagement? Roles for the Atlantic Alliance within the Evolving System of Multinational Crisis Management", Discussion Paper for the 5th Review on Future Tasks of the Alliance, Ebenhausen, March 7-8, 1992.

[19]Ibid, p. 7.

[20]Ibid, p. 8.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid, p. 9.

[23]Ibid, p. 10.

[24]Ibid, p. 11.

[25]Ibid, p. 13.

[26]Quoted in M. Bryans, "The CSCE and Future Security in Europe", Working Paper no. 40, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa, March 1992, p. 16.

Lorne Zakaib

The Realities of Producing for the International Security Market

John Young:

To conclude our morning's activities, we are pleased to have Mr. Lorne Zakaib, President and Chief Operating Officer of SNC Industrial Technologies Inc.

Mr. Zakaib is a graduate of McGill University with a degree in engineering and a diploma in business. Prior to becoming President of SNC, he held a responsible position at Canadian Marconi Company, Tek Aerospace, and IBM Canada.

He has received many awards for his business acumen and accomplishments including: (1) President's Award in 1984 for Manufacturing Excellence (2) Three Mercures, two in 1984 for investments and one for *L'Enterprise de l'Annee*, and (3) winner of *Les Nouveaux Performients* in 1986.

Lorne Zakaib

The title of my presentation, *The Realities of Producing for the International Security Market* , is very interesting title but very long. I would like to shorten it to a single word: *Survival*. That is the kind of business in which I and SNC find ourselves these days.

As you know, SNC procured the Industries Valcartier Inc. in 1980 where we manufactured small calibre munitions until last year. In 1988, SNC

decided to buy Canadian Arsenals which was a crown corporation at the time and it included a facility at St. Augustin for cartridge case manufacturing. Our purchase price was $92 million. In 1988 we were greeted with a 50 percent cut in work which caused a great deal of consternation for SNC. In 1989, I became president. Shortly afterward, in 1991 we took a significant cut in volume. So today we have a $92 million facility which has a capability of accommodating 2,500 people to make munitions of all sizes and associated items such as gas masks. But because of a variety of factors, we only have 650 people working in the whole company. We would like to be able to operate at full capacity with full employment. The context in which we at SNC live is one of rapid change not substantially different from the rest of the world.

When I joined the company in 1969 we had relatively full employment. Suddenly, the Cold War began to melt, and the markets disappeared. It is now thought that we have peace in the world. However, as pointed out earlier, though we may have peace between East and West, we are not sure about the cost of peace. The world map looks a little bit like it did in 1914. We've heard the questions of what is the future role of NATO and in Canada we have enormous public pressure in this area for the reasons that have been mentioned.

The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies is concerned, naturally, with strategy. I prefer to use the word "vision". In my mind, strategy and vision are one and the same. Sadly, neither exists in Canada. We don't trust our government. We don't trust our military. We contemplate our navels. We have a tough time moving the bow forward. The government deficit doesn't help. Certainly there must be better ways to address that problem than the approach we are using today. When we bought Canadian Arsenals in 1986 we were given a ten year period in which we would be a preferred supplier of munitions to the Canadian government. That ends in 1996. The pressures I and SNC face, of course, are ones that say you have to be competitive and that is true - I have to be competitive. I want to ship to the outside world - to those who wish to buy our Canadian products and apply for the necessary government permission. But when I come to ship to the outside world, Department of External Affairs officials tell me of the latest restrictions, which many times mean I cannot sell the product. This knowledge nearly always

comes after I have spent much money trying to ensure that the customer, whoever it may be, is satisfied with our product.

And now Canada has decided to withdraw all of its troops from Europe. We may challenge that decision and debate whether or not we are still a viable performer in NATO but the fact is that the size of our military forces is shrinking. Military demands are decreasing and base and factory closures are increasing not only in North America but throughout Europe. Many respectable companies have been forced into bankruptcy, liquidation or have been absorbed by others.

In the United States, interestingly enough, we just faced this situation very recently. There is a particular requirement for a particular powder that used to be manufactured in Canada but is now not available in Canada because of a problem at the Canadian facility. Thus, we turn to the USA to try and buy it. However, the Americans classify the product as a strategic material. Notwithstanding that we are at peace and that the USA is our closest ally, we can't buy the material. The closures in Canada are causing serious problems. Many in government and in industry are worried about the ability to supply the needed products in a crisis or an emergency.

However, there are many industries still left and now we see some protectionism occurring. In Europe, for example, governments still support many, many of their industries. They talk about offsets and technology transfers. If I sell a gas mask in Norway the Norwegians want me to buy something other than cheese. They want me to buy some kind of .20 calibre round or 20mm round or something of that nature. Our concern is for our particular business, for SNC, and let's face it, it is a business of munitions. It is an interesting experience for defence manufacturers to talk to politicians. Very often they say, "*Munitions are bad. Airplanes are okay. Even Armoured Personnel Carriers are not too bad but gee, when you make munitions, we cannot support you.*" It is hard to understand that mindset which says you can fly the military to a theatre of operations over in a military transport aircraft and put them in a jet fighter but don't give them the ammunition to fire at anything.

SNC has an enormous amount of assets. Our purchase price was $92 million, but today our assets employed are of the order of $150 million. SNC is a private enterprise not a crown corporation. We must provide our

shareholders with a return on assets employed. Now, with $130-$150 million in assets and only 650 people working, the return on assets employed isn't very good.

When SNC purchased Canadian Arsenals, the mentality there at the time, and probably for good reason, was that cost plus was important and peace time deliveries were not. Compare that mentality and that working environment to private enterprise or, for example, a Marconi, or an IBM. If the firm is required to produce 60 items a day, that means it's 60 a day, every day. It does not mean 60 today and 50 tomorrow. That product production-oriented mentality is very difficult to put in place in a crown cooperation which makes our ability to be competitive in an international market place even more difficult.

The other thing that happens as you continue to reduce the value of a company, is the question of critical mass, skill availability and electronics. When I was at Canadian Marconi, the equipment on which I worked was designed for the military but I also did installations for PanAmerican, World Airways, Air France, SAS, KLM, Alitalia because those electronic circuits could be adapted to commercial use. The difference was in the reliability. The systems in the commercial aircraft were used substantially more and therefore, we had some performance problems in this arena. But as you go down in the munitions business and you start to lose skills, they are not easy to replace. They are hard to come by so if you don't have the skills, it is more difficult to be competitive because you must be technically competent to be able to compete in the world marketplace. And, of course, as you lose the skills, the capacity goes down and then the question always arises, in case we need some more what can we do? If you don't have those skills, there is not an awful lot we can do. The debate is always, and will continue to be on the subject of whether Canada can afford a self-sufficient, indigenous supply of munitions, or in fact does it really care? Does the government have the attitude that we can purchase from the USA when the Americans feel inclined to supply us?

The other alternative of course is diversification. Again, I don't know if you know what it is like to try and diversify a company that makes things that go bang. It is not immediately evident as to what you can do - Firecrackers and Roman candles, out, boy, that is a pretty tough marketplace. So diversifica-

tion is not easy. We find many surprises in trying to do that. For example, we diversified into training ammunition, ammunition with limited range, and ammunition which leaves a little red mark of pink soap when it hits you and also lead-free munitions so you can open up some ranges and save some transportation costs. A new technology involved plastic parts and we did not have all the skills we should have had. It took two years to develop these for the training ammunition. So it does take time and we do need help.

Globally, we hear that the levels of munitions inventories are very high. NATO's requirements are, depending on who you talk to, 30 to 60 days of inventory. During the Gulf War we found out that some people had that and a lot of people didn't and those who tried to borrow munitions encountered difficulties.

What is interesting, by the way, is that during the Gulf War, we were submitting nearly a bid a day on one munition or other and didn't get to sell anything except the one we didn't quote and that was protective vests to the United States. They tried to order some but couldn't find a supplier so they came to us because we had a similar vest.

A key concern is the capability to recover no matter what we end up with and that is where the flexibility that we often talk about comes in. The global picture and the vision of the Canadian military is very, very confusing to us. Two years ago we were going to spend an enormous amount of money. The government redid the strategy in September 1991. We started to proceed in accordance with that vision and, lo and behold, very recently of course, with the announcement in the federal budget of further cuts to the defence budget, we ended up with another panic situation.

Interestingly, we just received this week, the military requirements for 1992. Recognizing that it is now April 1992, it is little difficult for our manufacturing people to react because many items require a long lead time. What are the alternatives for SNC and any other companies in this kind of business? A little niche has to be found somewhere. We believe our Canadian gas mask is one of those. It has sold very well in Denmark.

We believe that we have a flexible and adaptable mind set. Tell us what your requirements are and we'll meet them. We are working hard to make sure that our gas mask is a commercial success. Alliances and partnerships

are underway. We have some with Olin. We are making cartridge cases for Olin, shipping them to the United States - the first time that has happened in a long time. And, by the way, we are competitive, which really isn't very easy.

You are aware, of course, of NADIBO which is the North American Defence Industrial Base Organization. The objective is to share the requirements between the USA and Canada and maintain some level of production in both the United States and Canada. Sadly to say, even though NADIBO has been around for an awful long time, there is not an awful lot coming out of it. We continue to talk about it but private enterprise, and particularly manufacturing in Canada today, does not have the time to really wait. We have lost 400,000 jobs in Canada since 1989 and if we don't find something that gives value added in this country and provides some kind of vision, we are in real deep trouble.

In summary, there is not enough time and volume. The problem is that the changes are very rapid and we have very little visibility in dealing with the commercial market. You can know what is happening in the commercial market, you can test it - see what is happening. In this case it is very confidential, very secret. One day you are great. The next day you are downsizing. I believe that Canada wants us to maintain our capabilities. We still have the munition supply program and I feel that it is my responsibility to let the government know. When the next cut occurs and I start to lose the ability to recover and the ability to supply, they must be very much aware that that is their risk. We need overall cooperation - far more than in the past. As a supplier of a very unique product we need a little bit more partnership with the Government of Canada. As I often say - we are not the enemy. We have to work together towards success. That seems to be the best kept military secret I know. We can produce at low cost, by demonstration, having a contract with Olin. I have mentioned some of the solutions briefly - partnership, some specialization in the training ammunition field.

In addition, there are some management options we can explore. In the United States, they have organizations called GOGO's (government owned, government operated) similar to what Canadian Arsenals was - a Canadian crown corporation. They also have a government owned, company operated option, which is GOCO, whereby the government has the assets and hires a company to manage the munition facility. There is a COCO which is com-

party owned, company operated. This is what SNC Industrial Technologies is today. But if we can't find solutions like those and there are others we can come up with, we are going to end up a NO GO. Thank you

REALITIES OF PRODUCING FOR THE MILITARY MARKETS *

Context

- East/West
- Europe 1914
- NATO in question
- Public Pressure
- Government Deficit

Results

- Europe Withdraw
- Shrinking forces
- Diminishing Demands
- Closures
- Many left for shrinking market
- protectionism

Local Concerns

- Former Crown Corporation
- Assets
- Return to Shareholders
- Culture
- Critical Mass
  - Skills
  - Competitiveness
  - Capacity
- Diversification
  - *not that easy*
  - *many surprises*
  - *takes time and help*

Global Concerns

- Level of Inventories
- Capabilities
- Global Picture

Alternatives

- Niche
- Alliance
- Partnership
- Nadibo

Summary

- Not enough time/volume
- Must maintain capabilities
- Need overall cooperation
- Can produce at low cost

Solutions

- Partnership
- Specialization
- Alternative management options

*These bullets accompanied Mr. Zakoth's presentation on overhead projection slides.

LCol Doug Green, National Defence Headquarters

My question is directed to Dr. Bell initially but I was inspired further by Mr. Zakuta's remarks regarding vision and public pressure and trust and also by the recent publication of United States strategic goals, particularly in areas of defence and the settings of possible threat areas. I think there were seven scenarios mentioned. One was perhaps surprised at seeing some of the detail exposed in public but on the other hand, one did see some good in having strategic thoughts exposed to the public.

To return to what I consider a terribly critical problem as described by Dr. Bell, our inability to formulate strategy and to make cuts. Consider the way in which our corporate executives might approach this. Perhaps they would look at it in terms of a product and a customer. The product is strategy, the formulation of strategy, and the customer is the Canadian people who actually spend their hard earned tax dollars so that Canada can to do what it needs to do internally, and of course globally. I put it to you, is there some way we can practically and sensibly improve the way we state the problem? Can we improve the way we sensitize the Canadian public as to our inability to formulate the kind of strategic objectives and targets such as the Americans have done over the last couple of months? Can we in fact improve the way we connect the product, our product, to the customer, that is the folks out on the street? I suppose there is no real answer but I would be delighted to hear your remarks.

George G. Bell

Well, Colonel Green, I think there have been many suggestions as to how in our governmental system we could improve the process, first of all, of developing the strategic analysis that would underlie the developing a set of strategies and creating an effective mechanism for doing that. This is not a new idea. Philip Garigue was advocating it 10-15 years ago. Part of our problem is that we don't have a periodic message going out very often. We produce White Papers on External Affairs or White Papers on Defence sporadically, years and years apart. We need a much better way of articulating the strategic situation in which the country is involved to our publics. Other members of the Alliance, even Japan, do it better because they produce an annual document which actually shows the underlying concepts behind the overall national security strategy and this can be done in terms of the political, economic and other dimensions. I think that to do that, we also need to find ways of communicating more effectively and persistently with our publics. Even situations like what was tried in Mr. Beatty's time with the establishment of a National Speakers Bureau on Canadian Defence Policy. We seem to have the inability to continue to talk if we have an election coming. The writ comes down and everybody goes silent instead of being professional diplomats and professional military people who can talk about our subjects without being (capital 'P' political in any sense. So it really is a public education task. There are underlying facts concerned with values and with our history and our understanding of our relationships in the world that need to be communicated to the Croatian public for example. It really hasn't been done well by the Secretary of State for External Affairs either. There is lots of scope for action. There is no shortage of ideas of how to do it. There are the limitations of a responsible government system.

Michael Webber, Brig-Gen (Ret'd)

I would like to address my remarks to Mr. Zakaib who gave, what I thought, a somewhat humorous description of the decline and fall of the Canadian defence industry in which I had an interest in at one time. In telling us all his troubles, he mentioned, rather in passing, the self-imposed restrictions on the sale of defence and security equipment outside our own borders. I would like to ask you, Sir, to expand on that a little and try to give us a picture of just how badly we hobble our own industry and perhaps, if you could, give

us an idea of how many people who could be working in this country are not working because of self-imposed restrictions?

Lorne Zakaib

You don't make your question very easy when you talk about people who could be working and could not be working. First of all, I can not ship even to a NATO country without assuring that that is the last stop for the munitions. There is some concern about shipping to some NATO countries because there seem to be centres of transition where the munitions leave one country and go somewhere else. I use the most recent example, the Gulf War, where we had aircraft firing whatever they were firing and where we had Canadian ships and soldiers involved. And after that war was over, and the peace had settled down, I received a request to supply .50 calibre rounds to Kuwait and I was turned down by External Affairs because there were atrocities being committed in Kuwait. That is a tough one to follow logically. Maybe the rule says do not ship to where atrocities are being committed and maybe that is true, and I live by the rules, I don't want to go to jail, but I had a tough time swallowing that one. I am sure that if the Kuwait military was fighting beside Canadians in that particular war, and they had run out of .50 calibre ammunition, I am sure we would have given them some at that particular point in time. But when it came to me to sell some, it was against the rules and regulations and I did not.

Let me try and address the second question in terms of people. Additional work - I have to tell you that during my first three months this year, I manufactured purely for export because I did not know the Canadian requirements and I kept approximately 600 people working on export products other .50 calibre, cartridge cases for 20mm, gas masks for Denmark, and other sundry things. My success rates in bids in the last six months has been 35% - that is, of the contracts on which I bid, I am getting 35% of them all outside Canada, which is fairly good.

Jean Fournier, CISS member from Montreal

I'd like to direct my question to Professor Fortmann. He told us that NATO has now become more political than military. Linking that with the statement from the Canadian government that we still have a commitment to NATO, what form will this commitment take if it is no longer military? If it is political,

would you suggest we increase our political staff at NATO headquarters in Brussels?

Michel Fortmann

The comment that I made regarding the priorities - the new priorities for the Alliance - is the fact that the Alliance has realized that now its first missions are political in nature. That does not mean that there will no longer be military missions, only that in the long-term planning, it will be considered after coordination of dialogue with, for example, Eastern European countries, on the issues of conflict resolution and then deterrence and defence. In this sense, I believe there is a principle that was real for Canada in the past and which is still real. That is, that Canada plays a political role in Europe. It is necessary that there be a military force. I believe this is just as true today as in the past. It is of little importance that the military presence be under the form of a battalion as an 'immediate reaction force' or, under the form of, for example, a 'peacekeeping force'. It could be the two. However, I should remind you of a point made today by Mr. Triesstram of NATO Headquarters. He believes that Canada's decision to withdraw troops from Europe was bad political timing - a risky move, and I think that there will be consequences for Canada in this regard. Mr. Kinsman's arguments this morning upholding or supporting our decision to withdraw all our troops from Europe are not very solid. They are, in fact, quite weak.

Col. Nesa, National Defence Headquarters

I was intrigued by one thing that Professor Fortmann said about the future role of NATO. Obviously that is the sort of thing we should be thinking about in the place that I work. I would be interested in knowing how you would see the role of NATO expanding, particularly out-of-area, as of course, Yugoslavia is, and how you would gain the consensus required of NATO nations to envisage that sort of activity?

Michel Fortmann

I think that there should be a basic agreement among the Europeans in two categories - two kinds of consensus. One would be in the EC, the community and in NATO, and the other one amongst CSCE countries to legitimize this kind of intervention - and to make clear that it is not intervention in the case of war, which is prohibited for under Article 5, for example, of the NATO treaty

in terms of aggression. The agreement would cover what type of situation would trigger some kind of crisis management mechanism and who would be in charge of what measures. The basic argument I made in my presentation was that for there are many institutions which could take up specific roles. For example, the CSCE could be excellent in terms of either crisis prevention or political crisis management, in using diplomatic pressure for example. The European Community could do that too. But then when you cross the threshold from diplomatic intervention to coercion, you need some muscle. You need an agreement among Western Europeans and also Central and Eastern European countries as to what you consider a threat legitimizing an intervention. That is the basic condition. For the moment these basic conditions are not there, that is, what are called 'Crisis Prevention Mechanisms' decided upon by the CSCE during the meetings held in Valletta are largely insufficient. So there has to be an effort in the CSCE to define the type of conflict necessitating an intervention. Then we must have an agreement as to who would be the military muscle in Europe. We have NATO, and then some kind of WEU force. And then you hit the heart of the matter because there is basic disagreement among some of the allies over who should be that military muscle.

Award Presentation

John Marteinson, Editor, Canadian Defence Quarterly

Ladies and Gentlemen. I am deeply grateful to Alex Morrison and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies for allowing me to take this occasion to present an award for the 1991 John Gellner Essay Competition.

The John Gellner Essay Competition was established by the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Advisory Board in 1988 as a means of encouraging high quality writing on subjects of military significance. The competition is open to all members of the Canadian Forces, as well as to students in strategic studies or military history programmes at Canadian universities which participate in the Department of National Defence's Military and Strategic Studies Programme.

The winner of the prize in the 1991 competition is with us today. Lieutenant Donald A. Neill, a lecturer in strategic studies at College Militaire Royale de St-Jean, has been awarded an Honourable Mention Prize for his essay entitled "Back to the Basics: Defence Interests and Defence Policy in Canada." The essay was published in the December issue of *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. I would like to offer my congratulations and those of the members of the CDQ Advisory Board.

I would now ask Major-General Gordon Reay, the Deputy-Commander of Mobile Command, to present the Certificate of Award on behalf of the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Advisory Board.

Gordon Reay

The Canadian Army and Atlantic Security

George Bell, Chairman of the Board, CISS

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me introduce Deputy Commander of Mobile Command, (that is the Deputy Commander of the Canadian Army), Gordon Reay.

General Reay is a product of the higher education system of the Canadian Forces, as he is a graduate of the Royal Military College with an honours degree in history, of the Candian Land Forces Command and Staff College and of the National Defence College. On commissioning, he was posted to the Second Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry where he served as platoon commander, Company Second in Command and Adjutant. Following staff appointments, he returned to his battalion as the operations officer and company commander. During that time he gained direct experience in peacekeeping by participating in the UN force in Cyprus. After that tour he went off to NATO to the First British Corps where he was a senior member of the operations staff. For his service, he was decorated by Her Majesty as a Member of the Order of the British Empire.

General Reay returned to Canada to become the Senior Staff Officer Operations in First Canadian Infantry Brigade group based in Calgary, and then moved on to command the First Batallion PPCLI. He was posted to National Defence Headquarters, promoted to Colonel and appointed Director of the Military Manpower Distribution System. He remained in National Defence Headquarters for a further two years as the senior policy assistant to the Assistant Deputy Minister, Personnel following promotion to Brigadier-General and a year at the National Defence College. He moved to the Foreign

and Defence Policy secretariat of the Privy Council Office. He then commanded the First Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in Calgary for two years and subsequently returned to the National Defence Headquarters where he was the Chief of Land Doctrine Organization and has moved from there to his current posting as Deputy Commander of Mobile Command. In addition to being a member of the Order of the British Empire, he is a Commander of the Order of Military Merit.

Brigadier-General Gordon Reay

I very much welcome this opportunity to address the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and its guests on the role of the Canadian Army with respect to Canada's continuing commitment to the collective security of the member states of the Atlantic Alliance. This is a role which is evolving not only in response to the changes to our own defence policy, but also as a result of changes to the strategic concept of the Alliance itself. It is important, therefore, that any discussion of the army's NATO role be conducted against the background of both sets of changes.

I will shortly describe the new army we are building in response to this policy, but first I wish to draw your attention to some aspects of NATO's new strategic concept agreed by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Rome in November of last year, and which is based on an analysis of the international security environment. The direct threat to the alliance of massive military attack by the Soviet Union and its erstwhile allies has disappeared. In its place there exists a range of multi-faceted and multi-directional security challenges and risks engendered by political, economic and social instability in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, with the latter including the formidable residual military capabilities of the former Soviet Republics. Such risks and challenges include proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of natural resources, sabotage and terrorism and armed conflict which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the alliance.

Notwithstanding this altered security environment, the purpose of the alliance remains unchanged - to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. These changed circumstances do, on the other hand, permit the alliance to take a broader approach to security. This approach will

incorporate, in addition to a collective defence capability, a more extensive use of political means based upon dialogue and cooperation. It is an approach which embraces the potential of further arms control and disarmament agreements and other opportunities for the prevention and containment of conflict. It also recognizes the growing strength of the European pillar of the alliance and the complementary roles of other international bodies such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Community and the Western European Union.

More directly related to the continuing role of the Canadian army in maintaining Atlantic security are guidelines in the new strategic concept pertaining to the structure, posture and mission of the alliance's military forces. These include:

A. With respect to force structure:

(1) Available forces will include ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements of multinational composition, as well as main defence and augmentation forces able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable;

(2) Forces will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be built up when necessary by means of reinforcement, mobilization and reconstitution; and

(3) Appropriate force structure and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions;

B. With respect to force posture, a departure from a comprehensive, in-place, linear defence in conjunction with reduced force levels and readiness states; and

C. With respect to mission, recognition that notwithstanding their primary mission of guaranteeing the security and territorial integrity of member states, alliance forces have different functions in peace, crisis and war. These include, in peacetime, contributions to global stability and peace under the aegis of the United Nations.

Our allies are well embarked upon effecting the changes to their national forces engendered by these new guidelines. As I turn now to a description of the ongoing restructuring of the Canadian Army, I believe that the end product we propose is fully in harmony with NATO's concept.

You will remember the main thrusts of Canada's new defence policy. These include:

A. The establishment of defence priorities as:

(1) Defence, sovereignty and civil responsibilities in Canada;

(2) Collective defence arrangements through NATO, including our continental defence partnership with the United States; and

(3) International peace and security, through stability and peacekeeping operations, arms control verification and humanitarian assistance;

B. The maintenance of combat-capable sea, land, and air forces ready for operations at home and abroad and capable of mobilizing reserves for the purposes of reinforcement and sustainment;

C. The reduction of forces stationed in Europe;

D. A reduction in the strength of the regular force;

E. An increase in the size of the reserve force and a commitment to the implementation of a total force concept;

F. Continued infrastructure reductions; and

G. Continued efforts to increase the proportion of the defence budget allocated to the procurement of new equipment.

These require no elaboration. Let me focus instead upon the task which fell to the commander of the army as a consequence of this policy. Indeed, to understand our future army commitment to NATO, you must understand the nature of that army. The job given to the Commander of the Army was, and is, to design and implement a force structure able to generate general purpose combat capable land forces sufficient to meet Canada's defence policy objectives. Specific land force mission elements derived from these objectives include:

A. Assistance in the upholding of Canadian sovereignty including, if necessary, the defence of Canadian territory and, in conjunction with American forces, the Canada-US land mass;

B. Assistance in the maintenance of public order and security, emergency relief and the pursuit of national development goals;

C. Deterrence and, should deterrence fail, adequate response to the use of force or coercion against Canada or Canadian interests in Western Europe;

D. Peacekeeping; and

E. Contingency operations in support of Canadian interests abroad.

With the foregoing clearly in mind, our first step was to review the complete spectrum of structuring considerations relevant to organizing, manning, equipping and training the army. This review led to a structuring concept in which three themes predominate:

A. The maintenance of a general purpose combat capability;

B. The integration of regular and reserve components in a total force; and

C. A geographically-organized command structure.

Each of these themes is worth an explanation because they will set the character of the Army.

General Purpose Combat Capability

In times of fiscal restraint, organizing, equipping and training forces for a single type of conflict, level of operations or specific task is a luxury that Canada can ill afford. It therefore follows that the army should have a general purpose combat capability - and should resist specialization.

"General purpose" implies the ability to deploy, support, and sustain balanced combat teams, battle groups and higher formations in all types of operations. A general purpose combat capability also provides the flexibility needed to execute the widest potential range of tasks. Although some of the army's tasks have been specified, it is impossible to predict all contingen-

cies which may require the deployment of troops. Recent army commitments to the Gulf War, notably the provision of air defence to the navy and ground security to the air force, as well as the deployment of a field hospital to support the British forces, attest to this fact. Operation Salon, the aid to the civil power operation in Quebec in 1990, is another good example of a contingency, this time in a domestic context, in which general purpose, combat capable forces were required. So the army must be a versatile force, and its training must have a clear focus on combat operations. In short, the army must be a fighting force. Well-equipped, combat trained, professional soldiers can adapt readily to less demanding tasks such as peacekeeping, but the converse situation is not true. Moreover, even the "peacekeeper" requires combat skills to establish credibility, and hence, effectiveness, when operating between armed belligerents.

Total Force

The future of the army, and indeed of the Canadian Forces as a whole, lies in an effective total force, by which is meant:

A force composed of two mutually supporting and complementary components (regular and reserve) which together can provide one integral operational army during emergencies and wartime.

Sufficient resources do not exist to meet the number and scope of current and potential defence commitments with regular troops alone; reservists are also needed and have a vital role to play. Force strengths will change significantly. The size of the regular force will be reduced from its current level of some 23,500 soldiers to approximately 19,000 over the next few years. At the same time, the strength of the militia will increase from its present level of approximately 22,000 to 29,000 at end state. The implementation of a total force concept will ultimately improve operational effectiveness and provide a base for expansion should this become necessary. At the same time and somewhat ironically, it will reduce combat readiness because of the reduced scope of training and response times of the reserves. Army leaders will be challenged to maintain an appropriate balance between operational effectiveness and combat readiness as threats increase and diminish.

Geographically-Organized Command Structure

This new structure in which the army reorganizes geographically and assumes responsibility for domestic operations in the country is already partially implemented. It is a logical solution to fundamental flaws in the arrangement that has been in place until now, and it will enhance every aspect of the way in which forces are generated, deployed and supported. There are several major advantages to the area command structure:

A.It is organizationally sound, as it will reduce the present excessive span of control at army level, decentralize responsibility and eliminate a number of subordinate headquarters;

B.It is the keystone of the total force, with all regular and reserve land force units within a geographical area being commanded by one officer;

C.It will facilitate efforts to separate the field force from the infrastructure, although admittedly, some double hatting will still be required;

D.It will enhance the ability of the army to expand and mobilize in the event of an emergency or war;

E.It will provide a coherent framework on which to organize for territorial defence and other domestic operations; and

F.Finally, the area command structure will be an important step in reintegrating the army into Canadian society, as it will necessitate a routine interface between headquarters and governments at all levels. In addition, it will create a unified and higher profile total force presence that can be better attuned to regional considerations.

Command and Control

In approaching the issue of command and control, our intent is to ensure that the number, size and levels of headquarters are kept to a minimum. Mobile command headquarters will be replaced by a much smaller land force headquarters which will exercise command and control of all land forces. Land force headquarters will have six subordinate commands - the five area headquarters and a division level headquarters - in place of the larger number it has today.

The prime responsibility of the area commanders will be force generation, although they will also have responsibility for the conduct of certain territorial defence and domestic operations. They will command all army units within the boundaries of their area. Each of the areas will comprise a number of districts, with the total being reduced from the current 21 to 14.

As land force headquarters will be significantly smaller than mobile command headquarters, it will be incapable of providing the staff for a task force headquarters and still carry on with its normal functions. Thus, a small field deployable division level headquarters will be retained in the order of battle to meet continental defence needs and contingencies abroad. This tactical headquarters may form the basis of a national joint headquarters when warranted by circumstances and ordered by the CDS. As well, it will provide a command and control element to train brigade groups so that they can maintain a general purpose combat capability for deployment in specific contingencies should these arise. The division headquarters will also enable the army to maintain practical, professional expertise at a level which incorporates all combat functions.

Field Forces

The field force will consist of two parts:

Manoeuvre troops and deployment troops. The four areas in southern Canada will each have manoeuvre troops to provide the commander with a responsive well trained force. In essence, manoeuvre troops will be based on three brigade groups.

Manoeuvre troops will be equipped and trained to ensure that they can be deployed to any part of the country or abroad. They will be maintained at a relatively high level of readiness, and thus will be the first elements of the field force to be committed to operations. Because of the nature of their employment they will be commanded and manned primarily by members of the regular force. When available for full time employment, during peacetime as well as in declared emergencies of war, reservists will form part of these manoeuvre troops. Indeed, one infantry battalion in each brigade group will be manned predominantly by the militia - the total force in action. It should be noted that the manoeuvre troops include an airborne battalion which can

be quickly deployed to northern areas or elsewhere depending on the requirement.

Deployment Troops

Deployment troops are not permanently organized entities. They are task organized from the reserve units in the infrastructure and will be held at a lower level of readiness, to meet the following range of tasks:

A. Augmentation of manoeuvre;

B. Guarding of vital points;

C. Provision of a base for sustainment; and

D. Provision of a base for mobilization.

Deployment troops will be eventually categorized as mobile or static. As they will not have dedicated equipment holdings, their requirements will be met by combining the equipment held by reserve units and that held by training establishments.

Infrastructure

Let me now turn to training.

Tough, realistic training is the strength of any army and the fundamental importance of training establishments cannot be overstated. Indeed British and American officers claim that their victory in the Persian Gulf was won at their respective training centres in Suffield, Alberta, and Fort Irwin, California. Each area will have a battle school consisting of a leadership company, a recruit company and a militia training support centre. Placing these three elements under a single headquarters will reduce administrative overhead. As well, since each battle school is subordinated to the area commander, it will reinforce the total force concept and make optimum use of training facilities. The combat training centre will continue to comprise armour, field artillery and air defence artillery and infantry schools as well as developing and teaching combined arms tactics.

To summarize, what are the transition challenges facing the army? In general terms, the army will shift its focus from operations in support of territorial defence, to our civil responsibilities and to contingency operations

abroad. This change may influence the nature of equipment but doctrine and training will continue to focus on combined arms operations, as the ability to plan and conduct such operations is essential to the maintenance of a general purpose combat capability.

The troop strength and composition of the army will change dramatically. Regular force numbers will be reduced while the reserve force will increase in number by approximately 30 percent. Moreover, there will be a much greater mix of regular soldiers and militia soldiers within units. At the same time the army will move from parallel chains of command for its two components to a total force structure with a single chain of command. The present, overly-centralized functional command system will be replaced by a decentralized area structure. Today's Mobile Command Headquarters will become Land Force Headquarters, and will be much smaller in size. First Division Headquarters will be reduced in size and its role will change from its present commitment to NATO to responsibility for contingency planning and operations. It will also provide a capability for training brigade groups.

The Army and Atlantic Security

Let me now return to my central theme - the manner in which Canada's army will contribute to NATO and North Atlantic Security. It will be useful to do this in relation to the guidelines for the new alliance strategic concept.

First, with respect to structure. As with all of our allies, Canada can no longer justify maintaining the force levels that were possible and necessary during the cold war. Nevertheless, the importance of maintaining general purpose combat forces, capable of valuable contributions in any possible area of alliance operations, remains a key element of our structure plans. Our forces-in-being, the manoeuvre troops, will all be capable of operating abroad; they will be held at useful levels of readiness; and operational plans will address the essential requirements of strategic deployment and force sustainment, the latter being activities to which we gave insufficient attention when we had forces forward-deployed. In addition, the requirements of reinforcement and mobilization are addressed in our reserve component and its tasking. Finally, the land force will continue its active participation in the NATO armies standardization programme, contributing to the development of common doctrine, procedures and equipment standard. Overall, it would be accurate to say that the army structure which results from our plans will

conform nicely to alliance guidelines - smaller forces-in-being, with modernized, broadly-based and useful levels of capability, as well as a larger sustainment base.

Moving to force posture, it is obvious that this will be the greatest area of change. The value to Canada and to the alliance of maintaining a visible land force presence in Europe cannot be denied, and we had very much hoped that a reduced presence would remain a viable element of our defence policy. Regrettably, this has not proven to be possible. The decision to eliminate the proposed stationed task force from our plans was difficult, but, taken in context, this is understandable. In terms of cost-effectiveness, there are other areas of departmental activity, with either direct or indirect impact on our alliance commitments - as well as other defence priorities - which can provide a better return for our defence dollar. To have maintained the stationed task force commitment, with a reduced departmental budget, would have had an unacceptable impact on other elements of the army structure or on equipment plans. Thus, on balance - and given the strategic situation and Canada's fiscal dilemma - deleting this element of our plan was a sound decision.

It is in the area of mission and tasks that the question of balance can best be illustrated. I will briefly review the elements of the land force mission which relate directly or through collateral effect to the new NATO strategic concept.

A.Defence of the Canada-US Region

We must not forget that Alaska and British Columbia are as much a part of NATO's area of responsibility as are North Norway and Eastern Turkey. The army remains committed to the defence of the North American region of NATO in cooperation with the United States, and the new force structure provides a much more effective framework for this defence.

B.ACE Commitments

As with all NATO allies, Canada is in the process of negotiating the details of its ongoing and future commitments to Allied Command Europe. The situation is very much in flux, and it is premature to be specific about Canada's plans - or those of our alliance partners. However, the major elements appear to be firm:

(1)Defence of North Norway/Crisis Management

Canada will continue to contribute to NATO reaction forces, through the commitment of an infantry battalion group for deployment in North Norway within the ACE mobile force (Land) or the NATO composite force.

(2)Contingency Operations

In addition, the army will maintain a capability to deploy rapidly a brigade group anywhere in the world, including Europe. The relationship of this brigade group to the evolving NATO force structure is the subject of ongoing discussion and negotiation. But let me be clear, we are committed to the concept of contributing up to a third of our field force to NATO should the need arise.

C.Stability Operations

As underlined in NATO's new strategic concept, the current risks and challenges to the alliance's security are directly related to political and military instability in its neighbouring regions. Peace restoration and peacekeeping operations in these regions under the sponsorship of the United Nations and other international organizations are recognized as important tools to be utilized as a part of a broader approach to the attainment of security objectives. Canadian soldiers have served in every peacekeeping operation to date, and are currently serving in 13 peacekeeping missions. As I speak, the Canadian contingent - the largest in the United Nations protection force - is deploying to its assigned area of responsibility in Yugoslavia. Thus, the emphasis Canadian policy has placed on stability operations is clearly supportive of alliance objectives, and arguably the most effective means available in the prevailing international environment.

These are the major activities which contribute to the overall collective defence effort. There are others - our representation in influential positions in key areas of NATO headquarters, our bilateral agreements with Britain and Germany with respect to training areas in Canada, our continuing involvement in arms control and verification initiatives to name several - but I will not elaborate on these at this time.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies for this opportunity to contribute to a timely and relevant discussion and, in so doing, to continue with the process of educating the defence community and other interested Canadians as to the future plans of Canada's army. For the foreseeable future, North Atlantic security will remain a central element of Canada's national security strategy, and Canada will remain a critical player in the NATO alliance. I believe that the implementation of the structure I have described will provide Canada with a versatile and efficient army, capable of responding to a variety of national and international contingencies in this promising - yet nevertheless unstable and highly unpredictable - new world in which we live.

Alex Morrison

General Reay, let me thank you on behalf of everyone for explaining to us first of all the conditions under which the very professional men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces are working these days. We all know that you are told in one moment to make plans according to a certain set of principles and guidelines and you begin to carry them out and then in the morning you come to work and someone else in authority phones you and says what we said yesterday is not on. I think that is why we all ought to bear always in mind that the very professional men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces are reacting each and every day to tasks and decisions imposed upon them by the Government of Canada. I think we ought to be thankful that we do have people in uniform of the character and quality of those in Mobile Command, the other Armed Forces Commands and the up and coming people in our military colleges. Indeed it is not too much to say that if those in government who are the political masters of the military displayed at least a small part of the professionalism displayed by the military of this country, then perhaps the whole of the country would be in a much better state. Thank you very much sir.

Mary Collins

Canada and North Atlantic Security

Don Macnamara

As the president of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, it is indeed a pleasure for me to introduce our featured speaker, the Associate Minister of National Defence, Mrs. Mary Collins.

Mrs. Collins is a native of Vancouver and as a member of the Faculty of Queen's University, I am most pleased to be able to say she is a graduate of Queen's University in Political Studies. She spent ten years in the Ontario government, has had eight years experience in her own private business then went to Brinco Ltd. as the Director of Public Affairs. Throughout this period she was very active in the YWCA at the executive and board levels. She was first elected to Parliament in 1984 and was appointed the Associate Minister of National Defence in 1989 and then in 1990 as the Minister responsible for the Status of Women.

The Honourable Mary Collins, Associate Minister of National Defence

I am happy to join you at this annual spring gathering of the Canadian strategic community under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies to address the issue of Canada's role in North Atlantic Security. I hope my remarks will serve not only to give you a sense of the Government's thinking on these matters, but also to stimulate some lively discussion during the run of the day.

We live in truly historic times. Future generations will look back on this period as the beginning of a new era in international relations, a point in history equal in its significance to 1918 or 1945. Now, as then, realistic, far-sighted leadership can spell the difference between stability and turmoil, between cooperation and conflict.

Canada cannot be a passive onlooker in this process. For some forty years after the end of the Second World War, Canadian foreign and defence policy was conditioned by the unnatural division of Europe into two rival blocs. With the end of the Cold War, we have had to make some fundamental decisions about how Canada can make its most effective contribution to the creation of a more stable, peaceful international environment - something which remains essential to our security and our well-being.

The transformation of East-West relations has had an impact on all aspects of international security, but perhaps nowhere more than in Europe where the end of the Cold War holds out the promise of a more peaceful, democratic order.

To be sure, many challenges remain. To gain a sense of just how different the situation is now, I would ask you to reflect for a moment upon the nature of postwar Europe.

In the first instance, this was a Europe divided. The subjugation of Eastern Europe was one of the bitterest legacies of the Second World War. As occupying Soviet forces facilitated the rise of satellite governments in Eastern Europe, fundamental rights and freedoms were abolished. And at the state level, national diversity was suppressed.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization served the Soviet leadership's imperial agenda. But it was also a military alliance of enormous proportions which, from the early 1950s onwards, enjoyed massive conventional superiority over NATO. Just as ominous for the West was the offensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, and an apparent willingness - as shown in the crises over Berlin and Cuba - to use military pressure for political gain.

The Cold War prompted a very different set of arrangements in the West. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, few of NATO's founders could have envisaged that it would become the most successful peacetime alliance in history.

One of NATO's most important achievements was to create the militarily secure environment needed for the reconstruction of Western Europe as a political community. Indeed, NATO succeeded in promoting defence cooperation among a number of countries that, only ten years earlier, had been at war with one another.

In addition, collective defence allowed the Europeans to focus their efforts on economic recovery and begin the drive toward European integration. Had Western Europe been forced to respond by itself to the Soviet threat, or to worry about the resurgence of national rivalries, the community of nations that we know in Western Europe today - peaceful, democratic, and prosperous - might never have evolved.

Throughout this period, however, the European security environment remained confrontational. Central Europe was, by far, the most militarized place on earth. For both East and West, military issues were central to the political agenda and progress toward a more stable and cooperative relationship was halting, at best. One only needs to recall how little was achieved through sixteen years of negotiation at the Mutually Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks to appreciate the stalemate in the European security environment. Despite periodic phases of *detente* and the beginnings of the CSCE process, very little progress was made in the areas of human rights, trade or the promotion of democracy.

In retrospect, a fairly bleak picture, I think you'll agree. And a stark contrast to what followed in the late 1980s: the end of the Cold War, the peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe, and the complete transformation of European security.

Mikhail Gorbachev began this transformation by completely revising Soviet foreign policy. Socialist revolution, the Brezhnev Doctrine, and the need to maintain a massive military establishment were abandoned in favour of an approach that stressed the need for all countries to cooperate in addressing common problems.

With this sweeping change in outlook, formerly intractable issues became surprisingly solvable. Through a combination of unilateral reductions and rapid progress in arms control, NATO and the Warsaw Pact took advantage

of the warming trend in East-West relations to build a more stable military environment in Europe.

Many dramatic events were to follow. But perhaps nothing illustrates more clearly how far we have come from the days of the Cold War than the collapse of Soviet Union itself. Once the most serious threat to Western interests, it no longer exists as a cohesive political entity.

In the space of three short years, the European political landscape has been completely transformed. The Europe of the Cold War - divided and militarized - has been replaced by a new community of nations, one that stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok and where the old, narrow focus on military issues has given way to a broader perspective on security. Europe can now direct its attention to further developing a community of nations that is committed to the international and domestic political values set out in the Paris Charter.

I am not suggesting that this new environment is without its share of risks and dangers. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe all face a variety of problems that could result in violent conflict and impair democratic development.

Ethnic tensions have sparked on-going conflict in nations such as Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Political violence, economic hardship, and the consequences of severe environmental mismanagement have created substantial populations of refugees. The political, economic, and social consequences of reform could drive entire classes of people to turn against the process.

Clearly, these are serious problems that will have to be addressed. However, they represent a different kind of challenge to our security and well-being that will require a different kind of response from Western countries.

The more complex and diffuse nature of security issues today is reflected in our attempts to devise ways to deal with these challenges to peace and democracy in the new Europe. No one organization can address all of these concerns. The new security architecture, as it has come to be called, will be made up of several interlocking institutions, each with its own mandate - be it political, economic, social or military.

Canada is taking a pragmatic view of this process. The task of building a new European security order is, in our view, a matter of adapting existing institutions to the new circumstances.

Thus, we have been pleased with the evolution of NATO. Historically, the principal focus of the Alliance has been on the balance of military forces in Central Europe. What we see now is a rather different organization. NATO's essential purpose - to defend the territorial integrity and political freedom of its member states - remains unchanged. But, as part of its new strategic concept, the Alliance has broadened its strategic focus to encompass all of NATO's regions - not just the Central Front. The Alliance is a uniquely successful organization. NATO's facility for consultation, its ability to build consensus, and its tradition of solidarity have enabled it to adapt to new circumstances while continuing to ensure the security of its sixteen member states.

This is not lost on the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the abiding risk of instability and turmoil, a number have sought to join NATO as full members. For the moment, NATO has decided that an offer of full membership to these countries would not be appropriate. However, the Alliance has established a number of outreach programs which aim to provide political reassurance to the new democracies.

Of these initiatives, the most important is the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This organization brings together NATO foreign ministers and their counterparts from Central and Eastern Europe, while more frequent meetings take place at the ambassadorial level. In addition, NATO has offered the Central and Eastern European countries the accumulated expertise held within the body of NATO subordinate committees.

As an extension of this process, NATO defence ministers met for the first time with their Central and East European counterparts just over a week ago to discuss matters of common concern. Their communique gives us a sense of the potential of the process, as they have pledged to discuss such things as military doctrine, defence planning, the constitutional basis of armed forces, the harmonization of arms control and defence planning, and non-traditional military roles.

The evolution of NATO suggests two things. First, the business of collective defence remains essential. However, in an environment where the risk of bloc-to-bloc conflict has disappeared, the task of building cooperative security has become much more relevant.

In its broadest sense, this is the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE's inclusive membership and broad mandate will make it an increasingly important body with the greatest potential to foster democratic development, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and effective crisis management.

On March 24th, the foreign ministers of the CSCE countries opened the Helsinki follow-up meeting. My colleague, the Honourable Barbara McDougall, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, identified a number of key issues that Canada would like to see addressed. Canada hopes that by the time the CSCE Heads of State and Government meet this summer, we will have made much progress toward the further development of the CSCE - both in terms of its institutional development, and its ability to coordinate the contributions of other relevant organizations, including NATO, the European Community, and the Western European Union.

Canada takes an active interest in the entire range of cooperative security issues that are addressed by the CSCE. As one would expect, this agenda has an important arms control dimension.

Canada has been very active in the development of a Conference and Security Building Measures (CSBM) regime that may prove to be a landmark development in European security. I am referring, of course, to the Open Skies agreement that was signed by 25 countries two weeks ago in Helsinki. In recognition of our contribution to the entire Open Skies process, Canada, along with Hungary, is a co-depository of the Treaty.

The Department of National Defence has played an integral part in demonstrating that the Treaty regime can work. Indeed DND and DEA hosted a Hungarian trial overflight this past January in which a joint Canadian-Hungarian crew flew over a combination of military installations and industrial areas from Ottawa to Oshawa, in an aircraft equipped with a sophisticated sensor package provided by the Canadian Centre for Remote Sensing.

I should note that it could be a year or more before a sufficient number of countries ratify the treaty, thereby bringing it into force. Under the terms of the Treaty, Canada is obliged to accept 12 overflights per year. To date, however, only Russia has indicated its intention to overfly Canada - and even here, only twice annually. Nevertheless, during the initial period, Canada will conduct two flights over Russia, one over Czechoslovakia and Poland, along with one over the Ukraine to be shared with the United States.

The next step will be to ensure that subsequent discussions about arms control in Europe include all of the CSCE countries, and that the agenda addresses the broader issue of building political and military confidence among the CSCE's member states. In addition to discussions about conventional force levels and the development of confidence and security building measures, the new arms control agenda will likely include such things as the continuation of our highly successful military doctrine seminars, and the discussion of such issues of common interest as non-proliferation.

Given the emergence of this type of cooperative, increasingly transparent European security environment, what is now required of armed forces? How can Western militaries enhance our security in an environment so clearly different from that of the Cold War? What implications would these new roles have for defence policy?

At the most fundamental level, I would say that the requirement to maintain flexible, combat-capable armed forces remains unchanged. These will remain essential as an expression of our commitment to preserve this more secure political environment, and to defend our values and interests if the situation in Europe takes a drastic turn for the worse - however, unlikely that may seem at the moment. This long-term perspective underpins NATO's new strategic concept, and the Government's new defence policy.

The other contributions that Western militaries can make to enhance our security derive from the maintenance of this general-purpose capability. The recent history of Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh suggests a continuing requirement for countries to contribute personnel to multilateral peacekeeping and observer missions. Canadians are well aware that the maintenance of capable armed forces greatly enhances our capacity to participate in such missions.

Military personnel also have an important role to play in the area of arms control. Not only will they be involved with the implementation and verification of existing agreements, such as the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document, but they will also continue to play an important role in designing additional measures to enhance stability and build confidence.

How does Canadian defence policy address itself to these new realities in Europe? At a time of fiscal restraint at home, and rapid change abroad, how will we make our contribution to North Atlantic security?

In unveiling a new defence policy last September, the Government of Canada sought as its principal objective to maintain flexible, combat-capable forces which could be used to address a wide range of priorities both at home and abroad. To ensure that our military personnel have the tools to do the job, the new policy revised Canadian defence commitments and sought to refocus Canadian defence spending by achieving additional economies from within the defence program.

As the international and domestic context of Canadian defence policy continued to evolve, the Government announced additional changes in the defence program with the tabling of the most recent Federal Budget. Some of these changes have a direct impact on Canada's contribution to North Atlantic security.

Clearly the most significant measure will be the complete withdrawal of Canadian Forces from Europe by 1994. I want to offer a few remarks about this decision, as it will mark the end of a forty year military presence in Europe.

I should stress what this decision does not mean.

First of all, Canada is not withdrawing from NATO. We will continue to be an active member of the Alliance and our other Alliance commitments will remain unchanged:

- A Canadian Forces battalion will remain prepared to deploy to Norway with the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force or the NATO Composite Force;
- Canadians will continue to serve as part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning system in Geilenkirchen, Germany;

- Canadian destroyers and frigates will continue to sail with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, while other Canadian ships and aircraft will retain their role in patrolling the North Atlantic;

- Canada will continue to carry out its responsibilities for the defence of NATO's Canada-US region; and,

- Canada will continue to offer its allies facilities for military training.

In addition, we will maintain the capability to dispatch an expeditionary brigade group and two squadrons of CF-18s abroad in response to international emergencies. These could be deployed to Europe, should the need arise.

In the final analysis, the Government decided that retaining stationed forces in Europe was less important than the more fundamental task of maintaining armed forces that are well-trained and adequately equipped. Within this context, the decision to withdraw our forces from Europe was a difficult one, but there should be no doubt that the choice was clear.

In any event, home defence is the natural first priority of all Alliance countries. Indeed, we regard the adjustment of our defence programs as entirely consonant with NATO's move toward a more balanced military posture.

What also needs to be clearly understood is that the decision to withdraw our stationed forces from Europe does not mean that we have lost interest in European affairs. I have noted that we will remain an active member of NATO, but our other activities also reflect Canada's ongoing stake in European security. We currently have peacekeeping forces in Cyprus and Yugoslavia; we will continue to play an active role in arms control; and we will remain active within the CSCE and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in trying to address the new European security agenda.

Some observers have suggested that, by withdrawing our stationed forces from Germany, Canada risks being locked out of evolving political and economic structures in Europe. I would suggest otherwise. If Canadians want to develop key political and economic relationships with Europe, there is simply no substitute for working with our European partners in these areas. It might have been possible to argue that maintaining stationed forces gave

Canada some measure of political leverage in European affairs during the Cold War, but this is clearly no longer the case. As the European security environment changed, the political value of stationed forces was bound to change with it.

Canadian Defence Policy continues to be guided by the principles set out in the Government's announcement of last September. The Government will continue to respond to developments both at home and abroad by making pragmatic adjustments to the implementation of the existing policy.

But our abiding interest in North Atlantic security will remain unchanged. The global security agenda may undergo further - perhaps even radical - change over the coming years, but Canada's security and well-being will continue to depend on the extent to which the nations of Europe and North America can consolidate the positive trends of the past few years.

As a new, more cooperative security environment continues to develop, the Government remains committed to the maintenance of flexible and capable armed forces - forces that can serve Canadian security requirements and the needs of the North Atlantic community.

But before I conclude, I thought I would like to spend the final few minutes with you talking about another issue. It is really a security issue as well and that indeed is the security of our own future unity of this country. And something that all of us as individuals interested in national and international security issues must pay heed to. I would start by saying that I think in the last three years as Associate Minister of National Defence I have learned much about the value of this country and certainly the members of the Canadian Forces really truly know what Canada is about. They often have the opportunity to travel, to work in many different parts of the country. But as well I think that is because, over the decades, many paid for our defence in the dearest currency of all. What were they defending? They were defending a country and a set of ideals. Tomorrow's country - a land of vast vistas and of promise and hope - a special place where people from many lands could set aside yesterday's quarrels - one where people could work together and build together. And tomorrow's ideals - a new formula mixing freedom and respect, prosperity and compassion. That potent potion gave this nation its strength and has made Canada's way of life the envy of the world.

Now we are 125 years old - or young - without much thinking about it, we have become a senior partner in the community of nations. And, of course, with maturity you grasp that there is no perfection. Canada, as we know, has its faults. Our existing constitution has its flaws. After 125 years, what other human construct would not need amendments and renewal? So we must get on with the job at hand, rebuilding this nation as we have created it together. But together let us preserve this country and the ideal that is Canada and let's make ourselves renewed once again. Our heritage, which has been paid for in war as in peace is not divisible. It must not be dissolved by those who would rather stand alone than walk together, by those who begrudge, who have little vision, who look to the past, who seek to make Canadians enemies of each other.

Our real enemy is silence - because silence breeds misunderstanding. So let us talk hard, and let us listen harder and then let us act. Canadians are used to spanning vast geography - distances that separate us. And crossing the distance that separates our positions should be no harder because our interests are really closely linked especially since our future is at stake and the time to stake out the future that we want is now. We have entered into a year that will be remembered by our children and grandchildren for a long time. And as we make our way through it, visibly forging a new Canada, let us take the time to remember past years that were equally decisive. This year, one of the outstanding events that I will always remember was when I heard our latest astronaut, Roberta Bondar, speaking so beautifully of how Canada looked from space. And as we bask in the glory of the words of this Canadian astronaut speaking of peace, we should think too, of the silent distinction of those Canadian soldiers who died at war. That was the Canadian, fighting his way up the hill that was Vimy Ridge. That was a Canadian fighting his way up the hell that was the beach at Dieppe. They would be astonished to know that two Canadians have soared in the heavens above and they would have been very proud. We should be proud of them and we should never forget them. They gave us our symbols of courage in war. And on such symbols as that, many a nation is built. Unfortunately the world is full of countries that are built just on war, on hatred, on dreams of empire and domination. What makes Canada unique is that we know about war and we know what we fought for and what we won and we know about peace too. In fact, as some talk so foolishly about how simple it would be to smash

up this nation, Canadian Forces are helping to pick up the pieces in Yugoslavia. Canadians love peace and I think that is why we are so good at keeping it. Peacekeeping is one of the finest traditions of this country and our military takes fierce pride each time it takes up that challenge and brings it home.

Well, my friends, there are some very smooth talkers out there peddling a line about how easy Canada would be to dismember. While they say that in a twinkle of an eye we could just put it back together again or not, however we choose, I know that is not the case. And the mixture of facts and fancies that they are peddling are potentially very dangerous. It is not fear mongering to urge Canadians to face the facts. Putting the federal case forward for a united Canada is not a scare tactic because it is a case based, not on fear, but on reason and economics and on the spirit of cooperation and our long experience of how we have learned to live together so well. So I ask you all in your roles in your families, with your friends, in your businesses to look closely at the case for renewed federalism based on proposals that are being worked on at this very time by our colleagues from our federal, provincial and aboriginal communities. Let us look at the facts and how these proposals will play in the context of the here and now and in the future. Let's not put pride before generosity. Let us not put perfection ahead of flexibility.

As we have in Canada, for decades, joined hands across the Atlantic ensuring peace and prosperity for our European Allies, let us now join hands across this vast land of ours - from Vancouver Island to Newfoundland, to ensure that our country can mature into the greatness for which it has such potential, and that its potential be realized then for the security of our children and for future generations. Thank you very much.

Forum

Major-General Andrew Christie (ret'd)

Madame Minister, I have just retired after 38 years in the Armed Forces, twenty of which I spent outside the country. You talked about a sacred trust that was passed on to us and which we hope our successors will also carry. I am afraid I will have to disagree with you on a couple of points, when you look at the NATO perception. First of all, I can assure you, having gone through the Beatty White Paper of 1987 and the Canadian step back from it eleven months later, and from my many discussions in the NATO circles in Brussels, that Europeans are Eurocentric. They don't see NATO, and the security zone existing from Vancouver to Vladivostok. For them NATO ends 12 miles west from the west coast of Europe and they have very little concern about what happens here, but they are very concerned about our contribution there. I would suggest that because of, perhaps, political decisions that have been taken over the last few years rather than strategic decisions, we have become, in the eyes of the Europeans, less than a reliable ally. Only last September, the Prime Minister announced that Canada would be remaining in Europe with a task force for a substantial period and yet, six months later we announced, not from the Defence Ministry but from the Finance Ministry that we are withdrawing from Europe. We heard at that time, and again today from you, that Canada is prepared to send troops back to Europe or to any other contingency area if required and they will be well trained, well equipped, professional armed forces. Well I would maintain we have heard nothing in the last year that would lead me to believe that we will have well equipped, well trained professional forces available to be deployed. One, we

don't have the ability to transport them. There is very little mobility within the Canadian Armed Forces system. Canada does not have any sea transport to move people. We have had, even during the height of the Cold War, to rely on our NATO allies to provide railroad transport to move a relatively small contribution to North Norway. By not having people able to be moved on a regular basis, to train with our allies, we are going to lose another aspect of the flexibility, the availability to operate with our allies at a reasonable speed. Could you please explain to us how the Canadian government, under its present financial constraints, is going to produce that mobility potential to allow it to fulfil its obligations?

Minister Collins

I appreciate your point of view. I know it is one shared by others, but it is not one I share, obviously. And I guess what we are trying to do is move from the nostalgia of past to the reality of a future. That is based not only on the security and political realities but also on technological changes that are constantly taking place and that have an impact on our ability to be flexible and mobile as well. You mentioned that you had not been reassured that there had been any changes taking place in the last year, that provide the kind of re-equipment that was required - perhaps you didn't have the opportunity to hear the announcements just this week where they were made within the context of our new defence acquisitions program to indeed provide the kinds of equipment we believe are required for the flexible mobile forces that we anticipate will form the basic core of our military. There will be the 100 new helicopters for the army which can be used for a whole variety of roles and purposes, and the new light armoured vehicle for the army as well, again replacing existing vehicles but providing that kind of flexibility, interoperability and efficiency. I think we are very much moving in the direction you wish and indeed continuing to move forward to the point that we will achieve our objectives of spending 26 percent of the defence budget on capital over the next few years and ultimately rising to 30 percent. So I think it is important to look at our defence policy as a whole and I can assure you that I am satisfied that our people have both the capability and will be provided with the training. We will, in fact, continue to find opportunities of joint training exercises with allies not only, of course, in Europe, but also in the Pacific which is another very important area of security as well. Not having stationed

troops in Europe does not mean there will not be other kinds of opportunities for joint training to enhance their inter-operability skills.

Student, College Militaire Royal, St. Jean

Madame Minister, I agree with you on the point that perhaps NATO has fulfilled its primary function of creating a stable Europe, but I am not sure it has reached the end of its usefulness in that area. I was just wondering, is it for Canada to decide unilaterally to end its visible commitment to Europe - an action with such wide-ranging and serious ramifications for the rest of the alliance. For instance, you said the Europeans, when it comes to economic matters, won't look at the political ramifications of our NATO pull-out. But I think that if we consider what Mr. Triestram from NATO Headquarters said this morning, they don't see this as a negligible factor and I just want to know, have we alienated fifteen allies? I don't think that we can expect our past accomplishments to hold up our shortcomings today.

Minister Collins

Well, I would really disagree with you on that. Good heavens, I refuse to believe that after 40 years of financial and personnel commitments to maintaining our presence in Europe, when Canada sets out to make the kinds of changes that we believe are important for our own security, the Europeans are going to say, "well, tough beans, we forget about the past 40 years" rather than try to understand the kinds of situations that each one of us is in.

I have met with the defence minister from the Netherlands; I have met with defence ministers from other countries and yes, it is apparent that there will be some grumbling at this level for the moment. I personally don't think it will last because they are dealing with the very same kinds of situations that we are dealing with. Once it comes down to a common sense understanding of what is required, I don't think it will be a problem nor do I think it will, in the long term, impact on our economic and political relationships. Everyone is far too pragmatic for that. I mean if we have got an economic issue that we are dealing with in Europe, we are going to deal with that through many different mechanisms, not just NATO. And as I said before, we still believe in NATO. We are a very active partner in NATO. I don't want to reiterate everything I have just said, but to imply that we are not pulling our weight in an appropriate manner, I find is really quite astonishing because I think we have

contributed so much in relation to the size of our country, and we will continue to contribute in new and innovative ways toward what we hope will be a permanent peace in Europe - a peace in which we are not going to require grand numbers of military people from any country. That ultimately has to be the objective for all of us.

Officer Cadet Belanger, College Militaire Royale de St. Jean

Madame Minister, on behalf of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, I would like to thank you for a very interesting and insightful presentation on Canada's continuing commitment to North Atlantic security.

As you have mentioned, Canada must continue to play an important role in the Atlantic Alliance and in European security issues by adapting its institutions and its defence commitments to changing times. When looking at Canada's past successes, at Vimy, at Dieppe, during the Cold War, indeed, during all the challenges it has faced, it seems obvious that our country and our military will have little difficulty in meeting the challenges of the future.

Alistair Edgar

Transatlantic Trade Issues in the 1990's

Dr. Gerard Montifroy, Professor, Political Science, Concordia University and University of Quebec, President, SIGGIS, Session Chair

The concept under which we have come together this afternoon is entitled "*A View from Europe*". Let me, in a few words, call to your attention the meaning of the expression "*The View of Europe*". It is evident, as we well know even from the time of the Cold War, that which one calls the perception of the menace, was not the same at all from the point of view of Europe as from the point of view of North America.

In the very beginning, in the 1950's during the McCarthy era, it is very clear that there was an aggressiveness that everyone in North America as well as in Europe viewed as an era of extremism. On the other hand, the flip side took place in the late 1970s, in 1975 to be exact, at the time of the signing of the Helsinki Accord. At this time, 35 countries came together to sign the accord in the Finnish capital. I am sure you are all familiar with the contents of this accord.

There was a sentiment at this time that we were at the heart of *detente*, but this *detente* was to be short-lived. Six years later, the beginning of the 1980s saw the end of the Carter presidency and the start of the Reagan era that produced the term "the evil empire". Only ten years passed between the times of the evil empire to that of "Gorbymania". In ten years there has been a 180 degree change not only in public opinion but also in government policies.

What occurred in Maastricht is not equivalent to what is happening in Prague or elsewhere. As Philippe Benetton said, "*Men in politics have a tendency toward longevity.*" Does he mean in private life or public? It is evident that what is meant is public, as the more we speak of the private the less likely we are to get to the essentials. Recently, I read a journal article which implied that in the diplomatic world a doctrine was emerging according to which the United States would not accept the rise of other states to the point where they could challenge the Americans.

Thus, today we return to the topic of Europe and the theme permits me to explain precisely the difference between the two Europes and to point out the differences in perceptions held in the USA and Europe. This morning Mr. Triestram of NATO headquarters delivered an excellent speech, diplomatically highlighting the differences. Soviet military production has not decreased. The images that we see are those of a social and economic collapse. Thus, the view of Europe, the view of America - what is it that separates us - what is it that unites us?

What separates us is a commercial reality, as President Bush speaks of protectionism, as we try to reach agreement at the GATT talks. What unites us are certain concepts of freedom and rights - these are concepts of an epoch, an era.

The First World War saw the separation of Europe and the emergence of two new states, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Yet now the existence of the state called "Yugoslavia", which had combined peoples of diverse ethnic origins, is ending. Looking at this example, the difficulty in joining different cultures, based different foundations, into a single state becomes starkly apparent. Therefore, is Europe going to evolve as Minister Collins just explained - can one hope for that? Can we hope for a new definition of Europe that will simply become democratic, and politically and economically harmonious?

Even in the United States, Drs. Edwards and Novak, who published *The Logic of War and Peace*, have since the end of the 1980s expressed serious doubts. I will not hide from you the fact that I also have serious doubts. I don't think it would be prudent to lower our defences too quickly. For even if we have responsible politicians both here in North America and in Europe, nothing can assure us that they will be there for long.

Mr. Alistair Edgar is our next speaker. Mr. Edgar is a Ph.D candidate in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University and is a member of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. A graduate of Cambridge University and the University of British Columbia, he will complete his Ph.D this year on the subject of "*The Canadian Defence Industrial Base and Western Defence Economic Relations: Industry and Government Policy in an Uncertain Environment.*" He has been awarded a post-doctoral fellowship at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies of Harvard University which he will take up in 1992-1993.

He is the recipient of many scholarships and awards which attest to the high quality of his work. A few examples are: (1) The Dean's Award from Queen's; (2) US Information Service Award; (3) Donald S. Rickerd Fellowship; and (4) Ontario Graduate Scholarship.

Alistair Edgar

In my presentation to you this afternoon, I have been asked to attempt two things. The first is one that I always enjoy, which is to talk generally about the subject of transatlantic trade issues in the 1990s, or more particularly why these issues are becoming an important element in relations between the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

My second task, and perhaps a tougher one, is to put aside my academic's natural caution and preference for couching opinions in moderate terms, hedged about by caveats. I have promised to try, so for today at least I will call a spade a shovel, instead of a manual garden landscaping implement.

The reference point for our seminar is Canada and North Atlantic Security and, as such, most of the presentations given here today have offered Canadian perspectives. While I do have a few comments that I would like to make regarding recent Canadian defence and security policy decisions, my talk adopts a much more American-oriented approach. This may give my comments a rather strange slant. What you have is a European by origin, although now a Canadian by choice, talking to a Canadian audience about American policies. Nevertheless, my focus south of the border is based on my belief that the fundamental reason why international trade and other economic issues are getting a higher political profile in the 1990s and are becoming rather more contentious as they do so, is that the sudden collapse

of the Cold War bogeyman has finally left the US congress and the American voter to confront the fact that interdependence has a price tag. International economic issues, they are finding, are also national economic problems. And it has become more than ever apparent to Americans, concerned with their declining competitiveness and their economic recession, that their own domestic economic interests do not always or necessarily converge with those of their European or Japanese allies.

I am sure that by now everybody in Canada is only too familiar with the basic substance of the impasse between the USA and the EC at the GATT talks over the matter of agricultural subsidies. Let me therefore start by reminding you very briefly of the reasons why transatlantic trade issues recently became a matter of concern amongst the allies. At a high-profile conference in Munich last February, a number of USA Republican Senators and USA Vice President Dan Quayle all issued quite terse warnings regarding the negative effect that a collapse of the multilateral trade talks could have on alliance security relations. Specifically, Senators Richard Lugar, Warren Rudman, William Cohen, and John McCain each directly linked European concessions in GATT with their ability and willingness to seek to convince American voters and Congress itself of the need maintain large numbers of US troops stationed on European soil. Both Vice President Quayle and NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner acknowledged at the conference that if the current Uruguay Round of trade negotiations failed to reach an agreement, "*we risk a profound crisis in transatlantic relations.*"

The Americans' comments made headlines in all of the major European and North American newspapers, with titles such as "Newly isolationist US poised to withdraw from NATO" and "US officials take tough new line on Europe". While the first of these articles exaggerated what was said--none of the participants was talking about total withdrawal from NATO itself--at least one Senator, Richard Lugar of Indiana, reminded his audience of the speed with which the US has decided to close up shop in the Philippines after that government's negative decision on renewal of basing agreements. Without a clear demonstration of political support, and a willingness to make concessions, US base closure was scheduled with a rapidity even the Philippine government had not anticipated. As for Europe, none of the Senators believed that the Administration's announced force goal of 150,000 troops in Europe was realistic, with a more likely figure, barring a worsening of trans-

atlantic relations due to trade or other disputes, being 60,000 to 75,000. Both Woerner and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander - Europe (SACEUR), General John Galvin, have effectively conceded that the latter number may be acceptable to them, arguing that exact numbers matter less than commitment.

I must say that I have absolutely no sympathy for, and in fact, some sense of rueful satisfaction about, the type of complaint voiced by Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Brook regarding the Senators' and Dan Quayle's warning that for the United States in the 1990s, trade issues are security issues. Mr. van den Brook argued that that is not how friends talk to each other. Well, my Canadian history is not infallible, but I recall that in the mid-1970s Pierre Trudeau received a fairly sharp reminder from Europe that progress regarding the "Third Option" trade strategy depended on reconsideration of his defence policy reviews which had included the idea of a reduction of Canadian troop levels in Europe. Friends don't use that type of technique - but states, even allies, do, in the pursuit of their own national interests.

This, in fact, is indirectly the answer to the question that I was asked to comment upon: whether trade issues have become more important than security issues. My answer is that trade and economic relations more generally have always been a national security issue, from the time of the Albanian empire, to the British Navigation Acts, and including the well-known Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty -- the "Canadian Article". What is different in the 1990s from our relatively more recent past is that the Cold War is over, and with it also has gone America's willingness, when push comes to shove, either to paint over or put aside divergences of national economic interest in order to maintain Alliance cohesion.

After all, one of the clearest lessons learned in the United States from the Gulf War was neither military nor international in character. It was instead that popular appeal disappears very quickly in these times if it is based largely or solely on foreign policy, and especially if that foreign policy activism can be decried by critics as distracting politicians' attention from important domestic policy concerns. A public opinion poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations placed the protection of American workers' jobs at home, their interests abroad and the ensuring of adequate energy supplies well ahead of Alliance relations, weapons proliferation, and human

rights. Last of all was the promotion of democracy. Especially in this election year, the new political bugaboo in the USA is not that of being seen to be "soft on communism", it is that of being "soft on free trade", or for that matter of even being interested in free trade. The April deadline placed on both the NAFTA and the GATT talks by USA observers and officials is indicative of this unwillingness to discuss international trade prior to the election.

Let us be clear about one thing, however. This inward-looking inclination, and for our purposes the associated focus on making old allies share the costs of security through greater willingness to make compromises in trade policy, is not an election year gimmick. It will not simply fade after the votes have been counted. Rather, it is part and parcel of the post-Cold War transition from geopolitics to what has been called geo-economics, or the logic of conflict pursued through the methods of commerce.

I am not saying that there is or will be an inevitable increase in protectionism within the United States, or for that matter within the EC. What I do suggest, however, is that USA trade and other security policies emerging from Congress are going to be marked by greater pragmatism, an internationalism which is not willing to put American national economic interests or demands second to keep its European allies satisfied and to maintain good Alliance relations. To return to my favourite whipping boy for today, Foreign Minister van den Brook, the American Senators' and Vice President's comments should not be dismissed merely as "exaggerated reproaches", and the Foreign Minister's warnings that without the presence of US troops Europe will return to pre-1914 political rivalries and instability will not wash. The latter fails to recognize the significant changes that have taken place in European politics since 1945; and in any case, as Senator McCain bluntly stated, the American public in the 1990s simply will not accept such troop deployments on the basis of the argument that they are there to prevent Western European states from fighting each other.

This more self-interested pragmatism, I would suggest, has long been mirrored in European governments' policies and action, if not political rhetoric, in both international trade and the military component of security relations. What is important in this decade, however, is that it is becoming prevalent on the western side of the Atlantic ocean. Isolationist sentiments are part of the American political heritage, but isolationism is not a serious political op-

tion. This does not, however, mean that post-Cold War American foreign economic or security policies, or debates about policy choices, will look at changes only at the margins from the kind of leadership role previously played by the US in maintaining or promoting open international markets and alliance cohesion. The neo-isolationist, protectionist critique which featured in Harris Wofford's senatorial campaign in Pennsylvania and Pat Buchanan's fading Republican presidential candidacy also is raising a number of important policy questions which will be part and parcel of USA attitudes in the future: why are large numbers of American troops still permanently stationed abroad? What is the rationale for its multi-billion dollar foreign aid programme? What is an adequate and affordable new defence posture? And, of equal importance or even more, what are fair trading practices? The pressures which led to Super 301 are not simply going to disappear, especially since both Republican and Democratic Congressional parties, as William Hyland said in a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, are beginning to sound just a little like Smoot and Hawley from the 1930s.

For alliance economic and security relations and therefore for my presentation here today the key point is that this change is taking place in the USA. But it also is evident in Canada, and on that point, and recalling the request to be provocative, let me make one concluding remark. Though I suspect that the decision was made for many of the wrong reasons - financial rather than political or defence-related - and though I am somewhat embarrassed to admit that I am happy to endorse a policy decision of the present Government of Canada, I believe that the decision to withdraw all Canadian troops from Europe is justifiable, reasonable, and moreover should have been planned for and decided upon several years ago. To repeat Manfred Woerner's point, it is the commitment, not the number of troops, which is important, and new security circumstances simply cannot support European political pressures to keep our troops in place on European soil. Continuing commitment to NATO is a Canadian national interest; the stationing of forces in Europe was an artifact of the Cold War and the Cold War is over. The golden age of Pearsonian internationalism faded some time past, and if it is being replaced by a greater Canadian pragmatism, I for one will not be disappointed. What must be found now is an alternative means of demonstrating a real, rather than a symbolic commitment to European security - one that satisfies Canadian and European interests. I think that the problem there

is that while the Canadian government may mean what it says, what it actually says can change from week to week and from day to day.

I can only hope, and here I trust in the good sense of Minister Collins and her colleagues, that the reformulation of Canadian Defence Policy in the 1990s will be undertaken by the Department of National Defence, and not through default by the Finance Minister and the Treasury Board, as it has been so often in the past.

The View from Europe: Germany

Gerard Montifroy

His Excellency Dr. Richard Ellerkmann, Ambassador of Germany to Canada is our next speaker.

Dr. Ellerkmann received his law degree from the University of Bonn and later earned the degree, Doctor of Law. He also received a B.A. degree from the University of Toronto following which he was employed by Dupont of Canada in Montreal.

After two years of service with a law firm in New York City, he joined the German Foreign Service in 1963 and was immediately posted to Teheran. Alternating with tours of duty at the Foreign Office in Bonn, he has served in Warsaw and as Ambassador to Uganda, Zimbabwe and, from 1987 to 1991, to Iraq. He presented his credentials as Ambassador to Canada to the Governor-General on 27 March 1991.

Dr. Richard Ellerkmann

How do I see the European Security situation evolving?

Since the end of the Cold War in the summer of 1989, an understanding has developed in both East and West which is of fundamental importance for the future of Europe and the world.

First of all, it is agreed that we all have a common interest in stability. I would like to quote from the Charter of Paris for a New Europe from November 21, 1990 where it is said:

> *The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and cooperation.*

And furthermore:

> *With the ending of the division of Europe, we will strive for a new quality in our security relations while fully respecting each other's freedom of choice in that respect. Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others.*

The second insight is that our notion of security has to be more comprehensive. Today security is no longer based on military forces and on the principle of deterrence alone. Security today is more. Security is the common effort to secure stability in peace and freedom. In our understanding, security includes political, social, economic and environmental dimensions as well. This enlarged concept of security is in our minds when we consider and discuss new ideas and ask new questions such as: Why are we all interested in democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe? Why do we want successful democratization in the successor states of the Soviet Union? Why do we think that the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should receive economic assistance and why should the new democracies have closer ties with the European Community? Why should the Iron Curtain not be allowed to be replaced by a new division of Europe through economic disparity?

Third, more and more countries share the idea that friendly relations between states require a common understanding as to which principles should govern the internal order or states. The idea in itself is old. In his book *On Eternal Peace (Vom Ewigen Frieden)*, Viktor Immanuel Kant in 1795 proposed the foundation of a "United States" that is to include all nations. This process, according to his opinion, would require harmony between the different internal structures. The modern version of this thesis can be found in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe:

> *We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.*

With respect to human rights and the rule of law it is said:

> *Their observance and full exercise are the foundation of freedom, justice and peace.*

This actually means that the traditional principle of non-interference in internal affairs has lost its overriding significance as one of the guiding principles in international relations.

Fourth, we all agree that the military threat has been significantly reduced in Europe. The reductions in military budgets in Central and Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union, democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, also the new concept of security open up new opportunities for disarmament and arms control in Europe. In creating a new all-European peace, it is wise to rely on instruments and organizations which in the past have proven their value. One of these organizations is the European Community. It has increasingly been acknowledged as the anchor of stability in Europe. Therefore, it is important to transform the European Community into a political union.

A step towards reaching this goal was taken in Maastricht in the autumn of 1991. Resolutions were passed not only on economic and monetary union, but also on a common foreign and security policy as well as on cooperation in internal and legal matters. It is true that we need many more important achievements if we want to create a United States of Europe.

One fundamental element of the European union is seen in its common foreign and security policies. We will have to clarify in the near future which areas of foreign relations will be subject to a common policy, but since the principle of majority vote has been accepted, now we can be hopeful.

Also agreed upon in Maastricht was a common defence policy. The instrument of that will be the Western European Union. All EC member states that are not members of the WEU have been invited to become members, and all European member states of NATO that are not members of the WEU have been invited to become associate members.

Let me turn to the Atlantic community.

The Atlantic community is organised in two institutions; the CSCE and NATO. Both institutions form the basis for a new security order in Europe.

The CSCE process finally produced the conditions which made it possible to overcome the division of Europe and of Germany. The CSCE provided the framework in which non-aggression, human rights, the right to self-determination and "peaceful change" play a unique role. The principle of security and cooperation more and more turns into a principle of security through cooperation.

Until the summit in November 1990, emphasis was laid on the creation of a normative framework for Europe. The Charter of Paris laid the foundation for the creation of an institutional framework.

Today the CSCE commands institutions such as the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Centre and other mechanisms which allow the CSCE to become an active and efficient instrument to cope with security problems in Europe.

Let me add our expectations as to the Fourth CSCE Follow up Conference which is being held in Helsinki presently.

First, we urgently need a coherent concept for effective conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict settlement. To this end, the existing scope for CSCE action must be enhanced and made operational. The CSCE must create the capacity to adopt peacekeeping measures of its own.

Second, a steering committee to support the CSCE chairmanship should be introduced. This committee could be composed of the CSCE Chairman-in-office, supported by his predecessor and successor, as well as three or four interested states.

Third, the instruments available for the protection of minorities are not yet sufficient, and must be strengthened.

Fourth, a new phase of disarmament and arms control should begin. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe must be put into effect by the concluding summit meeting of the CSCE in July 1992 at the latest.

Fifth, a major priority is to be given to the establishment of an all-European infrastructure, a single economic area which, through efforts by all of us, will lead to a United States of Europe seeing their strongest allies in the two countries of the North American continent.

Let me now turn to NATO. NATO finds itself in a paradoxical situation. It has to avoid becoming the victim of its own success. The new situation in Europe raised questions of whether there was still a military need for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Questions were even asked by my sons, two of whom have served in our army. The questions are caused by the following developments:

- the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact;
- the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary;
- the beginning of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany and Poland;
- the transfer of heavy Russian weaponry behind the Urals.
- the end of Communism and therefore the end of the ideological separation in Europe.

Each of these changes constitutes a vital contribution to the improvement of the European security environment. This has led to new security considerations in NATO which have not been concluded yet.

In this context, the focal points are:

- European-American relations;
- the expectations of the states in Central and South Eastern Europe and the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States or CIS;
- the relationship between NATO and the CSCE.

Let me make some personal remarks:

With regard to European-American relations it has to be taken into account that the United States will reduce her European based forces, while Canada intends to withdraw her entire contingent. In the United States it is

increasingly difficult to convince the public of a continued military presence in Europe. If this is connected with economic and trade related questions such as GATT, the problem does not become easier. On the other hand, the United States wishes to maintain her political and military role in Europe.

It has to remain the aim of Europe together with our North American friends to create a lasting peace in Europe and to assist the states in Eastern and Central Europe and in the CIS to create democratic and market-oriented economic systems in order to maintain stability in all of Europe. These are the most important conditions for a peaceful process of European integration. We therefore find it essential that a reduced American presence in Europe does not weaken NATO. The substance of our Alliance is not to be seen in the numbers of American military units in Europe but in close political and military cooperation of all American and European partners.

The strongest impulse to modify the Alliance at present does not come from within but from without, namely from the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS. In the middle of 1990 a new relationship between NATO and those states was established. The most important element is the North Atlantic Cooperation Council of NATO which was founded in December 1991 at the summit in Rome. *De facto*, the Cooperation Council is a form of association. It allows for a contribution to increased stability without full membership. In the long run we will have to answer the question of full membership.

As a result of the great interest leading to their membership of the Cooperation Council, the relationship of the Central and Eastern European states, and the states of CIS on the one hand and of NATO on the other hand, today is closer than that of Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden which in the meantime have expressed similar interests. Thus, it cannot be overlooked that the geographic area of the Cooperation Council will in the long run be almost identical with the area of the CSCE.

Therefore, it seems very important to clarify the relationship between NATO and CSCE. While the United States favours the extension of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to maintain USA influence in Europe, France prefers the strengthening of the CSCE. It should be recalled that France has already suggested the "codifying" of the CSCE process with the aim of

rendering the CSCE into a full-fledged international organization that would satisfy the security needs of the Central and Eastern European states.

Answers still have to be found. They may lead into the direction of an identical membership of CSCE and North Atlantic Cooperation Council and a stronger cooperation between NATO and CSCE.

What are the new challenges? The dissolution of the Soviet Union creates immense problems for all of us. Some problems have to be solved immediately, others will take a longer time.

First of all there is an immediate need for food. The requests for aid are of such dimension that coordination in a multilateral framework is essential. The recent conference in Moscow showed that the message has been understood by all Western countries and that most of them will, I am sure, do their best also in the future. What is important now is first to determine the needs, then to decide on the contributions and thirdly to ensure that aid gets to the recipients without delay and without loss.

In order to give you an impression of the dimensions involved: since 1991 the EC has already donated food valued at $C 649 million.

The second problem has to be solved in an equally speedy manner to prevent former Soviet scientists and engineers who worked in sensitive areas from selling their knowledge and expertise to regimes striving to increase their military capabilities. They could endanger all international endeavours regarding the non-proliferation of weaponry of mass destruction. We have to make arrangements so that these experts do not become engaged in a transfer of sensitive technology to states that could pose problems for the future.

Therefore, Russia and the EC countries, the United States and Canada have agreed to the foundation of an International Science and Technology Centre located in Russia. The Centre is to give scientists from Russia and the other republics of the CIS who so far were involved in research, development and production of weapons of mass destruction, prospects to work in non-military areas.

Next to these immediate needs the states of CIS need Western help to restructure their economies and to build democratic institutions. Without

massive financial aid provided by the West, the restructuring of the economy will be impossible. We have to be careful that orthodox Communists do not exploit public discontent and disappointment, which could endanger the process of democratization and economic restructuring. The West has an interest in the success of these reforms. We all have to go to the limits of our financial abilities.

The recent decision of the G-7 to make available the total amount of $26 billion dollars is a step in the right direction. Eighteen billion dollars are meant to be a credit for the purchase of foodstuffs and to balance the present budget. Six billion dollars are needed to stabilize the ruble.

Another challenge the Atlantic community has to face is to make sure that arms and 'dual-use' goods are not proliferated. This problem has become one of the highest order. The new states of the former Soviet Union have command over enormous depots of military equipment. Unfortunately, there are too many states interested in buying advanced weaponry. We will have to convince the states of CIS that through the proliferation of armament to undemocratic states, another crisis like the one we witnessed one year and a half ago in the Gulf could be made possible.

A third challenge to all of us is disarmament and arms control.

As to strategic nuclear missiles, last year's initiatives by USA President Bush and USSR President Gorbachev and their confirmation by President Bush and Russian President Yeltsin of January 1992 ask for a drastic reduction in the strategic nuclear potentials. However, in the area of tactical nuclear forces, that is long-range artillery and short-range missiles, there seem to be problems. In January 1992, NATO urged the successor states to the Soviet Union to accept the obligations following the Bush-Gorbachev initiative of last September, that is, that all US and Soviet nuclear short-range missiles and nuclear artillery ammunition be destroyed completely. The reason for this initiative is that tactical nuclear weapons are hard to verify and can easily be brought out of the country.

It was possible to mention only a few challenges we are facing in Europe and in our Atlantic Community, but they highlight the necessity of even closer cooperation in creating a new order of security and peace in Europe. The

new situation in Europe makes a close cooperation with North America indispensable.

With the continued presence and cooperation of North America it will be possible to succeed in carrying peace and security in Europe into the next century. Therefore NATO should not be regarded as a military and political instrument of the years of the Cold War but as an institution now needed more than before.

Friendship and partnership with North America will remain of essential significance for Germany and future freedom and security in Europe will be guaranteed only through continued transatlantic cooperation. Thank you.

Valeriu Eugen Pop

View from Europe: Romania

Gerard Montifroy

To conclude our seminar, we will hear a presentation by His Excellency Valeriu Pop, Ambassador of Romania to Canada.

Ambassador Pop's early education, training and employment were in the field of engineering. He graduated from the Bucharest Polytechnical Institute Faculty of Mechanics in 1961, the Faculty of Power Engineering in 1969 and the Central Institute for Management in 1975.

Following a distinguished career in government, he was made Minister of the Environment in 1990, a post he held until he presented his credentials as Ambassador to Canada to the Governor-General on 5 February 1992.

Valeriu Eugen Pop

Romania is fully aware of the importance and vital necessity of stability and security on the entire continent, these elements constituting also a *sine qua non* prerequisite to the implementation of our reforms and activities for a democratic Romanian society.

The events in Europe have known a rhythm of rapid succession hard to imagine until not so long ago, which was marked by a swift alternation between moments of hope and of concern. The breakdown and dissolution of the USSR, the evolution of the situation in Yugoslavia and more recently the

explosive situation in the Republic of Moldova, confirmed the particular risks the young democracies of Eastern Europe are exposed to.

The transition of all countries of Central and Eastern Europe - from the Baltic Sea to the Black and Adriatic Seas - to pluralist democracy and to market economies proves to be more difficult, long term and painful than many had expected. Three years after their liberation from communism and dictatorship, Eastern European countries still feel inadequately integrated and secure. There are, however, many positive signs for Europe as a whole.

The bipolar order of the cold war - previously based on the confrontation between two irreconcilable ideologies - is now dead. This disappearance has led to an increased vitality of international organisations, such as the United Nations, and we have now a real opportunity to make the CSCE a truly effective Euro-Atlantic forum for political dialogue, cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

But it is not a secret that for the time being, Central and Eastern Europe look more like a bad card than like a trump for Euro-Atlantic security, and there is a crucial challenge before both the Eastern and Western actors on the European scene. The new Europe is faced with a deep division in the technological and scientific areas; these significant gaps could potentially endanger the prospects of stability on the whole continent.

Even more, stability in the Balkans - the region well-known as the "powder keg of Europe" - is another Euro-Atlantic challenge. It is an open question as to whether Europe will succeed in coping with all of these.

In our opinion, one of the most important prerequisites to finding a successful solution to the contradictory circumstances with which Euro-Atlantic security is confronted, entails infusing throughout Eastern Europe a spirit of solidarity.

For those who are familiar enough with Eastern Europe's history, it could hardly be a surprise finding out that the countries in that area behave like players in a zero-sum game; unfortunately, with a few, and only short-lived exceptions, the rivalry was only seeing one face of the coin. In spite of the official declarations of intentions, the zero-sum game behaviour is still alive and well even within the newly created sub-regional groupings.

A most recent and suggestive illustration of that deep-rooted attitude is offered by the favourite metaphor some East European representatives have been using when they refer to their countries as "islands of stability". Its implied meaning is that one's own country is a better bet than its neighbours.

The rules of the new game - a cooperative one that includes all the actors in the region - must be applied. Consequently, solidarity must be grounded on the awareness that the economic and political stability of all one's neighbours are part of the national interests of each, regardless of whether they belong to a certain area.

The common risks that East European countries are, and will continue to be, confronted with are the region's vulnerability to the domino effect and the already tested ineffectiveness of "tough" solutions to their protracted disputes are requesting such an alternative.

By reviving the spirit of the Marshall Plan for example, the Western countries could help introduce a new gameplan to the Eastern part of the continent where old and new, objective and subjective roots of conflicts interweave with each other.

Nobody denies that the West has the right to use conditionality as a stimulus for democratic changes. All we want to emphasize is that, pushed beyond reasonable limits, it becomes rather counterproductive. We think that conditionality, complemented by encouragement, might prove a more efficient lever for change. The establishing, for example, of a "code of conduct" incorporating all recognized European standards for national minorities and having each country with minorities implement them, will move this matter from the bilateral arena to the multilateral one.

Furthermore, combining individual conditionality with global conditionality (coming from collective actors such as NATO, EEC and others, and addressed to Eastern Europe as a whole), the Western democracies could not only positively influence Euro-Atlantic security, but also prevent the *"fragmentation malaise"* from crossing their borders.

As a matter of fact, all the European countries, regardless of their geographic position have to learn to cooperate for a common future. To accept this as a goal is not quite a matter of choice. Things are different as far as the efforts aimed at bringing all the Eastern European countries within the

democratic family are concerned. This joint endeavour involving all regions of the continent will extend and strengthen the grounds of Euro-Atlantic security. Past history does warn us that the narrower the base of Euro-Atlantic security today, the bigger the bill of "containment" tomorrow.

When Romania thinks about its security, it is looking to Europe - to its Euro-Atlantic structure, to NATO as well as to Western European Union (WEU), and to the Common Market. First, because it is the family to which Romania naturally belongs. Second, NATO has once more shown, through its ability to open new horizons of hope, its crucial role in creating a safer and more durable European security order. Romania wholeheartedly shares the conviction expressed by NATO member states that their own security is inseparably linked to that of all other States in Europe. We also have taken note of their committment expressed in the statement that "NATO states do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the continent."

Fully aware of the importance of the cooperative initiatives provided by NATO member states in the London and Copenhagen declarations, Romania has expressed immediately her interest and readiness to participate effectively and dynamically in such activities involving "security partnerships" such as the organisation of meetings of officials and experts to exchange views and information; the intensification of military contacts between senior NATO military authorities and their counterparts in the Central and Eastern European States; the participation of experts from the above-mentioned countries in certain Alliance activities; the gradual expansion of NATO's information programmes in Eastern Europe and the encouragement of contacts between the parliaments of all these countries and the North-Atlantic Assembly. These, together with regular political consultation, are helping to create a coherent strategy within a partnership framework, namely the NACC, that will discourage possible adverse actions.

The perspectives offered by the new, recently established North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) are encouraging for all of us in Eastern Europe. It has created a network for democratic stability, based on the golden triangle of *"dialogue-partnership-cooperation"* that holds enormous promise for Euro-Atlantic security.

The conversion of the defence industries, military doctrines and budgets, the civilian control of armed forces, the conceptual approaches to arms con-

trol, alongside the conclusions of the "partnership agreements" bilaterally and multilaterally, and technology transfers are amongst the topics and fields where NATO and its member states, Canada included, have the necessary experience and expertise required by Romania and the other countries of the region.

The inauguration of the Bucharest Euro-Atlantic Centre on February 21, 1992 is a starting stone on this new Romanian road. As NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Manfred Woerner expressed while attending the ceremonies:

> *The establishment of this new Euro-Atlantic Centre in Bucharest is yet another manifestation of the determination of Romanians to join the Euro-Atlantic Community of free nations. It is a signal of confidence, of energy, and of political vision which can only add credit to Romania's important role in the New Europe.*

Romania has developed a network of bilateral relations with countries participating in the CSCE. In addition, bilateral treaties of friendship or partnership were concluded with Germany, France, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria and one is now under negotiation with Hungary as is a brotherhood treaty with the Republic of Moldova.

Having good relations with all the Balkan Countries, Romania has proposed applying the institutional structure of the CSCE to the region to govern the multilateral relations among the countries as well to promote the peaceful settlement of any conflict that might arise. In this time, Romania continued to develop her traditionally friendly relations with Yugoslavia. Political consultations are conducted regularly with Yugoslavia as a whole and with each component republic.

Special attention is paid to the complicated developments in the relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. Moldova is a country currently in the throes of violent upheaval accompanied by an open aggression towards legal authorities, territorial integrity and sovereignty and to large parts of the civilian population from the Russian Cossack forces - a well-organized, well-trained organization.

A large majority of the population of Moldova is of Romanian origin and much of Moldavian territory was part of Romania before the Soviet ultimatum

of June 1940. The republic declared independence on August 27, 1991 and since then has received international recognition, already becoming an UN member and a participant in the CSCE.

Based on common historical roots, Romania is nurturing a special relationship with the Republic of Moldova. Romania is ready to offer any kind of the assistance and facilities - obviously military excluded - for preserving the territorial integrity and sovereignty of this Republic. Already, a free trade zone between them is being established.

We hope that recently established mechanisms of political consultations among the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation will prove to be effective, forcing foreign mercenary and paramilitary forces to immediately withdraw from the territory of the Republic of Moldova thereby, safeguarding its sovereignty.

Making more references to this region of Europe, there is the Black Sea Cooperation Project - initiated by Turkey - established on the basis of a joint declaration, already installed on February 3, 1992 by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Romania and Turkey. The project remains open to other countries to join. Yugoslavia and Greece are welcome to do so as founding states.

Being an expression of a new geographical awareness, this project is taking into account the Black Sea - Mediterranean connection, as well as Romania's proximity. The economic and non-economic advantages of a greater Western presence in the region are evident by themselves.

Considering that in the near future the Danube will be linked to the Rhine by the Mein-Rhine Canal and therefore, to the North Sea, Romania has conceived of a project and already submitted it to the Danubian countries. The essence of this Romanian-Danubian project is to develop this waterway as an active economic, historical, cultural, and geographical link between the European countries.

A relatively less developed country compared to other European states, Romania would be prepared to extend participation in this project to the landlocked countries of the continent (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, and

Switzerland) granting them privileged access to the Black Sea Romanian Harbour, Constanza and the banks of the Danube-Black Sea Canal.

In this way, the whole basin Danube-Mein-Rhine becomes a strategic link between East and West, North and South in an integrated development project on a grand European scale.

This project together with the Black Sea Cooperation initiative, will bring the prospect of a unique European economic space closer. Thank you.

Student, Political Science major, exchange program between the University of Grenoble in France and Concordia University

Dr. Ellerkmann, I noted in your propositions that you emphasized the economic aid that is now necessary for the new democracies. We know that there has not been a true political end to Maastricht, therefore, taking into account the stability that one knows in Europe, I would like to pose two questions considering the historical and cultural ties between Poland and Germany. What will happen when capital is massively invested in Poland? And second, what will happen when capital is massively injected in the new economic zone of Kaliningrad, formerly known as Konigsberg, the city of Immanuel Kant?

Richard Ellerkmann

Those are very difficult questions. On the one hand, Germany together with all the other western countries, has been requested by these countries to invest as much capital as possible which we did. But in the case of Czechoslovakia, for example, after eight months it was discovered that of all western investments, 85% came from Germany. There was criticism in Czechoslovakia, and words such as "economic Germanization" were used. From that I would conclude that the new Germany has to move in a very careful manner with regard to Eastern European countries.

With regard to Kaliningrad, as you know, it was the northern part of East Prussia which is now part of the Russian Republic. There is no claim from

our side, there may be by others. Before there is massive investment from the German side, we will have to weigh this very carefully, and the same goes for Poland. On the one hand there are requests to invest, especially addressed to our banks and our industries; but as I said, we in Germany have to be very careful when investing heavily.

George G. Bell

In your presentation, you talked about the evolution of a single economic area based on the membership of CSCE. Would you give us some sense of how you see that evolving in terms of time and what difficulties lie ahead in that process? How would the North American members of the CSCE fit into this framework?

Richard Ellerkmann

I think that Maastricht made clear that the economic and monetary union will begin January 1, 1993 with a free flow of capital, people and services across the borders of the twelve member states. A monetary union and a Central Bank of Europe have been agreed on; also agreed upon was eventual social union with one country abstaining. As far as I can see it, we will have a closer union by the end of this century. What we are striving for is to have more members of the European Community. Personally, I think that with regard to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary the time is much too long to be an associate and not to become a full member and I would assume that the three Baltic countries and the other three countries that have already applied for membership - Austria, Finland and Sweden - will become full members before the year 2000. As to the CSCE, all successor states of the Soviet Union, except for one, I think it is Georgia, have become members of the CSCE. All except four have become members of the Cooperative Council of NATO. What I said is that in the long run, we may have a regional, geographical identity between the CSCE and NATO members but that remains to be seen.

Don Macnamara

Concluding Remarks

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We started this morning with the recognition that this is the 75th anniversary of Vimy, later reminded that 1992 is also the 50th anniversary of Dieppe. These European battles have been particularly formative of the Canadian psyche - military and non-military. Our commitment to Europe historically in this century was paid in a price beyond dollars - a price paid in lives, in many ways because of a lack of readiness in the first instance.

Mr. Kinsman addressed the many changes that have taken place in Europe and which continue to take place. He spoke of the threats to international security - from renewed nationalism, through nuclear weapons proliferation and environmental concerns to economic dislocation - all in Europe. He identified the various institutions, old and new, to address these threats - CSCE, G7, and NATO - a NATO without stationed Canadian Forces. Why? Because the price is too high, specifically the cost of maintaining dependents there.

Ms. Paquette reminded us of the importance of strategic analysis in forecasting our security requirements, and that our national strategy - loosely defined - is a reflection of our national values. The changes in the ethnic origin of the new immigrants to Canada from Europe to Asia and other non-European regions may in fact contribute to a change in our values, especially our Eurocentric values.

Mr. Triestram, recalled that his first sight of a Canadian was a soldier passing through his garden in the process of liberating Holland in 1944. He recounted the many changes in NATO in terms of role, goals and structure. He acknowledged the major contribution of Canada to the establishment of NATO and regretted the decision of Canada to withdraw its forces from Europe, but was pleased that Canada would maintain a commitment to NATO.

Dr. Bell addressed the important issue of national strategic planning, especially the need for a coherent set of strategies flowing from recognition of our values and goals, the proper assessment and discussion of the current and anticipated environments for national security, and finally, a strategy that reflects a set of policies followed by the necessary plans for implementation.

Dr. Bell emphasized the multiple dimensions of strategy, a theme then picked up by Mr. Zakaib in addressing the need for the maintenance of appropriate industrial capabilities to support national military requirements, mobilization potential and the development and application of new technologies.

At lunch, Major-General Reay described the rationale for structure of the new Canadian Army, designed and definitely to be equipped to respond to a multiplicity of tasks, from protection of Canadian sovereignty, cooperation with the United States in the defence of North America, with our NATO allies, peacekeeping and arms control verification and, if necessary, to internal security. The principles of appropriate firepower and mobility coupled with effectively trained and equipped general purpose combat forces would serve the roles assigned.

Associate Minister of National Defence, Mrs. Mary Collins, gave a stirring speech recalling the Canadian commitment to and sacrifices in Europe. She addressed in detail the major and historic changes that have reduced the Soviet-Western confrontation and tension in Europe. The removal of Canadian Forces from Europe would coincide with a renewed commitment to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force [AMF(L)] slated for for potential deployment to Norway and a dedicated brigade and two squadrons of fighters for expeditionary an contingency purposes, backed up by a re-equipment programme to ensure the appropriate mobility and capability.

Professor Montifroy structured the afternoon discussion with an appeal for recognition of the potential for instability that exists in Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe and South-West Asia. He suggested that the assumptions of peace and harmony reflected by many speakers in justifying changes in NATO and military structures could not be made with confidence and that we should be aware of the potential and probability for continuous flare-ups in these regions.

Mr. Edgar reflected on the need to understand the pragmatic issues involved in the changes in Europe - the changes in industrial demands in support of the military and the cost in North American jobs, the whole economic dimension in security from these changes and the impact of the new Europe on European-North American relations at the political, economic and military levels.

Our two ambassadors, Ambassador Dr. Ellerkmann from Germany and Ambassador Pop from Romania provided the insight available only from the European view. Ambassador Ellerkmann underlined the costs of democratization and economic reorganization, on the one hand, and that the risks of weapons proliferation (or leakage of know-how) have to be recognized and addressed in realistic political and economic assistance policies. Working in concert, the institutions available, such as NATO, the CSCE, and the EC, have the capacity to do so - but only with cooperation and commitment from all concerned.

Ambassador Pop reviewed the amazing changes in his own country and Eastern Europe since 1989. However, the going has been tough. The changes towards democracy and a market economy are very difficult indeed. This again requires assistance, cooperation, and commitment - to reorganize the breadth of the security equation. The narrower the base of European security, the broader the dangers for security in the future. There must be involvement, cooperation, contacts, support and assistance to lend to the partnerships in the region necessary for future security.

Let us hope that 1992 is not seen in the future as the beginning of unravelling a successful security agreement - a beginning that was brought on by an assessment of costs in terms of dollars as opposed to a potential cost in terms of lives.

Mr. Triestram said this morning that the first Canadian he had ever seen was a soldier, walking through his garden in the process of liberating his country. I hope that the last Canadian soldier he sees is not one who is abandoning his country to a future of uncertainty and insecurity in Europe.

With that I would like to thank many people. First of all thank you to all of our speakers who have provided us with an interesting and stimulating day. To our chairpersons, General Christie, Professor Young and Professor Montifroy and especially to our staff, Executive Director Alex Morrison, to his assistant Susan McNish, and our two DND interns Kristina Ikavalko and Derek McLellan. And thanks to all of you for participating in our session today. The challenge for us from this point on is to continue this discussion before the Canadian public and hope that they will become better informed to lead to a more sophisticated, and more enlightened discussion of our security interests both at home and abroad. And with that chart I bid you good afternoon and thank you.

Goran Kapetanovic

APPENDIX
A View From Europe: Yugoslavia

(i) EDITOR'S NOTE

Mr. Goran Kapetanovic was Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 until his resignation on 1 June 1992.

He graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of Belgrade and later conducted post graduate studies in law at the Faculty of Law and at the European University Centre, both in Nancy, France. An expert in the field of international terrorism, he has written widely on the subject and has represented Yugoslavia at many UN and international conferences.

In addition to his posting in Ottawa, Mr. Kapetanovic's foreign postings have included the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the UN in New York and the Yugoslavian Embassy in Cairo. His last posting in Yugoslavia prior to becoming Ambassador to Canada was as Federal Under-Secretary, Chief of Cabinet and Foreign Policy Advisor of the President of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia.

(ii) LETTER FROM MR. GORAN KAPETANOVIC TO THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES:

8 April 1992

Dear Mr. Morrison:

I am very sorry to inform you that due to tragic events in my country, Yugoslavia, I am not able to come to Montreal to participate in the deliberations of the seminar and to present my views on the situation in Yugoslavia and on questions of security in Europe. The tragic outburst of hostilities and armed conflict in my homeland prevent me at the moment from leaving Ottawa. I would like to use this opportunity to share with you some of my thoughts on the problems of my country.

The events in Yugoslavia are the consequence of extreme nationalism which has been the basic political programme of the forces in power in all Yugoslav republics. As nationalism is by its nature irrational, the policies based on nationalism can only bring tragedy to the Yugoslav people. It was obvious from the beginning of the crisis that the separatism of a multi-national society could only bring conflict, hatred, mistrust and destruction. This is why it is very difficult to understand why the European Community radically changed its position of support for the unity of Yugoslavia and gave its support to the nationalist and separatist forces. It is possible to explain why the irrational people cannot behave rationally but it is very hard to comprehend why the countries rationally striving for their own unity supported the irrational forces of nationalism and separatism in Yugoslavia.

Such a policy can have very serious consequences for Europe and for the world. In the case of Yugoslavia, a very selective approach has been used for the exercise of the right to self determination. A double standard is applied. The European Community recognized the right to separation as superior to the right to continue living together in Yugoslavia. Such an approach might trigger a wave of separatism in Europe. Is the European Community going to accept the same logic for Scotland, Wales, Basque country, Flemish Belgium, Slovakia, Corsica, Northern Italy, Bavaria, Alsace, Kurdistan, to mention only a few. And how to draw the lines of new borders, how to divide families and friends. Where is the end? Had the energy and effort the European Community used for the support of separatism been used for the

support of rational solutions and unity of Yugoslavia, today we would not have thousands dead, destroyed towns and villages, separated families and unbelievable hatred. While the leaders of different republics bear the biggest part of responsibility for all evils we are faced with, the European Community cannot excuse itself for its part of the responsibility.

The crisis in Yugoslavia cannot be solved by adopting unilateral measures or by recognizing its different republics. This can only bring new bloodshed and destruction. We do not need partial arbitrators, we need impartial mediators. We need the pressure of all those who are committed to peace in Yugoslavia for the continuation and permanent session of the Peace Conference. The Yugoslav crisis can only be solved through negotiations where all the parties will agree upon solutions. If they are imposed, they will not be solutions and they will only bring new problems and conflicts. We welcome the earliest possible arrival of the UN peacekeeping troops. They will be deployed in accordance with the plan adopted by the Security Council. Let us hope that the UN peacekeeping troops will prevent further armed conflicts and bloodshed. But, the peace-keeping troops cannot bring solutions to the crisis. It has to be done in the process of negotiations. This process has been, so far, very slow and inadequate. All the participating parties have not been treated equally. In order to be successful, the negotiating process has to be permanent while all the participants have to be treated in the same way. If not, new conflicts will arise and Yugoslavia and Europe will be faced with even larger confrontations.

Different political circles discussed the possibility of the use of the rapid deployment forces of West European Union in order to bring an end to the conflict in Yugoslavia. Military involvement of that kind would be an irresponsible adventure which would cost thousands of human lives. For who, and against whom, would these forces fight? What would be the result of their intervention: new bloodshed, new killings, new destruction. And there would not be peace. If it happened, many young Europeans besides Yugoslavs would die. For a very long time we would have a reign of terror. We don't need new generals and new soldiers; we have enough of them. Very soon we will have peacekeepers in Yugoslavia. As soon as possible we need impartial peacemakers, people of goodwill devoted to justice and peace.

Sincerely, Goran Kapetanovic, Ambassador of Yugoslavia

(iii) NEWSPAPER COVERAGE

Yugoslav Ambassador 'can't understand the hatred': Career Diplomat says European Community partly to blame.
[Source: *Globe & Mail*, 19 May 1992, Alan Freeman]

When Goran Kapetanovic was appointed Yugoslavia's ambassador to Canada in 1989, he came with high hopes of improving trade relations and of forging new links between companies and universities in the two countries.

Today, all those hopes have dissipated, consumed by the civil war that has ravaged his country.

"Who can co-operate with a country that is at war?" asks the 46 year old career diplomat.

The Yugoslav federation may have all but collapsed but Mr. Kapetanovic and his small embassy staff remain Yugoslavia's official representatives in Canada.

The latest round in Yugoslavia's effort at self-destruction is particularly painful for Mr. Kapetanovic, a Muslim from Sarajevo. The capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina is now the centre of the latest round of the civil war, which has carved up the country into a series of independent ethnic enclaves.

"I can't accept this nationalistic madness that is happening in Yugoslavia," he says. *"It's stupid to kill each other because of that. It's stupid to kill each other because of that. It's mad."*

"I can't understand the hatred," he continues. *"I can't understand such violent nationalism."*

Despite the fact that Yugoslavia has all but ceased to exist and its former citizens now identify themselves as Croatians, Slovenians, Bosnians and Serbians, Mr. Kapetanovic still identifies himself as a Yugoslav.

"My family is mixed. We have four citizenships. My wife has Croatian citizenship. Her mother was a Croat and her father was Serbian. I was born in Bosnia. My elder son was born in Belgrade and has Serbian citizenship and my younger son has American citizenship. We can only be Yugoslavs."

Mr. Kapetanovic says the European Community is partly to blame for the current situation. *"They didn't understand the complexity of the situation, and by supporting separation in Slovenia and Croatia, indirectly they just enabled this powderkeg to explode."*

"It would have been better if the EC had pushed for negotiation instead of recognizing separatism," he says.

But separation came and Canada joined the European Community in recognizing Croatian and Slovenia as independent states. And earlier this month, Canada also recognized an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Despite the recognition, Canada still has no official diplomatic relations with these new countries, leaving Mr. Kapetanovic and his staff to give out visas and passports for all of the old Yugoslavia, even though they have to be exchanged for new documents from the independent states once the travellers arrive at the border.

With his own country near collapse - he says Yugoslavia may survive but with only two of its original six republics - he remains optimistic about Canada's fate.

"I hope Canada will solve its problems," he says. *"If somebody has doubts about [the cost of] separatism and nationalism, just see what is happening in Yugoslavia and that would be enough.*

"I hope that Canada will remain together and that reason will prevail in this country, but it's up to Canadians of course."

Yugoslav Ambassador Calls on Leaders to Quit
[*Toronto Star*, 30 May 1992 (Southam News)]

In an extraordinary move, the Yugoslav ambassador to Canada yesterday publicly urged his country's leaders to resign.

Goran Kapetanovic released copies of his letter to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Momir Bulatovic, the president of Montenegro. The two states are the only remaining members of the Yugoslav federation.

"Under your leadership, Yugoslavia has fallen to the lowest level, being in conflict with all its neighbours and condemned by all the countries of the

world. You have to turn around and wonder why you have been left alone," the letter says in part.

It is highly unusual for diplomats to offer any public criticism of the governments they represent. But in an interview, Kapetanovic said he was finding it *"very difficult to represent a government in such shape."*

Earlier this week, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney endorsed a U.N.-led embargo and ordered the Yugoslav consulates in Vancouver and Toronto closed. Canadian landing rights for the country's national air carrier, JAT, were also suspended.

Kapetanovic, who has been in Ottawa for about two years, indicated he won't be Yugoslavia's ambassador much longer.

He declined to discuss if he hoped to stay in Canada after he loses his post.

Yugoslav Ambassador Resigns Post in Ottawa: Denounces Military Attacks on Civilians

[*Globe & Mail*, 2 June 1992, Jeff Sallot]

Yugoslavia's ambassador to Canada, Goran Kapetanovic, resigned his post yesterday in protest against the use of military force against civilians in war-torn remnants of the Yugoslav federal state.

Mr. Kapetanovic, 46, a member of a Muslim ethnic minority, denounced Serbian-led attacks on the civilian population of his home town, Sarajevo, and on other cities and villages in the breakaway republic of Bosnia.

He said the Belgrade government and the Yugoslavian National Army have been arming the Serbian irregulars mounting the attacks.

But he was also critical of other racially motivated groups that have resorted to violence. *"I am very sorry for Croatian mothers, and for Serbian mothers and for Muslim mothers. I condemn racism of all kinds."*

Mr. Kapetanovic, who came to Canada as Yugoslavia's ambassador in 1989, said farewell yesterday to Canadian officials at the Department of External Affairs.

He is undecided about whether to apply for immigrant status for himself and his family.

He is in Canada with his wife and their two teen-aged sons. His parents still live in Belgrade and he has other family members in Sarajevo.

Canadian officials say that with his resignation Mr. Kapetanovic no longer has any diplomatic status in this country. If he wants to remain he has to apply through normal channels.

Mr. Kapetanovic said in an interview he did not expect he would face persecution if he returned to Belgrade, where he has a home. *"But you never know."*

The career diplomat and former Yugoslav basketball standout has been speaking out recently against his government's policies and has called for the resignation of the Serbian leadership.

"The policies they have been conducting have brought Yugoslavia into isolation in international relations," he said. *"I have been advising them of the reactions here by the Canadian government."*

Canada has joined a United Nations effort to enforce a trade ban and other economic sanctions against the Belgrade government. As well, Yugoslav financial assets in Canada are being frozen.

DOCUMENT 1

ROME DECLARATION ON PEACE AND COOPERATION
8 November 1991

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Rome to open a new chapter in the history of our Alliance. The far-reaching decisions we have taken here mark an important stage in the transformation of NATO that we launched in London last year.

2. The world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.

A New Security Architecture

3. The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU

and the Council of Europe complement each other. Regional frameworks of cooperation will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.

The Future Role of the Alliance:
Our New Strategic Concept

4. Yesterday, we published our New Strategic Concept. Our security has substantially improved: we no longer face the old threat of a massive attack. However, prudence requires us to maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks to our security which may arise from instability or tension. In an environment of uncertainty and unpredictable challenges, our Alliance, which provides the essential transatlantic link as demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe, retains its enduring value. Our new strategic concept reaffirms NATO's core functions and allows us, within the radically changed situation in Europe, to realize in full our broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defence dimension. Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The use, as appropriate, of these elements will be particularly important to prevent or manage crises affecting our security.

5. The military dimension of our Alliance remains an essential factor, but what is new is that, more than ever, it will serve a broad concept of security. The Alliance will maintain its purely defensive purpose, its collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure as well as cooperation and coordination agreements, and for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces. Our military forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. Thus, our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be organized for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence. Multinational formations will play

a greater role within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced: the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in Europe will be cut by roughly 80% in accordance with the decisions taken by the Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies remains political: to preserve peace, and prevent war or any kind of coercion.

European Security Identity and Defence Role

6. We reaffirm the consensus expressed by our Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. The enhancement of the role and responsibility of the European members is an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. We are agreed, in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security identity and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all our members. The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty. Recognising that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.

7. We welcome the spirit in which those Allies who are also members of the Twelve and the WEU have kept the other members of the Alliance informed about the progress of their ongoing discussions on the development of the European identity and about other issues, such as their peace efforts in Yugoslavia. Appropriate links and consultation procedures between the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance will be developed in order to ensure that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. The Alliance's

new Strategic Concept, being an agreed conceptual basis for the forces of all Allies, should facilitate the necessary complementarity between the Alliance and the emerging defence component of the European integration process. As the transformation of the Alliance proceeds, we intend to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defence depends. We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the Alliance and with the European Political Union.

8. We note the gradual convergence of views in the discussions concerning the developing European security identity and defence role compatible with the common defence policy we already have in our Alliance. We feel confident that in line with the consensus in Copenhagen, the result will contribute to a strong new transatlantic partnership by strengthening the European component in a transformed Alliance. We will help move this development forward.

Relations with the Soviet Union and the Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: A Qualitative Step Forward

9. We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States. We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.

10. The Alliance can aid in fostering a sense of security and confidence in these countries, thereby strengthening their ability to fulfil their CSCE commitments and make democratic change irrevocable. Wishing to enhance its contribution to the emergence of a Europe whole and free, our Alliance at its London Summit extended to the Central and Eastern European countries the hand of friendship and established regular diplomatic liaison. Together we signed the Paris Joint Declaration. In Copenhagen last June, the Alliance

took further initiatives to develop partnership with these countries. Our extensive programme of high level visits, exchanges of views on security and other related issues, intensified military contacts, and exchanges of expertise in various fields has demonstrated its value and contributed greatly to building a new relationship between NATO and these countries. This is a dynamic process: the growth of democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and encouraging cooperative experiences, as well as the desire of these countries for closer ties, now call for our relations to be broadened, intensified and raised to a qualitatively new level.

11. Therefore, as the next step, we intend to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. We invite, at this stage of the process, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Romania, and the Soviet Union to join our Foreign Ministers in December 1991 in Brussels to issue a joint political declaration to launch this new era of partnership and to define further the modalities and content of this process. In particular, we propose the following activities:

- annual meetings with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council;
- periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level;
- additional meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial or Ambassadorial level as circumstances warrant;
- regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed, with;
- NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees;
- the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities.

This process will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the CSCE without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. It will be carried out in accordance with the core functions of the Alliance.

12. Our consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil/military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Our new initiative will enhance participation of our partners in the 'Third Dimension' of scientific and environmental programmes of our Alliance. It will also allow the widest possible dissemination of information about NATO in the Central and Eastern European countries, *inter alia* through diplomatic liaison channels and our embassies. We will provide the appropriate resources to support our liaison activities.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

13. We remain deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE process, which has a vital role to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe in a period of historic change. We will intensify our efforts to enhance the CSCE's role, in the first instance by working with the other participating CSCE states to ensure that the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992 will be another major step towards building a new Europe. The CSCE has the outstanding advantage of being the only forum that brings together all countries of Europe and Canada and the United States under a common code of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security, and economic liberty. The new CSCE institutions and structures, which we proposed at our London Summit and which were created at the Paris Summit, must be consolidated and further developed so as to provide CSCE with the means to help ensure full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other relevant CSCE documents and thus permit the CSCE to meet the new challenges which Europe will have to face. Our consultations within the Alliance continue to be a source of initiatives for strengthening the CSCE.

14. Consequently, we will actively support the development of the CSCE to enhance its capacity as the organ for consultation and cooperation among all participating States, capable of effective action in line with its new and increased responsibilities, in particular on the questions of human rights and security including arms control and disarmament, and for disputes, consistent with international law and CSCE principles. To this end, we suggest:

- that the CSCE Council, the central forum for political consultations, continue to take decisions on questions relating to the CSCE and the functions and structures of the CSCE institutions;

- that the Committee of Senior Officials serve as the coordination and management body between Council sessions and that it acquire a greater operational capacity and meet more frequently, with a view to ensuring the implementation of decisions;

- that the CSCE's conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities be improved: as one contribution, in addition to the functions entrusted to it by the Paris Charter, the means available to the Conflict Prevention Centre should be strengthened and made more flexible to enable it to fulfil the specific tasks assigned to it by the CSCE Council and the Committee of Senior Officials;

- that specific tasks based on precise mandate by the CSCE Council or the Committee of Senior Officials might be entrusted to *ad hoc* groups;

- that the decisions taken at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting ensure complementarity among CSCE activities in the security field including, *inter alia*, conflict prevention, arms control and consultation on security;

- that consideration should be given within the CSCE to develop further the CSCE's capability to safeguard, through peaceful means, human rights, democracy and the rule of law in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the state concerned;

- that the Office for Free Elections be transformed into a broadly focused Office of Democratic Institutions to promote cooperation in the fields of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;

- that the monitoring and promotion of progress on human dimension issues be continued in the form of periodic meetings of short duration on clearly defined issues;

- that further political impetus be given to economic, scientific and environmental cooperation so as to promote the basis of prosperity for stable, democratic development.

Arms Control

15. We strongly support President Bush's initiative of 27th September 1991 which has opened new prospects for nuclear arms reduction. We also welcome President Gorbachev's response. We particularly applaud the decision of both sides to eliminate their nuclear warheads for ground-launched short-range weapons systems. The Allies concerned, through their consultations, have played a central role in President Bush's decision which fulfilled the SNF arms control objectives of the London Declaration. They will continue close consultations on the process of the elimination of ground-based SNF warheads until its completion. We will continue to work for security at minimum levels of nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability. We look forward to the early ratification of the recently signed START agreement.

16. We note with satisfaction the recent achievements in the fields of conventional arms control and disarmament. We reiterate the paramount importance we attach to the CFE Treaty and call upon all CFE signatories to move forward promptly with its ratification and implementation. We urge our negotiating partners to work with us to reach substantial agreements in the CFE 1A and CSBM negotiations, and remain dedicated to achieving concrete results by the time of the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. We welcome the resumption of the Open Skies negotiations; we look forward to agreement on an Open Skies regime by the time of the Helsinki Meeting as an important new element in greater openness and confidence-building in the military field.

17. The Helsinki Meeting will mark a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe, now with the participation of all CSCE states. This will offer a unique opportunity to move this process energetically forward. Our goal will be to shape a new cooperative order, in which no country needs to harbour fears for its security, by:

- strengthening security and stability at lower levels of armed forces to the extent possible and commensurate with individual legitimate security needs both inside and outside of Europe;

- conducting an intensified security dialogue within a permanent framework and fostering a new quality of transparency and cooperation about armed forces and defence policies; and
- promoting effective mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention.

18. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery undermines international security. Transfers of conventional armaments beyond legitimate defensive needs to regions of tension make the peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. We support the establishment by the United Nations of a universal non-discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers. We support steps undertaken to address other aspects of proliferation and other initiatives designed to build confidence and underpin international security. We also deem it essential to complete a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons next year. We welcome the positive results of the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in particular the decision to explore the feasibility of verification.

Broader Challenges

19. Our Strategic Concept underlines that Alliance security must take account of the global context. It points out risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage, which can affect Alliance security interests. We reaffirm the importance of arrangements existing in the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of our efforts including our responses to such risks. We will continue to address broader challenges in our consultations and in the appropriate multilateral forums in the widest possible cooperation with other states.

20. The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of the values they share. In a still uncertain world, the need for defence remains. But in a world where the values which we uphold are shared ever more widely, we gladly seize the opportunity to adapt our defences accordingly; to cooperate and consult with our new partners; to help consolidate a

now undivided continent of Europe, and to make our Alliance's contribution to a new age of confidence, stability and peace.

21. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of the Italian Republic.

DOCUMENT 2

NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL STATEMENT ON DIALOGUE, PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION 20 December 1991

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance consisting of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States, and the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania and the Representative of the Soviet Union, (1) have gathered in Brussels to develop further the process of regular diplomatic liaison and to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council marks an historic step forward in our relationship.

2. In the new era of European relations where the confrontation and division of past decades have been replaced by dialogue, partnership and cooperation we are determined to work towards a new, lasting order of peace in Europe. Aware of NATO's positive influence as a source of stability, our common objective is to contribute to the enhancement of European security by promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe. As stated in the Joint Declaration of Paris security is indivisible and the security of each of our countries is inextricably linked to that of all States participating in the CSCE. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation therefore concern us all. In coming closer together, we wish to further the great progress that has been made across Europe in establishing solid democratic

institutions, respect for human rights and economic liberty. The success of efforts to create modern competitive market economies is essential to overcoming grave economic disparities and thus enhancing our common security and stability. We reaffirm the need to continue to support these efforts with all available means.

3. We are determined to make another substantial contribution to our shared goal: a Europe whole and free. Our new joint undertaking will contribute to strengthening the role of the CSCE and to the achievement of its objectives without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. We seek an architecture for the new Europe that is firmly based on the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Security is today based on a broad concept that encompasses more than ever political, economic, social and environmental aspects as well as defence. For this reason an interlocking network in which institutions such as the CSCE, the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other can best safeguard the freedom, security, and prosperity of all European and North American states. Frameworks of regional cooperation will also be an important part of this comprehensive security architecture.

We welcome the progress made in the sphere of conventional and nuclear arms control and disarmament. We are determined to achieve full implementation of the CFE and START Treaties, as well as to continue to seek security at the lowest possible level of arms.

We all recognise the need, and acknowledge the responsibility to ensure full respect for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to refrain from any steps that could lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and to take firm measures to prevent the unauthorised export of nuclear or other destabilising military technologies. Authorities in the Soviet Union have confirmed their intention to ensure the safe, responsible and reliable control of these weapons under a single unified authority. All members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council agree on the importance of this effort.

4. Following the proposal of the Alliance Summit in Rome, we have agreed to build on our existing liaison and to develop a more institutional relation-

ship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues, and in particular to:

- hold annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;
- hold bi-monthly meetings of the North Atlantic Council with liaison partners at the Ambassadorial level, beginning in February 1992;
- hold additional meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at Ministerial level, or of the North Atlantic Council in permanent session with Ambassadors of liaison partners, as circumstances warrant;
- hold meetings at regular intervals of NATO subordinate committees with representatives of liaison partners. This will include inter alia meetings with the Political and Economic Committees, as well as with the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities and NATO's Atlantic Policy Advisory Group.

5. The focus of our consultations and cooperation will be on security and related issues, such as defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. We will enhance participation of liaison partners in NATO's 'Third Dimension' scientific and environmental programmes. We will cooperate actively in disseminating as widely as possible information about NATO in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and embassies of NATO member countries.

6. The implementation of the process described above and in particular the practical arrangements for meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level and with NATO committees will be determined by Ambassadors who will prepare a work plan.

7. The annual meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council will, as a rule, take place in Brussels in conjunction with the Autumn Ministerial of the North Atlantic Council. Expectations are not excluded. Our next annual meeting will take place in Oslo in June at the invitation of the Norwegian government.

(1) Ambassador Afanassievsky, representative of the Soviet Union, made the following statement in this connection:

> "We proceed from the assumption that the agreements concerning the contacts in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council which is being created today are valid for the Sovereign States which are becoming legal successors of the Soviet Union."

Later in the session he made the following additional statement:

> "In accordance with the latest instructions received from Moscow which result from the consultations between the sovereign states, we request that all references to the Soviet Union be excluded from text of the Statement."

DOCUMENT 3

AGREEMENT
Between Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic Forces' Status

The Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine, which are henceforth referred to as Member States of the Commonwealth,

- being guided by the Agreement on Strategic Forces Between Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States,
- considering the role of strategic forces of the Commonwealth in ensuring the security of Member States of the Commonwealth,
- reaffirming their commitment to the principles and standards of international law,
- have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The Meaning of Terms:

For the purposes of this Agreement:

1. The term "strategic forces" means military formations and facilities under a single command, with the list of them to be defined by each state on agreement with the Strategic Forces Command and to be approved by the Council of Heads of State.

2. The term *'military formations and facilities'* means military units, institutions, military schools, enterprises, organizations, military missions, airfields, test sites, command posts and other installations of strategic forces.

3. The term *'host state'* means a member state of the Commonwealth on whose territory strategic forces are based.

4. The term *'basing area'* means the territory assigned for use to strategic forces.

5. The term *'immovable property of strategic forces'* means the military posts (cantonments), airfields, naval bases, ports, spur tracks, installations at combat positions, training grounds, test sites, firing ranges, stationary control posts and communication means, dwelling houses and other facilities in areas made available for temporary use by strategic forces and ensuring their functioning.

6. The term *'movable property of strategic forces'* means all types of arms, munitions and military equipment, including the necessary transport means and other material and technical resources in use by strategic forces.

7. The term *'personnel of strategic forces'* means servicemen and civilians serving or employed in formations of strategic forces.

8. The term *'members of families of personnel of strategic forces'* means wives, children and other related dependants.

Article 2

General Provisions

1. Any member state of the Commonwealth, regardless of whether military formations and facilities are based on its territory, may be a party to this Agreement.

2. Strategic forces are designed to ensure the security of all States Parties to this Agreement and shall be maintained through fixed contributions by the said states. (Armenia's own opinion: property of strategic forces shall be the joint property of all Member-States of the Commonwealth).

3. Each of Member States of the Commonwealth agrees to the permanent or temporary stationing and functioning of military formations and facilities

of strategic forces in basing areas, where they were stationed and functioned at the moment of signing this Agreement. Change of basing areas shall be made on agreement between parties to this Agreement.

4. The stationing of military formations and facilities of strategic forces on the territory of a member state of the Commonwealth shall not affect the sovereignty of the said state in any way. Strategic forces shall not intervene in domestic affairs of the host state.

Military formations and facilities of strategic forces based on the territory of a member state of the Commonwealth and personnel of strategic forces shall be obliged to respect and observe the laws of the said state.

5. Member States of the Commonwealth shall not take actions impeding the discharge of their functions by strategic forces, if such functions are not at variance with the legislation of the sovereign state.

Article 3

Procurement of Personnel for the Strategic Forces

The Strategic Forces shall be manned on the basis of the principles defined by a separate agreement.

Article 4

Guidance of the Strategic Forces

1. The Strategic Forces shall function as an independent strategic command.

2. The operation of the Strategic Forces shall be directed by the commander of the Strategic Forces subordinate to the Council of the Heads of State and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

3. The command of the Strategic Forces shall:

- work out plans of combat use of the formations and units of the Strategic Forces;

- organise combat duty (combat service), plan and conduct operational and combat training, and carry out other activities to maintain the Strategic Forces in necessary combat readiness;

- exercise direct combat control of the formations and units of the Strategic Forces, organise and carry out activities to ensure security of nuclear weapons in the regions of their deployment and on the routes of their movement, and of civilian population, and to protect the environment;

- fulfil the functions assigned to them in the general system of measures to rule out non-sanctioned actions involving nuclear weapons;

- place on a contract basis at the scientific and industrial organisations of the Member States of the Commonwealth orders for development of armaments and military equipment and their deliveries to the Strategic Forces in conformity with the approved programmes of armament, and finance the works in process, within the limits of the budget appropriations for these purposes;

- carry out measures to comply with the international treaties on nuclear arms and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

4. A decision on the necessity of using nuclear weapons shall be adopted according to the procedure envisaged by Article 4 of the Agreement among the Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States of December 30, 1991.

Article 5

Legal Status of Persons Forming Part of the Strategic Forces and Members of Their Families

The legal status of the persons who form part of the Strategic Forces and members of their families shall be regulated by the Agreement among the Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Social and Legal Guarantees of Servicemen and Persons Discharged from Military Service and of Members of Their Families.

Article 6

Relations of the Strategic Forces with the State Bodies, Enterprises and Organisations of the Member States of the Commonwealth

1. The bodies of military command of the Strategic Forces of the Commonwealth shall carry out their activity concertedly with the state bodies, enterprises and organisations of the Member States of the Commonwealth.

2. The Strategic Forces of the Commonwealth shall conclude agreements with enterprises and organisations of the Member States of the Commonwealth on carrying out work to create, modernize and eliminate specimens of weapons and military equipment and on other questions of ensurance of activity of the Strategic Forces. The Member States of the Commonwealth shall render assistance in the conclusion of such agreements.

3. Movement of the formations and units of the Strategic Forces, military exercises, manoeuvres and other activities of operational and combat training of the Strategic Forces beyond the areas of their permanent deployment shall be carried out in conformity with the plans agreed upon with the body authorised by the government of the Member State of the Commonwealth on the territory of which it is planned to carry out these activities, or with the consent, in each case, of this government or the body authorised by it.

The Member States of the Commonwealth shall give necessary means of transport and land, air and sea space to the troops formations and installations of the Strategic Forces for movement in conformity with the aforesaid plans.

4. Construction of new roads, bridges, buildings and permanent radio and radiotechnical facilities with the definition of their frequencies and capacities, as well as of other immovable-property facilities of the Strategic Forces in the areas of their deployment shall be carried out with the consent of competent bodies of the Member State of the Commonwealth on the territory of which it is planned to build new facilities.

5. If the land plots used by the Strategic Forces are freed up, they shall be returned to the host state. The question of the immovable-property facilities built on them on the money of the Strategic Forces shall be resolved

in conformity with legislation of the host state or with the corresponding Agreement.

Article 7

The Financing and Maintenance of Strategic Forces

1. The member states of the Commonwealth shall take part in the financing of the Strategic Forces and the observance of international obligations on their reduction and elimination. The amount and procedure of financing shall be stipulated by a separate treaty.

2. The procedure for the maintenance of the Strategic Forces and settlements in the currency of the host country shall be set out by the Council of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth member states.

Article 8

The Property of the Strategic Forces

1. The host countries shall leave in the possession of the Strategic Forces immovable assets the latter had by the moment of signing this Treaty, and shall also provide to them electricity, utilities and other services. The procedure for and terms of using land plots allocated to Strategic Forces, as well as providing all kinds of services to them shall be defined in accordance with the legislation of a host country.

2. Movable assets of the Strategic Forces shall be possessed and used by them. The procedure for administering these assets shall be defined by the Council of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth member-states.

Member-states of the Commonwealth shall be obliged not to prevent the transfer of movable assets of the Strategic Forces outside their territory upon the consent of the host country.

3. The vehicles of the military units of the Strategic Forces shall bear licence plates and markings. The chief command of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces shall issue unified licence plates and markings.

Article 9

Jurisdiction

Crimes and misdemeanours committed by the personnel of the Strategic Forces or members of their families shall be within the jurisdiction of the legislation effective on the territory of the Commonwealth member-state, where such crime or misdemeanour was committed.

Article 10

The Withdrawal Procedure

Each member-state of Commonwealth shall have the sovereign right to withdraw from this Treaty. A Commonwealth member-state intending to withdraw from this Treaty shall notify the depositor state and all other participating states, in writing, of its decision to do so. The notification shall be submitted at least one year prior to the intended withdrawal from this Treaty.

Article 11

Entry into Force

1. This Agreement shall be ratified by each member-state of the Commonwealth in keeping with its constitutional procedures. Ratification instruments shall be kept in custody of the Government of the Republic of Belarus that shall be appointed depository state by this Agreement.

2. This Agreement shall enter into force ten days after the ratification instruments are deposited by all member-states of the Commonwealth.

3. The depository state shall forthwith notify all the member-states of the Commonwealth of the following:

a) deposition of each ratification instrument;

b) entry into force of this Agreement;

c) notification by any member-state of the Commonwealth of the withdrawal from this Agreement in keeping with Article 10, and the date of withdrawal;

d) any issue that needs to be reviewed or requires that provisions of this Agreement be amended.

The Agreement shall enter into force from the moment of its signing.

Done on February 14, 1992 in Minsk in one original copy in Russian. The original copy shall be kept in the government archives of the Republic of Belarus that shall send to the signatories of the Agreement a certified copy thereof.

The Agreement was signed by representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

The representative of Azerbaijan made the following note: "On condition that funds are provided for the strategic units stationed in Azerbaijan only until these units are withdrawn at the end of 1994."

The representative of Armenia made the following note: "With a reservation". The representative of Kazakhstan noted that "An agreement on proving grounds shall be concluded with the Republic of Kazakhstan." The representative of Kyrgyzstan wrote "With Item 2, Article 2 included". The representative of Ukraine made the following note: "Except for Item 2, Article 2, Article 10 (In keeping with the Minsk agreement, the withdrawal deadline for Ukraine shall be the end of 1994)."

DOCUMENT 4

STATEMENT
by the CIS Heads of State

The heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States who met in Minsk on February 14 1992, consider it expedient to declare the following:

- being aware of the world public's concern over developments in some member-nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States, we hereby emphatically reaffirm the unswerving commitment to the provisions enshrined in the corresponding documents adopted by the heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Minsk on December 8, 1991, in Alma-Ata on December 21, 1991, and in Moscow on January 16, 1992, to the effect that the member-nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States shall not permit the use or threat of force in respect of each other and shall settle whatever disputes that may arise between them exclusively by peaceful means, through negotiations;

- resolve that no movable or immovable property or weapons, equipment, and material and technical means of the former USSR shall be sited without the consent of the host nation, and that an appropriate convention shall be drafted and adopted in the near future.

The statement was signed by representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

DOCUMENT 6

STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10 March 1992

1. We the Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance - consisting of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, the United States, and the Defence Ministers and Representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan,(1) Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan have gathered today in Brussels to welcome the inclusion of the additional states as partners in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. We are determined to work together to work together towards a new, lasting order of peace in Europe through dialogue, partnership, and cooperation.

2. The new members commit themselves in full to the aims of our cooperative relationship and the means of its practical expression which were set out in the Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, issued at the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on December 20th, 1991.

3. The Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation which was elaborated by Ambassadors pursuant to the mandate provided in the Statement of 20th December 1991 and issued today provides an initial basis for the process of consultation and cooperation on security and related issues. All of us therefore endorse this Work Plan and are ready to participate fully in the activities undertaken by the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate bodies with cooperation partners.

6. We are committed to early entry into force without renegotiation and full implementation as soon as possible of the CFE Treaty and fully endorse the efforts underway in the Informal High Level Working Group to this end. We believe that the CFE Treaty will be an important milestone in the enhancement of stability and improvement of security in Europe and that, therefore, it will open the way to future arms control within the CSCE and to cooperative security in Europe. Ministers concerned expect to see the Treaty in force by the time of the Helsinki Summit in July. An important step towards achieving this result will be an Extraordinary Conference, to be held in connection with the next NACC meeting in Oslo, among all Parties, providing the basis for the entry into force.

9. In the interest of further strengthening security and stability in Europe, we also support the determination of the participants in the CFE1A negotiations to reach, in connection with the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, an agreement to limit the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces in time for the Helsinki summit at the end of the CSCE meeting.

8. Kazakhstan, although not represented today, has conveyed its wish to participate in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on the basis of the Statement of the 20th December 1991 and today's statement. It is hereby a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

7. We look forward to the next meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Oslo on 5th June 1992.

(1) Tajikistan authorized the Delegation of the Russian Federation to represent it at the meeting.

DOCUMENT 6

WORK PLAN FOR DIALOGUE, PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION
Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10th March 1992

Introduction

1. The Ambassadors of the countries represented in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), in fulfilment of the request by Ministers at the inaugural NACC Meeting in Brussels on December 20, 1991 to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation, have agreed to the following work plan beginning in 1992. The number and levels of activities to be implemented in 1992 are indicative, subject to review once the NATO budgets for 1992 are approved. The topics and activities listed in this plan reflect a dynamic process which will evolve through practice. The work plan could, if necessary, be revised by the Ambassadors or under their authority.

2. Our work will encompass two aspects: intensified consultations on the part of the Central and Eastern European countries with the North Atlantic Council, NATO's various specialized committees, and the Military Committee, and a range of cooperative activities. Both aspects are designed to promote dialogue, partnership and cooperation on security and related issues. The topics we have listed for political consultation are described in general terms to permit all participants to raise political and security related issues of concern or interest to them.

3. In both aspects of our work, we will base ourselves on the NACC Declaration of 20 December 1991, as well as the Rome Declaration of the NATO Heads of State and Government of 8 November 1991 and the Com-

[illegible] of NATO Foreign Ministers of 18 December 1991. The focus of our consultations and cooperation will be on security and related issues, such as defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management, the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes and enhances participation in NATO's 'Third Dimension' scientific and environmental programmes. We will also cooperate actively in disseminating as widely as possible information about NATO in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and embassies of NATO member countries.

4. NATO Allies have committed themselves to providing appropriate resources to finance our cooperative activities. NACC cooperative activities are agreed by the NACC Partners; they may involve the participation of all or only some of them. Accordingly, some activities may be funded by individual nations.

Political and Security related matters

Topics:

- Political and security related matters;
- Conceptual approaches to arms control and disarmament.

Activities:

- Consultations of the Political Committee with cooperation partners, including as appropriate with experts, as a rule every two months.

Defence planning issues and military matters

Topics:

- Principles and key aspects of strategy including crisis management, defensiveness, sufficiency and flexibility;
- Issues of defence planning;
- Force and command structures;
- Military contribution to conceptual approaches to all arms control and disarmament issues.

- Views on military exercises;
- Democratic concepts of civilian-military relations;
- Planning, management and analysis of national defence programmes and budgets;
- Concept and methods of training and education in the defence field.

Activities:

- Consultations of the Military Committee in a cooperation session at Chief of Staff level, and other MC meetings with the cooperation partners and consultations in other appropriate fora;
- Military contacts including high-level visits, staff talks and other exchanges;
- Participation by cooperation partners in special and/or regular courses at the NATO Defence College and at the NATO School (SHAPE) at Oberammergau.

Defence Conversion

Topic:

- Defence conversion, including its human dimension.

Activity:

- Defence Conversion Seminar organised by the Economic Committee, *inter alia* with a view to identifying the possibility of further cooperation in this field.

Economic Issues

Topic:

- Inter-relationship of defence expenditure and budgets with the economy.

Activities:

- Consultations of the Economic Committee in sessions reinforced by experts with cooperation partners every 3 months;
- Economic Colloquium on External Economic Relations of cooperation partners;
- Defence Economics Workshop.

Science

Topic:

- Enhancement of participation of cooperation partners' scientists in NATO Science programmes.

Activities:

- Meeting of the Science Committee with counterparts from cooperation partners' countries once a year;
- Attendance at Advanced Study Institutes and Advanced Research Workshops; (800 scientists from cooperation partners' countries)
- Participation in the Collaborative Research Grants Programme; (40 grants)
- Proceedings of NATO's Scientific Meetings to a central library in each cooperation partner's country;
- Intensive Courses in cooperation partner's countries; (30 courses)
- Visits of experts to cooperation partners' laboratories; (8 visits)
- Linkage between NATO and cooperation partners' laboratories; (10 grants)
- Science Committee Seminar on the mobility of scientists.

Challenges to modern society

Topics:

- Defence-related environmental issues

- Pilot studies of interest to cooperation partners.

Activities:

- Meeting of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society with counterparts from cooperation partners' countries once a year;
- Seminar on the military role in environmental protection;
- Participation of cooperation partners' experts in pilot study meetings;
- Pilot study of defence base cleanups;
- Pilot study on protecting civil populations from toxic material spills during movements of military and other dangerous, defence-related goods;
- Pilot study on exiting cross-border environmental problems emanating from defence-related installations and activities.

Dissemination of information

Topic

- Dissemination of information about NATO in the countries of cooperation partners.

Activities

- A meeting of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) with cooperation partners;
- Information about NATO will be disseminated as widely as possible in the countries of cooperation partners, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and embassies of NATO member countries;
- Visits to NATO by selected group;(46 groups)
- Sponsorship of a number of cooperation partners' representatives to attend seminars in Allied countries; (50 representatives)
- Co-sponsorship with cooperation partners of one major seminar;

- NATO speakers' tours to cooperation partners of one major seminar; (9 tours)
- Limited expansion to 60 fellowships of Democratic Institutions Fellowships programme;
- Special issue of NATO Review with focus on cooperation partners;
- Increased dissemination of NATO documentation in cooperation partners' states.

Policy Planning Consultations

Topic

- A mid- and long-term foreign and security policy issue; such an issue might include the formulation of foreign policy in a democratic state.

Activity

- A meeting of NATO's Atlantic Policy Advisory Group with cooperation partners.

Air Traffic Management

Topic

- Civil military coordination of air traffic management.

Activity

- A seminar with participation of cooperation partners to follow-up the October 1991 CEAC Seminar, *inter alia* with a view to identifying the possibility of further cooperation in this field.

DOCUMENT 7

STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE MEETING OF DEFENCE MINISTERS OF NATO AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AT NATO HEADQUARTERS
Brussels, 1 April 1992

1. We NATO Defence Ministers and Representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, the United States, and the Defence Ministers and Representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan met today in Brussels for the first time (1). We considered how we could deepen dialogue and promote cooperation between us on issues that fall within the competence of Defence Ministers.

2. Much has already been done to develop the partnership between our countries. The Rome Declaration of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation Council as well as bilateral contacts and exchanges in the defence field provide an excellent basis for further progress. Today, in a spirit of friendship and goodwill, we discussed the contribution which we, as Defence Ministers, can make to this process in order to promote our common objectives.

3. The positive changes in the security environment of recent years have major implications for the organisation of our defences. In this context, we are determined to achieve early entry into force without renegotiation and full implementation as soon as possible of the CFE Treaty and expect to see the Treaty in force by the time of the Helsinki Summit in July. In the interest of further strengthening security and stability in Europe, we also support the determination of the participants in the CFE IA negotiations to reach, in connection with the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, an agreement to limit the

personnel strength of their conventional armed forces in time for the Helsinki Summit at the end of the CSCE meeting. We welcome the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna CSBM Document 1992 as major new steps towards greater openness and confidence-building in the security field. Complementary bilateral and regional efforts aimed at achieving enhanced confidence and security can also make a positive contribution.

4. We all agree on the importance of the safe, responsible and reliable control of the residual nuclear arsenals. We took note of the assurance given in this regard with respect to the reliability, security and single control of the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. We equally took note of the intention of the states concerned to join the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as soon as possible as non-nuclear weapon states. We confirm the need to ensure full respect for the Treaty and to contribute in all possible ways to efforts aimed at preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

5. Many of us are faced with major restructuring of defence efforts and some are addressing basic issues of defence organisation and planning for the first time. All of us can benefit from an intensification of contacts and cooperation. It is therefore with satisfaction that we note the progress which has already been achieved through an extensive visits programme, discussions, courses and frequent military contacts at all levels. But more can and will be done. To this end our Chiefs of Defence Staff will meet on 10th April 1992 in the framework of the first Meeting of the Military Committee in Co-operation Session. It will be the beginning of a regular series of meetings at the highest military level.

6. Furthermore we have agreed that

- a high level seminar on defence policy and management will be held covering the role and constitutional position of armed forces in democratic societies, as well as strategic concepts and their implementation; a key purpose will be to identify specific issues to be pursued during subsequent cooperation in defence related matters;

- an initial workshop will address practical aspects of defence management and the reform and restructuring of armed forces. This will be followed up by several panel tours to capitals conducted by small groups

of experts as well as by participation of cooperation partners in relevant NATO training;

- a workshop will be held to provide an opportunity to share experiences and to identify the most suitable practices and work methods for the environmental clean-up of defence installations;

- small teams of civilian and military defence experts, drawn as appropriate from several Alliance countries, could be sent, on request, to countries desiring advice. These teams will be made available as quickly as possible to assist in Ministries of Defence or other areas in the defence establishment and will be prepared to stay in place as necessary. Detailed arrangements for meeting the needs of cooperation partners can be pursued in the Group on Defence Matters;

- further agreed activities of mutual interest in our field of responsibility will be organised in the framework of Group on Defence Matters and reported to us or our representatives on a regular basis. The Group on Defence Matters could also act as a clearing house for proposals for cooperation in the defence field, including bilateral or multilateral activities not necessarily involving all of us.

The aim is not only to increase mutual understanding and confidence among us, but also to provide practical assistance on defence related matters at a time of profound transformation and transition. NATO members have promised to make available for this purpose the considerable expertise and experience they have developed in defence related issues. The list at annex, which is not intended to be exhaustive, provides an initial basis for discussion of areas for cooperation in defence related matters.

7. We have entered a new era of partnership amongst our states. The resulting improved understanding and transparency will help develop patterns of cooperation and create conditions that encourage peaceful solutions to political problems. We are determined to grasp this opportunity to deepen our relationships, enhance security and contribute to the evolving process of a Europe whole and free. In our capacity as Defence Ministers we shall therefore play a full part in dialogue, partnership and cooperation. We shall meet to review the progress of work in the defence field annually or more frequently should circumstances warrant it.

ANNEX

Areas for Further Cooperation in Defence Related Matters

The following is a list of possible areas for cooperation in defence related matters. There are various ways in which they could be addressed: seminars, workshops, panel tours, courses, bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Some topics will be most suited to military contacts, others dealt with primarily through civil channels; many will involve joint activities. As well as acting as a clearing house for proposals for cooperation, the Group on Defence Matters could also help organise activities in the following areas. The list is not intended to be exhaustive, but it could form the basis for a future work programme including practical activities.

Military Strategies: including discussion of concepts such as defensive sufficiency, stability, flexibility and crisis management;

- Defence Management: the planning and management of defence programmes in democratic societies, to include accountability, financial planning, programme budgeting and management, research and development, equipment procurement procedures, personnel management.

- The Legal Framework for Military Forces: the establishment of a constitutional framework, the position of armed forces in a democracy, the democratic control of armed forces and civil-military relations, parliamentary accountability.

- Harmonisation of Defence Planning and Arms Control: the consequences of arms control for defence planning, the role of military forces in verification, proliferation, resource implications of CFE.

- Exercises and Training: the philosophy, format, requirements and standards of training and exercises.

- Defence Education: Organisation of education for both military and civilian defence personnel.

- Reserve Forces: mix of active and reserve forces, force structures, training.

- Environmental Protection: the military and the environment, protection, conservation, clean-up of facilities.
- Air Traffic Control: military contribution to air traffic management.
- Search and Rescue: military contribution to search and rescue activities.
- Military Contribution to Humanitarian Aid: practical experiences, planning, coordination, civil-military cooperation.
- Military Medicine: organisation and practical issues (occupational health, preventive measures, hospital management, medical supply, education).

(1) Kazakhstan attended as an observer. Turkmenistan, although unable to be represented, has indicated that it wishes to be associated with this statement.

DOCUMENT 8

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN OSLO, NORWAY 4 June 1992 FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, have met in Oslo on 4th June to continue our consultations on current political developments, and to contribute as an Alliance to the fostering of a new and more peaceful order.

2. We reaffirm that the security of our member states is guaranteed by the Alliance and the transatlantic partnership. At the same time, we are also convinced that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area will increasingly be built on a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions: NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe. Other institutions and forms of regional cooperation also have a role to play in this framework. We will play our full part in enhancing cooperation among these institutions, as envisaged by our Heads of State and Government in Rome, so as to make the best use of our available resources to support the process of democracy and reform, and to prevent conflicts.

3. In this spirit, we are resolved to make the forthcoming CSCE Summit in Helsinki a success and to strengthen further the role and effectiveness of the CSCE in this European security architecture. We also welcome tomorrow's Extraordinary Conference on the CFE Treaty. Entry into force of the CFE Treaty will put in place the cornerstone of a transformed European security structure, and will open the way to future arms control within the CSCE and to cooperative security in Europe.

4. We are profoundly disturbed by the violence and destruction which continue in various areas of the Euro-Atlantic region. This is in sharp contrast to

the peace and stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic area to which we are committed. We will do our utmost to prevent unbridled nationalism and attempts to resolve disputes by violence from frustrating our efforts to achieve a peaceful and cooperative order in Europe. We have issued today separate statements expressing our concern regarding the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and the crisis centred on Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Alliance: A Strong Transatlantic Partnership

5. The process of peaceful change in Europe needs a strong and dynamic North Atlantic Alliance. The Alliance provides one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe and its cooperation on political and security matters is an important contribution to that environment. In its process of transformation, the Alliance has also established a broader political relationship with other countries and institutions and, on the basis of its new Strategic Concept, is reducing and restructuring its forces. In an environment of more diverse risks and constrained resources, there will be a continuing need to ensure an effective collective defence based on a common perception of the security situation. To this end, the Allies will work closely together in implementing the Strategic Concept.

6. As in the past, the vitality of the transatlantic link is critical to our Alliance. The tasks that we now face in building cooperation, democracy and security for all in Europe underscore the importance of developing the community of values and purpose between the North American and European democracies in the spirit of Article 2 of our Treaty. The presence of US armed forces, as well as the continuing political and military commitment of both the United States and Canada, will remain essential for the promotion and further consolidation of a new peaceful order in Europe.

A European Security and Defence Identity

7. The common understanding laid down in the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, and the agreement reached by the member states on the European Community and in the Declarations of he Western European Union at Maastricht, establish the basis of the future relationship between the Alliance and the emerging European security and defence identity. We reaffirm our support for the objective of developing the WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as a means of strengthening the

European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. We welcome, therefore, the progress being made in discussions among the member states of the WEU on strengthening the operational role of the WEU. The development by the WEU of its operational capabilities in ways that complement and are fully compatible with the common defence we enjoy in the Alliance, will enhance the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence. We reaffirm that, as the transformation of the Alliance proceeds, we intend to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defence depends. We stress the importance of maintaining Allies' existing obligations and commitments of forces to NATO, and we emphasize in this regard that the primary responsibility of forces answerable to the WEU will remain NATO's collective defence under the Washington Treaty.

8. At our last meeting in December, we tasked the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to develop proposals for practical arrangements regarding the working relations between the two organisations. These arrangements, based on transparency and complementarity, will reinforce transatlantic solidarity in security matters and will ensure that all the Allies are adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. As the WEU develops further its own structures, we will continue to work with it to establish close working links, including between the two Councils and secretariats and between defence staffs. In this regard, we welcome the joint meeting of the Permanent Councils of the Alliance and the WEU that took place on 21st May. We also look forward to concrete arrangements within the WEU regarding the role of other European Allies. We welcome the intention of the WEU to ensure that these arrangements will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of the WEU.

Relations with Cooperation Partners

9. Our Security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. A major goal of our Alliance is not only to provide security for its own members, but also to contribute to the building of a new and lasting order of peace in Europe through dialogue, partnership and cooperation. We have moved quickly to respond to the needs and expectations of our new cooperation partners. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which will meet tomorrow for the third time, has opened new possibilities for addressing the security concerns of all participating countries in a Euro-Atlantic forum. At the same

time, it helps to further the objectives of the CSCE. Our work plan gives substance to our determination to build a new relationship with our cooperation partners through consultation and through cooperative activities in such matters as civilian control over the military. Our work plan will evolve further over time according to circumstances and needs. We also welcome the efforts of the North Atlantic Assembly and the Atlantic Treaty Association and its individual members in support of these activities.

CSCE

10.The CSCE has an essential role to play in the development of a cooperative approach to security, and in the promotion of democracy, human rights and economic liberty. During the past two years, we have taken initiatives to reinforce the CSCE and its ability to contribute to a Europe in which change takes place in conformity with CSCE principles. We are determined to continue our common efforts to secure full implementation of these principles. The strengthening of the means available to the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management will be essential if peace and prosperity are to be upheld in Europe. We support the proposal under discussion at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting for the CSCE to declare itself as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations' Charter. We look to the Helsinki Summit to strengthen the process of political consultation and cooperation by enhancing the existing institutions, structures and mechanisms of the CSCE and developing new means to facilitate peaceful democratic change.

11. The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. We have asked the Council in Permanent Session to address, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, the practical options and modalities by which such support might be provided. This will be done without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to these operations.

12. The development of all aspects of the CSCE in a coherent manner will improve its ability to contribute to Europe's peace and stability. Full obser-

vance of CSCE commitments remains essential for the achievement of our goal: a peaceful, prosperous Europe. In an environment where the relevance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law to security and stability is becoming more apparent, the respect for human rights must remain a central concern for the CSCE. We believe that further political impetus should be given to economic, scientific and environmental cooperation. We note in this respect the decision that the Committee of Senior Officials will meet periodically as the CSCE Economic Forum to foster economic development and free markets.

The United Nations

13. We support the valuable contribution of the United Nations to conflict settlement and peacekeeping in the Euro-Atlantic region. We reiterate our commitment to strengthening the organisation's ability to carry out its larger endeavours for world peace. We welcome the fact that the Allies participate in and contribute to United Nations peacekeeping and other efforts.

Baltic States

14. We understand the concern of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania about the lack of progress in their negotiations with Russia on the withdrawal of former Soviet forces. We are aware of the practical problems for Russia connected with such withdrawals, but these cannot affect the application of the basic principle of international law that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a sovereign state requires the explicit consent of that state. We call upon the states concerned to conclude agreements soon, establishing firm timetables for the early withdrawal of former Soviet forces.

Arms Control and Cooperative Security

15. We are committed to continuing our efforts to negotiate concrete measures of arms control and disarmament designed to reinforce confidence and security among all CSCE participating states. Such negotiations, together with intensified cooperation and dialogue in the field of security, and enhancement of the relevant mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict, are essential building blocks for shaping a cooperative order of security. We confirm our main objectives, set out last December and in the paper tabled by Norway last March in Vienna for a CSCE forum for security cooperation to be established at the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in Helsinki.

16. The CFE Treaty is an important milestone in the enhancement of security and stability in Europe. We thus welcome the agreement among the states of the former Soviet Union, setting out their individual rights and obligations under the Treaty, as a major step towards the full implementation of the Treaty. We look forward to the successful outcome of the Extraordinary Conference tomorrow, to the results of which the High Level Working Group has significantly contributed. We remain committed to achieving entry into force of the CFE Treaty in time for the Helsinki CSCE Summit, and call upon states parties to the Treaty to deposit outstanding instruments of ratification by that time. The successful conclusion of a CFE IA agreement will also be an important contribution to stability in Europe. We call on our negotiating partners to work with us to resolve the remaining issues and to conclude such an agreement in time for he Helsinki Summit.

17. We look forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty on Open Skies and adherence to it from interested states which are participating in the CSCE but are not original signatories to the Treaty, and called for in the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24th March 1992.

18. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an essential element of cooperative security and of international stability. We attach importance to early accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as a non-nuclear weapon states, as was made clear in the Allies' statement of 21st April. We welcome the commitments by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to become non-nuclear weapon states and urge them to negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA as soon as possible. We urge all states concerned to uphold, as a matter of priority, the commitments set out in the Alma Ata and Minsk accords and welcome the announcement that withdrawal of former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for ultimate dismantlement has been completed well before the 1st July target date.

19. We also expect the full implementation of all obligations undertaken unilaterally and bilaterally by the Russian Federation concerning tactical and strategic nuclear weapons reductions. Allies reiterate their offers to provide assistance in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons. We call for the speedy ratification and entry into force of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In this context, we welcome the commitments undertaken

by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the Protocol to START agreed in Lisbon on 23rd May.

20. International transfers of conventional armaments beyond legitimate defence needs in particular to regions of tension, increase the dangers of conflict and hinder the achievement of peaceful settlement of disputes. We are committed to working towards transparency and restraint in this field and fully support the universal register of conventional arms transfers established by the United Nations. We call on all UN member states to provide the required data to make this register fully effective. We shall furthermore examine how the CSCE can contribute to responsible policies on arms transfers.

21. We are convinced that agreement on a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons can be reached this year, and are determined to complete the Geneva negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament successfully.

Conclusion

22. We will pursue this ambitious agenda for cooperative security with energy and determination. In recent months and years, NATO has shown itself capable of adapting to the profound and historic changes sweeping this continent. The challenge nw is to press forward with building an architecture of mutually reinforcing institutions which will provide effective means to enhance security for the whole of Europe. By combining vision with pragmatic initiatives and action, we will ensure that our Alliance will remain central to the success of this great enterprise.

23. We express our deep appreciation to the Government of the Kingdom of Norway for its gracious hospitality. Our Autumn North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial Session will be in Brussels on 17th December 1992.

DOCUMENT 9

STATEMENT ON THE CRISIS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial Session in Oslo, 4th June 1992

1. We strongly condemn the continuing resort to force and mounting loss of life in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. We fully endorse the efforts of the United Nations, the CSCE and the European Community to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict. We therefore express our strongest support for Resolution 757 of the United Nations Security Council which imposes sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). We are determined to make those sanctions effective and will continue to work to ensure that their objective is achieved. In that regard, we reiterate the demand in the Resolution for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of all victims of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. Despite repeated agreements on a ceasefire and the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force, there has been a continuous extension of the conflict on an unprecedented scale with the risk of further spill-over effects. The attacks against the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its inhabitants continue. We deplore the relentless shelling of Sarajevo, the bombardment of Dubrovnik and other cities and the continuous fighting, which has been made more destructive by the use of the air force and heavy weaponry by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). We similarly deplore the persecution of members of various ethnic groups, including forced resettlement of populations based on ethnicity.

3. All parties to the conflict have contributed in their own way to the present state of affairs but the main responsibility falls on the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro and the JNA. The pattern of clear, gross and uncorrected

violations of CSCE commitments by the authorities in Belgrade and by the JNA is now firmly established.

4. We call on the parties to resume immediately the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina which remains the only forum for a positive solution to the problems of that republic. Moreover, we call on all parties concerned to cooperate for the success of the EC peace conference in order to achieve a comprehensive solution to the problems of that republic. Moreover, we call on all parties concerned to cooperate for the success of the EC peace conference in order to achieve a comprehensive solution that takes care of the legitimate interests of all parties. We declare expressly that unilateral changes in borders, territory, or populations achieved through force, violence, or *faits accomplis* are unacceptable. We insist that those elements of the JNA and Croatian Army now in Bosnia-Herzegovina must either be subject to the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina or else withdrawn or disarmed and disbanded. We call also for the dissolution of paramilitary forces currently in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the establishment of full control by the legitimate Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina over all its territory and over all the armed forces on it. We demand that the JNA and other parties to the conflict refrain from destroying the diverse historical, religious and cultural heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

5. To facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to all the victims of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular through the establishment of an air bridge, we call for safe and secure access under international supervision to airports in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We urge all states to respond to appeals for humanitarian assistance.

DOCUMENT 10

STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL IN OSLO, NORWAY 5 June 1992

1. We, the Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the countries participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council have gathered in Oslo to consult on the major security issues, including regional conflicts as well as nuclear weapons issues, in the area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok and to deepen further our cooperation, building on our two previous meetings. We are pleased today to welcome Georgia as a member of this Council. We also welcome the membership of Albania in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

2. It is only six months since our first meeting but already the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has proved its value as a forum for closer cooperation and consultation among our countries, contributing to our own and to international security. We note with satisfaction the ongoing implementation of our Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation. Regular meetings of cooperation partners with the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate bodies on security and related issues - including political, military, economic, scientific and environmental subjects - and exchanges on concrete problems such as defence conversion and civil/military coordination of air traffic management, enable us to pursue effective action to achieve our shared goals. Practical cooperation on defence matters is expanding. However, this represents only a beginning and much remains to be done. The experience gained will enable us to develop further our cooperation and to respond to specific needs of our countries.

3. Our Council contributes to the building of a new security architecture based on cooperative relations among states and a network of mutually rein-

forcing institutions. In support of the CSCE process and other institution, we will work to increase stability and confidence and to promote transparency. Frameworks of regional cooperation will also be important in enhancing the CSCE process. We reaffirm the importance of efforts to create modern, competitive market economies with a view to overcoming grave economic disparities and thus enhancing our common security and stability. We are striving to reduce armed forces and armaments to minimum levels consistent with legitimate security requirements and to ensure democratic control of armed forces.

4. The CSCE has a vital role to play in achieving a more peaceful and cooperative Europe. We are committed to working with all CSCE participating states to ensure that the Helsinki Summit opens a significant new chapter in the CSCE process. In this respect, we attach particular importance to enhancing the CSCE's operational and institutional capacity to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes, including peacekeeping, making use of the potential and support of CSCE countries and other organisations which are prepared to contribute. In this context, we have noted with interest yesterday's statement by Alliance Foreign Ministers in paragraph 11 regarding support for peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE.

5. Regional conflicts and ethnic tensions have not yet been eliminated from the CSCE area. These are of direct concern to us and must be resolved by peaceful means in accordance with international law and principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE documents.

We deplore the continuing resort to force and resulting loss of life, as well as the suffering and extensive destruction in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, of which the tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is yet another example. Although all parties to the conflict have contributed in their own way to the present state of affairs, the main responsibility falls on the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) including the JNA. We express our strong support for the efforts of the UN, the CSCE and the European Community to end the hostilities and to find a negotiated solution to the crisis. We trust that Resolution 757 approved by the United Nations

Security Council will convey the determination of the international community to pursue such objectives.

We are also profoundly disturbed by the escalation in the fighting, loss of life, suffering and extensive destruction in the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh and beyond. We welcome the decision to convene the CSCE Conference in Minsk as well as all steps - such as the emergency preliminary meeting in Rome - designed to ensure its success, and the actions taken in the framework of the CSCE to bring about a peaceful solution to this conflict. We will contribute towards this goal and urge all parties concerned to do likewise. We support efforts within the CSCE to agree on arrangements for the timely introduction of civilian observers to the region to contribute to the peace process and we note the readiness of members of our Council to participate in such a mission.

We call on all parties involved in both cases immediately to establish effective ceasefires as fundamental contributions to the negotiation of peaceful solutions. We also call on all parties to facilitate the provision of urgently needed humanitarian assistance to the victims of both conflicts. We stress that any attempt through the use of force to acquire territory, change boundaries or achieve political ends is unacceptable and can only undermine efforts to achieve the lasting, negotiated and peaceful settlements which are essential.

6. Military forces should be stationed on the territory of a foreign state only with the consent of that state. We recognize the importance of establishing soon, in the negotiations underway, a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states.

7. We are deeply concerned by the dangers of nuclear proliferation, including diversion of nuclear materials, and we attach the greatest importance to the safety and security of nuclear weapons. In this context, we stress the vital role played by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency in preventing the further spread of such weapons and of nuclear-weapons technology and expertise. We therefore reiterate our unequivocal support for the Treaty and undertake to do everything we can to guarantee its integrity and further its objectives. We urge all states which have not yet acceded to it to do so as non-nuclear weapon states without delay and we call

upon all states parties fully to abide by their obligations. With a view to reducing nuclear arsenals, we call for speedy ratification and entry into force of the START Treaty and implementation of other commitments to cut back, transfer and eliminate nuclear forces.

8. The consolidation and implementation of existing arms control, disarmament and confidence-building agreements, and the negotiation of new initiatives in the new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation to be established within the CSCE, are fundamental to the cooperative security process. In support of these aims:

- we welcome agreement on the Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference which will provide the basis for the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, with all the new states within the CFE area of the former Soviet Union as full participants. We note with appreciation the contribution of the High Level Working Group to this successful result. Those of us concerned reaffirm our determination to bring into force the Treaty by the time of the Helsinki Summit Meeting of the CSCE on July 9-10, 1992 and stress the necessity of states parties concerned taking the steps necessary as soon as possible in order to meet this target date;

- we support the determination of the participants in the CFE1A negotiations to reach an agreement to limit the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces in time for the Helsinki Summit;

- we emphasize the importance of prompt and full implementation of the provisions of the Vienna 1992 Document on confidence and security building measures by all CSCE states; it will strengthen stability and promote transparency within the CSCE area;

- we look forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty on Open Skies and adherence to it by interested states which are participating in the CSCE but are not original signatories to the Treaty as provided for by Article XVII of the Treaty and called for in the CSCE Open Skies Declaration of 24th March 1992;

- we urge all states to exercise restraint and responsibility in the field of conventional arms transfers and call on all to submit full relevant data to the UN Register of Arms Transfers.

9. The eradication of chemical weapons is a challenge for all nations. We urge the conclusion this year and early entry into force of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

10. Finland attended this meeting as an observer at its request.

11. We look forward to the next meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Brussels in December 1992.

12. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Kingdom of Norway.

DOCUMENT 11

Text of United Nations Security Council Resolution SR 761-1992

Here is the text of the resolution adopted unanimously by the 15 Security Council members 29 June 1992 sending a battalion of peacekeepers to open Sarajevo's airport

The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, 727 (1991) of 8 January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992, 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992 and 760 (1992) of 18 June 1992,

Noting the considerable progress reported by the Secretary-General towards securing the evacuation of Sarajevo airport and its reopening by UNPROFOR and feeling the need to maintain this favourable momentum,

Underlining the urgency of a quick delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs,

1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy immediately additional elements of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with his report dated 6 June 1992 (S-24075);

2. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to comply fully with the agreement of 5 June 1992 and in particular to maintain an absolute and unconditional cease-fire;

3. Appeals to all sides to cooperate fully with UNPROFOR in the reopening of the airport, to exercise the utmost restraint and not to seek any military advantage in this situation;

4. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agencies and organizations and take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel; in the absence of such cooperation, the Security Council does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs;

5. Calls upon all States to contribute to the international humanitarian efforts to Sarajevo and its environs;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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A CONTINUING COMMITMENT: CANADA AND NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY

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A Continuing Commitment: Canada and North Atlantic Security examines these questions and more from academic, governmental, and diplomatic perspectives and in the context of the Canadian government's February 1992 decision to withdraw all of its troops from Europe.

ISBN:0-919769-44-6